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JUN 1 O 2010 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
K CANNON, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
LUIS J. GUZMAN, individually ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
DALE PIERCY, individually and ) 
JENNIFER SUTTON, individually, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
~~~~~~~~~-) 
DALE PIERCY, individually, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
CANYON COUNTY, LUIS GUZMAN, ) 
individually and JENNIFER SUTTON, ) 
individually, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
Case No. CV05-4848 
JENNIFER SUTTON'S REPLY TO DALE 
PIERCY'S RESPONSE TO MOTIONS TO 
RECONSIDER 
JENNIFER SUTTON'S REPLY TO DALE PIERCY'S RESPONSE TO MOTIONS TO 
RECONSIDER- 1 
1343 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Defendant Jennifer Sutton ("Sutton") respectfully refers this Court to the Factual History 
and Procedural Background section set forth in the Memorandum in Support of Defendant 
Jennifer Sutton's Motion for Reconsideration filed July 30, 2009. In general, Sutton agrees with 
the summary factual and procedural background as set forth in Dale Piercy's ("Piercy") Response 
to Motions to Reconsider except as set forth herein. 
On or about October 9, 2007, the District Court entered its Order Denying Defendant 
Percy's [sic] Motion for Summary Judgment, Joining Canyon County, and Holding all Other 
Motions in Abeyance Until the Herd District's Validity is Resolved ("Order Denying Defendant 
Piercy's Motion for Summary Judgment"). Therein, the District Court denied Piercy's motion 
for summary judgment on the validity of the herd districts on the grounds there existed genuine 
issues of material fact. (Order Denying Defendant Piercy's Motion for Summary Judgment at 
23.) The Court further concluded the validity of the herd districts was a legal issue that required 
resolution prior to litigating the damages issues. (Id at 22.) To fully resolve the herd district 
issues, the Court further concluded it was necessary to join Canyon County as a party. (Id. at 22-
24.) The Court directed Sutton's counsel "to prepare and serve the necessary pleadings to join 
Canyon County ... as a third-party defendant."1 (Id. at 24.) The Order Denying Defendant 
Piercy's Motion for Summary Judgment did not address Sutton and Plaintiff/Defendant Luis J. 
1 Procedurally, joining Canyon County as a third-party defendant was not entirely proper. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 14(a) provides a defendant may bring in a third-party "who is or 
may be liable to such third-party plaintiff for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against the third-
party plaintiff." Canyon County was not, nor could it have been liable to Piercy or Sutton for 
Guzman's tort claim. 
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Guzman's ("Guzman") affirmative defenses of equitable estoppel, estoppel by laches or quasi-
estoppel. 
Guzman, joined by Sutton, moved the Court to reconsider its Order Denying Defendant 
Piercy's Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds the Court failed to consider the estoppel 
arguments. Contrary to statements made in Piercy's Response to Motions to Reconsider, Guzman 
and Sutton did not move for summary judgment on the estoppel/laches defenses, nor did the 
Court consider the motion to reconsider as a motion for summary judgment. 
On April 30, 2008, the Court entered its Order on Motion to Reconsider, denying 
"assertion of the doctrine of quasi estoppel and the doctrine of laches against Defendant Piercy's 
attempt to invalidate Canyon County's Herd District ordinances." (Order on Motion to 
Reconsider at p. 20) 
Pursuant to the Order Denying Defendant Piercy's Motion for Summary Judgment, on 
October 15, 2007, Sutton's counsel filed the Action for Declaratory Judgment, adding Canyon 
County as a defendant and requesting the Court determine the validity of the herd districts. On 
November 8, 2007, Canyon County filed its Answer of Third Party Defendant Canyon County, 
Idaho. As pleaded, the Action for Declaratory Judgment did not require an Answer from Sutton, 
Guzman, or Piercy. 
On March 27, 2008, the Court entered the Order From Scheduling Conference Setting 
Bench Trial On Challenge to Canyon County Herd Districts ("Scheduling Order"), setting the 
trial on the validity of the 1982 herd district ordinance for a two day bench trial commencing 
October 8, 2008. Therein the Court ordered the parties to submit an amended stipulation 
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regarding various scheduling dates, including setting the deadlines for the filing of amendments 
or the joinder of parties. 
On April 11, 2008, the parties filed an Amended Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning 
which included a provision requiring all amendments to pleadings or joinder of parties be filed 
120 days before trial. 
The parties to the declaratory judgment action were not properly aligned. Although 
Sutton's counsel filed the original declaratory judgment action by order of the trial court, it was 
actually Piercy that was seeking a determination from the court regarding the validity of the herd 
district. Approximately one month before trial, but after the amendment cut-off date, the parties 
agreed to realign. As a procedural house-keeping measure, on September 3, 2008, the parties 
entered into a Stipulation to Amend Pleadings and Scheduling ("Stipulation"). Therein, the 
parties agreed to "waive any defenses they may have regarding the timing of the filing of Mr. 
Piercy's Amended Action for Declaratory Relief' with regard to the amendment cut-off date. 
(Stipulation at pg. 2.) The Stipulation further provided "[i]t is the purpose and intent of this 
stipulation to simplify the procedural posture of the case and to have the pleadings accurately 
reflect the positions of the different parties." (Id.) 
The Amended Action for Declaratory Relief was subsequently filed on or about 
September 11, 2008. On or about September 23, 2008, Sutton filed her Answer to Amended 
Action for Declaratory Relief, asserting the affirmative defenses of estoppel by !aches, estoppel 
by waiver, equitable estoppel, and statute of limitations pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-224. This 
JENNIFER SUTTON'S REPLY TO DALE PIERCY'S RESPONSE TO MOTIONS TO 
RECONSIDER- 4 
1346 
was Sutton's first opportunity to file a responsive pleading on the issues set forth in the 
declaratory relief action. 
The bench trial on the declaratory judgment action occurred as scheduled on October 8, 
2008. Sutton attempted to again raise the equitable defenses of !aches and estoppel at trial, and 
to present evidence on the same. The Court did not allow the defenses, and denied the admission 
of evidence. Sutton's Post-Trial Memorandum was filed on December 3, 2008. Because of the 
Court's ruling on the equitable defenses, the equitable issues of estoppel and !aches were not 
briefed in the Post-trial Memorandum. However, Sutton did fully brief the issue of whether 
Piercy's challenge to the 1982 herd district ordinance was barred by the statute of limitations. 
(Post-Trial Memorandum at pp. 5-15.) 
On January 21, 2009, the Court issued its Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment in Bifurcated Portion of Trial ("Judgment"), holding the 1982 herd district ordinance 
invalid. The Court's Judgment failed to address the equitable defenses of !aches or estoppel, nor 
did it address the statute of limitations defense. 
On July 30, 2009, Sutton filed a Motion for Reconsideration, and was later joined by 
Guzman. The Court entered its Order on Motion to Reconsider on December 7, 2009. 
Consistent with the Court's Order on Motion to Reconsider, Guzman and Sutton presented 
testimony from Paul Axness, the insurance adjuster that investigated a 2001 accident between 
two vehicles and Piercy's livestock in the same area where this accident occurred. 
As further ordered by the Court in its order dated December 7, 2009, a hearing is 
currently set for June 14, 2010, for purposes of adjudicating the "validity of the 1982 Canyon 
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County herd district in light of the asserted statute of limitations and estoppel defenses." (Order 
on Motion to Reconsider, p. 9). In preparation for the hearing, the parties have filed additional 
briefing on the affirmative defenses at issue. 
Additionally, Guzman filed a motion to dismiss and noticed the same for hearing on June 
14, 2010. Guzman's motion is based on a legislative change to Idaho Code§ 31-857 that 
prevents a challenge to the proceedings or jurisdictional steps preceding an order creating a herd 
district seven years after the date of the order. See Idaho Code§ 31-857. Suttonjoins in 
Guzman's motion to dismiss. Piercy has failed to timely respond to the motion to dismiss. 
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
A. Defendant Piercy's Challenge to the 1982 Herd District is Barred by the Statute of 
Limitations Pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-224. 
Idaho Code§ 5-224 bars Piercy from challenging the validity of the 1982 herd district 
ordinance. This statute of limitation defense2 was timely raised, properly plead and preserved for 
trial. A decision on the validity of the herd district will be binding on all parties. Sutton did not 
waive this defense by entering into the Stipulation. 
1. The Court's Ruling on the Validity of the Herd District Will be Binding on 
All Parties Despite Canyon County's Failure to Plead the Statute of 
Limitations Defense. 
It is important to review why Canyon County was brought into this lawsuit as a necessary 
party. In the Order Denying Defendant Piercy's Motion for Summary Judgment dated October 9, 
2007, the Judge stated "[t]he fact that the proponent of herd districts on Canyon County is absent 
2 Sutton agrees Idaho Code§ 5-221 is not applicable to the facts of this case and will not 
be raised at oral argument. 
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from this litigation exacerbates the lack of resolution. Hence, Canyon County should be joined 
as a third-party defendant, though not for the purpose of liability. Rather, Canyon County needs 
to be a part of this litigation for the limited purpose of fully developing the validity of herd 
districts in the area Piercy's bull escaped and in the area where the collision with the bull took 
place." (Pg. 23). Thus, Canyon County was added to the lawsuit for the limited purpose of 
providing information. Furthermore, Canyon County's addition to this lawsuit ensures the 
County will be bound by the Court's determination on the validity of the herd district ordinance. 
It does not matter that Canyon County did not plead or has not argued the statute of 
limitations defense because Canyon County will be bound by the Court's determination in this 
case. This case is procedurally complex and Canyon County's role in the litigation is expressly 
limited pursuant to the Court's order. The herd district ordinance is either valid or invalid. It 
would not make sense to allow the Court to allow the ordinance to be valid as applied to one 
party and invalid as applied to another. 
2. Sutton Did Not Waive the Statute of Limitations Defense. 
a. Sutton timely asserted the statute of limitations defense. 
Pursuant to the Order Denying Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, on October 
15, 2007, Sutton's counsel filed the Action for Declaratory Judgment, adding Canyon County as 
a defendant and requesting the Court to determine the validity of the herd district ordinance. 
Procedurally, Sutton could not have filed an answer to that original Action for Declaratory Relief 
because the complaint was solely for the purpose of bringing Canyon County into the lawsuit. 
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Therefore, the first opportunity to plead the statute of limitations defense was in the answer to 
Piercy's Amended Action for Declaratory Relief filed on or about September 11, 2008. 
Piercy incorrectly contends that in order to have avoided waiving the statute oflimitations 
defense, Sutton would have had to plead the statute of limitations defense in her response to 
Piercy's original motion for summary judgment. A response to a motion for summary judgment 
is not a pleading. Furthermore, Piercy's affirmative defense challenging the validity of the herd 
district ordinance is not a cause of action requiring a responsive pleading. Again, the first 
opportunity to plead the statute of limitations defense was in the answer to Piercy' s Amended 
Action for Declaratory Relief filed on or about September 11, 2008. 
Finally, the statute of limitations argument has been fully briefed for over a year, and 
Piercy has had adequate time to respond to the arguments; therefore, Piercy has suffered no 
prejudice. 
b. Sutton did not waive the statute of limitations defense by entering into the 
Stipulation. 
Contrary to Piercy's assertions, the purpose and intent of the Stipulation was not to waive 
the statute of limitations defense; rather, it was to waive any defenses regarding the timing of the 
filing of the Amended Action for Declaratory Relief with regard to the amendment cut-off date in 
the Amended Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning. As stated above, the parties filed the 
Amended Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning on April 11, 2008, which included a provision 
requiring all amendments to pleadings or joinder of parties be filed 120 days before trial, which 
was set to commence on October 8, 2008. Procedurally, the declaratory judgment action should 
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have been filed by Piercy since Piercy was seeking a determination from the Court regarding the 
validity of the herd district ordinance. Approximately one month before trial, but after the 
amendment cut-off date, the parties agreed to realign. As a house-keeping measure, on 
September 3, 2008, the parties entered into a Stipulation, and in part, agreed to "waive any 
defenses they may have regarding the timing of the filing of Mr. Piercy's Amended Action for 
Declaratory Relief." (Stipulation at p. 2.) This waiver only related to any defenses Sutton may 
have regarding the timing of the filing of the Amended Action for Declaratory Relief with regard 
to the amendment cut-off date. 
Sutton did not intentionally waive her right to raise the statute of limitations defense, or 
any other defenses she may have to Piercy's challenge to the herd district ordinance. 
A waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known 
right and "the party asserting the waiver 'must show that he acted 
in reasonable reliance upon it and that he thereby has altered his 
position to his detriment.' 
Ada County Highway Dist. v. Total Success Investments, LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 370, 179 P.3d 323, 
333 (2008) (additional citations omitted). Furthermore, Piercy has not presented any evidence 
indicating that he reasonably relied upon Sutton's alleged waiver of her statute of limitations 
defense or that he altered his position to his detriment. 
To follow Piercy's logic, the waiver contained in the Stipulation would also preclude 
Sutton from arguing her laches defense, which Sutton has argued from the beginning and 
obviously had no intention of waiving. Counsel cannot take the broad language contained in the 
Stipulation meant to waive any defenses arising as a result of the late filing of the Amended 
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Action for Declaratory Relief and construe it as a waiver of all defenses to Piercy's challenge to 
the herd district ordinance. Sutton did not intend to waive any defenses to Piercy's substantive 
arguments, nor was such a broad waiver contemplated by the parties when the Stipulation was 
executed. The statute of limitations defense was timely plead in the answer to the Amended 
Action for Declaratory Relief, and the issues were fully briefed. Piercy is attempting to take 
unfair advantage of the language contained in the Stipulation to assert Sutton waived the statute 
of limitations defense when that was not the agreement that was made by counsel. 
The only purpose of the Stipulation was to allow Piercy to amend at a later date. The 
Court should interpret the Stipulation in light of its purpose. 
3. Idaho Code § 5-224 Applies To the Facts of This Case. 
Idaho Code§ 5-224 applies to a challenge of an ordinance. See Canady v. Coeur d'Alene 
Lumber Co., 21Idaho77, 120 P. 830, 831 (1911). Piercy challenged the validity of the order 
creating the 1982 herd district on a number of procedural grounds; however, Piercy has not 
challenged the constitutionality of the order. Therefore, Piercy's examples of unjust voting laws 
and Brown v. Board of Education are inapposite. 
Contrary to Piercy's assertions, he did have notice of the order creating the herd district. 
On December 20, 1982, the Idaho Press Tribune published the following notice: 
RESOLUTION PASSED REGARDING HERD DISTRICTS IN 
CANYON COUNTY 
The following Resolution was considered and adopted by the 
Canyon County Board of Commissioners on the 2nd day of 
December, 1982: Upon motion of Commissioner Hobza and the 
second by Commissioner Bledsoe the Board resolves as follows: 
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That because of the confusion that exists due to the over-lapping 
lines of herd districts and open range and because over ninety-five 
(95%) percent of the area of Canyon County is already designated a 
herd district the Board will issue an order designating all of 
Canyon County to be herd district as of December 14, 1982. 
Motion Carried Unanimously. 
At the least, Piercy is charged with having constructive knowledge of the order 
establishing the herd district since 1982, and could have timely challenged the order. Piercy 
should not be rewarded for sleeping on his rights and choosing to challenge the order establishing 
the herd district only after being potentially liable for an injury causing accident. 
B. Defendant Piercy is Estopped from Challenging the Validity of the Order 
Establishing the 1982 Herd District. 
As noted above, any decision as to the validity of the herd district ordinance will be 
binding on the County regardless of the defenses and arguments raised or not raised by the 
County. Any other result would defy logic. 
1. The Testimony of Paul Axness Is Relevant To the Estoppel and Laches 
Defenses. 
Based on the testimony of Paul Axness, the Court may reasonably conclude Piercy was 
aware the geographic area at issue in this lawsuit was in a herd district. As an insurance adjuster, 
Mr. Axness's duties included investigating, evaluating and concluding claims. (Affidavit of 
Joshua S. Evett in Support of Defendant Jennifer Sutton's Motion for Reconsideration ("Evett 
Aff."), ~ 3, Ex. A, 7:1-2.) As part of investigating claims, Mr. Axness spoke with his insureds 
and documented his file. (Id at~ 3, Ex. A, 7:13-15; 8:10-12.) Admittedly, Mr. Axness had no 
independent recollection of adjusting the 2001 motor vehicle accident between Piercy's livestock 
and two vehicles. However, Mr. Axness learned there was no open range at the location where 
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the accident occurred from somewhere. (Id. at., if 3, Ex. A, 21:11-14.) Based on Mr. Axness's 
notes, and the indication therein that he had just spoken with Piercy, it is reasonable to conclude 
Mr. Axness learned the area was not open range from Piercy. (Id. at ii 3, Ex. A., 23:21-25; 24:3-
8; 27:22-28:2; 35:1-15.) In fact, there could be no other reasonable source for this information. 
Mr. Axness's testimony indicates Piercy was aware the 2001 accident occurred in an area 
·that was not open range. Combined with Piercy's deposition testimony wherein he admits to 
being a cattle rancher in the area where the accident occurred for fifty years, and testifying that to 
his knowledge all livestock in Canyon County are not allowed to roam free and are contained by 
fences and/or natural geographic barriers, such as rivers, it is more than reasonable to conclude 
Piercy knew the pasture where the bull escaped from was in a herd district. (Id. at if 4.) 
Furthermore, Piercy's motivations in 2001 differ from this case. At the time of the 2001 
accident the claims were only for property damage; the stakes were much lower than those that 
exist in the current lawsuit. Therefore, the information Piercy provided to Mr. Axness is more 
reliable than statements made to create a defense in this action. 
Finally, Mr. Axness's testimony proves Piercy's insurer paid under Piercy's policy for the 
property damage to the vehicles and paid for the loss of Piercy's livestock, which the insurer 
would not have done had the accident occurred in an open range area. (Id. at., if 3, Ex. A, 31-34.) 
In sum, there is evidence Piercy knew the subject land was in a herd district. 
2. Sutton has Provided Evidence To Support Her Claim of Estoppel By Laches. 
Estoppel by !aches precludes Piercy from challenging the 1982 herd district ordinance. 
This issue was extensively briefed in Jennifer Sutton's Brief Regarding Defenses on 
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Reconsideration filed June 2, 2010, and is incorporated into this brief. (See Jennifer Sutton's 
Brief Regarding Defenses on Reconsideration, dated June 2, 2010, pgs. 13-19.) 
3. Sutton has Provided Evidence To Support Her Claim of Estoppel or Quasi-
Estoppel. 
As set forth above, pursuant to Mr. Axness's testimony, it is reasonable to conclude 
Piercy told Mr. Axness the area where the 2001 accident occurred was not open range. Now, 
Piercy asserts the area where the subject accident occurred, which is geographically close to 
where the 2001 accident occurred, is open range. Based on Mr. Axness's testimony, Piercy has 
not always believed the pasture in question was open range. 
Furthermore, based on the notice published in the Idaho Press Tribune on December 20, 
1982, Piercy had, at the very least constructive knowledge, if not actual knowledge, the County 
was claiming his land was in a herd district. 
This issue was extensively briefed in Guzman's brief, and is incorporated into this brief. 
(See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff/Defendant Luis Guzman's Motions for 
Reconsideration and Motion to Dismiss, dated May 26, 2010, pgs. 15-22.) 
III. CONCLUSION 
Jennifer Sutton respectfully requests this Court allow the affirmative defenses of estoppel, 
quasi-estoppel, estoppel by !aches, statute of limitations and the statutory amendment to Idaho 
Code§ 31-857, and preclude Dale Piercy's untimely challenge to the validity ofthe 1982 herd 
district ordinance. 
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TH.E COURT: That will be fine. 
MR. PECK: Thank you. 
MR. EVETT: Josh Evett on behalf of Jennifer Sutton. 
MR. WALTON: Tim Walton for plaintiff Guzman. 
MR. ERICSON: Carlton Ericson on behalf of Canyon 
county. 
THE COURT: Okay. If I recall, it was Suttons' - Sutton 
was the one who originally wanted to present this testimony; 
is that correct? 
MR. EVETT: Oh, I suppose so, but I think Mr. Walton is 
going to question Mr. Axness. 
THE COURT: Okay. We will call the witness, and start 
with Mr. Walton and work our way around. 
MR. EVETT: Okay. 
THE COURT: And, Mr. Ericson, do you have enough room 
back there? Do you need a chair up here or not? 
MR. ERICSON: No, Your Honor. That's fine. I can sit 
here. 
THE COURT: Okay. Alright, sir, if you'd come forward 
and raise your right hand and take an oath. 
6 
Thereupon, 
2 PAUL AXNESS, 
3 was duly sworn, was examined, and testified as follows: 
4 
5 THE COURT: Mr. Walton, you may proceed. 
6 MR. WALTON: Thank you, Your Honor. So that I may see 
7 the witness, can I come around this way? 
8 THE COURT: Yes. 
9 
10 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
11 QUESTIONS BY MR. WALTON: 
12 Q. Good morning, Mr. Axness. 
13 A. Good morning. 
14 Q. Would you state your name for the record. 
15 A. My name is Paul Axness. 
16 Q. What's your job now? 
17 A. I have the best job now - I am now retired. 
18 Q. How long have you been retired? 
19 A. Four years. 
20 Q. Before you retired, what did you do? 
21 A. I worked for Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance Company in 
22 the claims department. 
23 Q. How long did you work for Mutual of Enumclaw? 
24 A. 18 years. 
25 Q. What did you do for them? 
7 8 
A. It would be the investigation, evaluation, A. Could you repeat that? 
2 conclusion of claims. 
3 Q. Would your job title commonly be known as insurance 
4 adjuster? 
5 A. Sure. 
6 Q. How did you refer to your job title? 
7 A. I think we are called claims representatives, but 
8 claims adjuster would be the ... 
9 Q. Is an apt description? 
o A. Sure. 
Q. Okay. Did your duties include investigating claims? 
2 A. Yes, it did. 
3 Q. In the course of investigating claims, did you 
i commonly talk to your insureds? 
A. Oh, yes. 
Q. Did you do things like talk to the claimants? 
A. Sure. 
Q. And a claimant would be somebody who had a claim 
against your insured? 
A. Right. 
Q. Did you do things like review police reports 
pertaining to incidents? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Would you generally gather information pertaining to 
a claim from other people? 
i No. CV-2005-4848 
2 Q. Yes. Did your job generally entail gathering 
3 information pertaining to a claim from other people? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. Did you have a law library that you used? 
6 A. No. 
7 Q. If you had a legal issue, did you consult with a 
8 lawyer? 
9 A. We would. 
10 Q. When you adjusted a claim -- let me rephrase. When 
11 you investigated a claim, did you document your file? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. Why would you do that? 
14 A. Just so -- you couldn't always recall everything, 
15 you would want to document your investigation. 
16 Q. So that if somebody came back nine years later, you 
17 could try to recall how things happened at the time you 
18 adjusted the claim? 
19 A. Sure, based on review of the file. 
20 Q. Would you authorize payment of claims? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. Would those payments sometimes be to your own 
23 insured? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 Q. That would be a first party claim? 
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THE COURT: It is leading. 
2 MR. \A/AL TON: Yes, it is. 
3 THE COURT: Do you want to try again, Mr. Walton? 
4 MR. WALTON: I will do my best. Thanks, Judge. 
5 Q. BY MR. WALTON: You wrote in your file, "no open 
6 range." 
7 A. I wrote, "zero open range," that's right. 
8 Q. Zero open range. Did that mean to you that there 
9 was no open range at the location of this incident? 
10 A. I think that's fair, yes. 
11 Q. Did that mean -- the fact that you wrote that entry 
12 in your file, does that tell you that you must have gained 
13 that information from somewhere? 
14 A. From somewhere, yes. 
15 Q. Then you write, "call Talsma." Who is Tolsma? 
16 A. A body shop. 
17 Q. Okay. So we have a call on October 12 to 
18 Mr. Piercy, and you document it? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. The next call you document is a call to Talsma, a 
21 body shop? 
22 A. Yes. 
!3 Q. You wrote in your file, no open range between the 
!4 time - within the time frame of when you called Piercy and 
!5 when you called Tolsma? 
23 
you that a couple of calves got out and got through the fence 
2 after being weaned? 
3 A. Right. 
4 Q. Then there is a "- no open range"? 
5 A. Right. 
6 Q. You interpreted that"-" to be significant, and to 
7 have interrupted the phone call with Piercy? 
8 A. Yeah. 
9 Q. Okay. But the next five, six words, you have, 
o "call Tolsma - Hansen pd total"; correct? 
A. That's right. 
2 Q. Yet, that is not a new phone call, that is one phone 
call; correct? 
4 A. I assume that would be, yeah. 
Q. Okay. So it may well have been one phone call that 
you had with Mr. Piercy where he told you two calves got out, 
and that there was no open range; correct? 
MR. PECK: Objection; leading. 
THE COURT: He can answer the question. 
THE WITNESS: Can you repeat that again? 
Q. BY MR. WALTON: It may well have been one phone call 
where you called Mr. Piercy, and he said two calves got out 
through the fence a~er being weaned, and there was no open 
range? 
A. It could be. 
l No. CV-2005-4848 
22 
A. That's rig 
2 Q. Let's go down to the next line where it says, 
3 "Hansen pd total." Is it correct to say that that means that 
4 the Hansen vehicle was totaled by the wreck? 
5 A. Right. 
6 Q. Okay. Would that have been per Talsma? 
7 A. I believe it would be. 
8 Q. Okay. Do you see where it says, "call Tolsma -"? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. And then "Hansen pd total"? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. So within the call with Tolsma, you learned that 
13 Hansen's vehicle was totaled? 
14 A. Right. 
15 Q. The reason I think - I am taking a little time on 
16 that is because earlier you said -- do you see where it says, 
17 "two calves got through fence after being weaned - no open 
18 range"? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. And you interpreted the "- no open range" to mean 
21 some new call or something; correct? 
22 A. I don't know what you mean. 
23 Q. Let me rephrase. 
24 A. Okay. 
25 Q. On October 12, you called Mr. Piercy, and he told 
24 
Q. Okay. 
2 A. All I can rely on is what is here. 
3 Q. Right. In fact, when you make a call, you document 
4 that you made the call? 
5 A. Correct. 
6 Q. And you didn't document a new call when you wrote, 
7 "zero open range"? 
8 A. Right. 
9 Q. Let's keep reading. After you write, "Hansen pd 
1 o total - ", what do you write there, sir? 
11 A. "Refer to John." 
12 Q. Who is John? 
13 A. John would be an auto appraiser in our office. 
14 Q. So John would go confirm that the Hansen car was a 
15 total loss? 
16 A. Right, he would settle it then. 
17 Q. And then your next entry, "call from Shane at 
18 Enterprise"; right? 
19 A. That's right. 
20 Q. That's just to confirm that Ms. Hansen had rented a 
21 vehicle at a certain rate per day, and so forth? 
22 A. That's right. 
23 Q. Let me get to that in a second. But that rental 
24 rate was fine with you, is what you wrote in your file? 
25 A. I assume, yeah. 
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i 1 Q. Because you said it was okay; r 
2 A. Right. 
3 Q. And then you authorized five additional days at that 
4 rate? 
5 A. That's what it says, yeah. 
6 Q. To Ms. Hansen? 
7 A. Yeah, authorized, I guess, for the car rental five 
8 additional days, yes. Right. 
9 Q. Then continuing on through this October 12 work, you 
10 note in your file that Mutual of Enumclaw insures Don Allen; 
11 right? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. And that that was the second property damage claim 
14 pertaining to this incident; correct? 
15 A. Right. 
16 Q. And that Scott in your office was handling that 
17 second claim. That's the next thing you write there on 
18 October 12; right? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. And then the next entry, "call Allen," and then a 
21 phone number. That just documents that you attempted to 
~2 reach Mr. Allen by telephone? 
~3 A. Right. 
~4 Q. And that you left a message on his recorder to call 
!5 you back; right? 
27 
Q. Okay. What's the next? 
2 A. Car totaled from Tolsma. I didn't say how I found 
3 that out. Maybe I called Tolsma. I don't know. 
4 It says, 1985 Dodge Aries, advised her that John 
5 will inspect and settle. 
6 Q. So, would you interpret that actually now that you 
7 have read that whole note, does it mean to you that you got a 
8 call from claimant, that she told you that the car was at 
9 Tolsma, that the car was totaled, that it was a 1985 Dodge 
o Aries, and that you told her that John in your office will 
inspect and settle? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. The thing I want to mention right there and visit 
4 with you about is, in between all of those little notes, 
call from claimant- car at Tolsma - car totaled, 1985 Dodge 
Aries - advised her that John will inspect and settle. That 
was all one phone call, was it not? 
A. I assume it would be, yes. 
Q. But you used the dashes in between to separate 
subject matters; correct? 
A. Yeah, I think so. 
Q. So you may have used that dash on the October 12th 
visit, then, when Piercy told you a couple of calves got 
through his fence after being weaned - no open range -- you 
may have used that dash to separate subject matters in your 
l No. CV-2005-4848 
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A. Right. 
2 Q. And then on October 15, does that just document --
3 well, just tell me what that says, if you would? 
4 A. October 15, returned call to second claimant, 
5 Linda Hansen, and then her phone number. Apparently, that's 
6 an extension of her's, "#402, leave voice mail, call from 
7 claimant, car at Tolsma, car is totaled." 
8 Q. Does that all pertain to Linda Hansen's claim for 
9 damage, then? 
10 A. I assume it does. 
11 Q. That's your handwriting; right? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. Is that how you would interpret your notes? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. Okay. So Linda Hansen had called you, and you 
16 returned her call and left her a voice mail, is that what 
17 that says? 
18 A. Right. Returned call to her, yes. 
19 Q. And then the next entry under October 15, it says 
20 call from claimant. 
21 A. October 15? 
22 Q. We are on the second line of the October 15 entry, 
23 begins with "leave voice mail.'' 
24 A. Leave voice mail, call from claimant, which I assume 
25 would be Linda Hansen. 
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phone call with Mr. Piercy; right? 
2 A. Could be, yes. 
3 Q. Below the October 15 entry, you have written, 
4 "Hansen vehicle = total loss $1,275." Does that mean that 
5 the value of the vehicle was 1,275 bucks? 
6 A. It is, but that's not my handwriting on there. 
7 Q. Okay. But that's what you would understand that to 
8 be? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. What does that say below that? 
11 A. First report. 
12 Q. What does that mean? 
13 A. That means whoever it was made a first report to the 
14 home office to establish reserves. 
15 Q. In other words, when you say 'establish reserves,' 
16 that means you put a number on what you think you are going 
17 to end up paying out total on this? 
18 A. Exactly. 
19 Q. And that's done for accounting purposes for 
20 insurance companies? 
21 A. Sure. 
22 Q. Then your next entry, is that your handwriting on 
23 November 5? 
24 A. It is, yes. 
25 Q. What do you write there? 
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A. It says, "received APD," which 1 ~property 
2 damage, "rental bill." 
3 Q. Okay. So that would have been one of the claimants 
4 had rented a car, and you got a bill for it; correct? 
5 A. That's right. 
6 Q. And then on November 13, what does that say? 
7 A. (reading:) Received auto property damage final bill, 
a issue checks. 
9 Q. Okay. What is that next entry? 
10 A. It says, close file. 
11 Q. What's the November 14 entry say? 
12 A. November 14, received bill for tires, discussed with 
13 John, wheel alignment, wheel and tire. 
14 Q. My page is cut off at the bottom. 
15 A. I think it probably says, called claimant and 
16 conclude, but I don't know. 
17 Q. So one of the claimants had some follow-up matters 
18 to resolve in terms of tires, and so forth? 
19 A. Right. 
w Q. Okay. Let's go to the next page of the Exhibit 1. 
!1 Do you see the January 3 entry? 
!2 A. Right. 
!3 Q. What does that say? 
!4 A. It says, (reading:) Call from Merce at Tolsma -
!5 Hansen pd, auto still there - call Rick at Barger Mattson, 
31 . 
A. Right. 
2 Q. Okay. And then on January 7, what happened? 
3 A. Discuss with John, okay to pay Westphal estimate, 
4 issue check. 
5 Q. Now, go to the last two pages of Exhibit 1 -- last 
6 three pages, excuse me, what are these pages? 
7 A. These would be copies of the checks that were issued 
B on this. 
9 Q. So check No. 1, does it show that Mutual of Enumclaw 
o paid Nancy Allen $426.47? 
A. Right. 
Q. That would be under Mr. Piercy's policy; correct? 
A. That's right. 
Q. Because it shows insured, Dale Piercy, on the check; 
right? 
A. Right. 
Q. And check No. 2 shows Mutual of Enumclaw paid 
430 bucks to Barger Mattson? 
A. That's right. 
Q. Under Mr. Piercy's policy again? 
A. Right. 
Q. Presumably for storage? 
A. Let's see. (Reading:) Advance tow and storage 
charges, right. 
Q. Okay. And then check No. 3 was 128 bucks to 
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will check and ca 
2 Call from Nancy Allen, motor mounts on their car 
3 needed to be replaced from accident per Westphal. 
4 She will forward estimate, and I will review with 
5 John. 
6 Call from Rick at Barger. He has taken care of 
7 salvage problem. Received -- whatever that is. Is it a fax? 
8 I don't know. I don't know what that would be. 
9 Q. That's okay. Mr. Axness, just review, in your own 
10 words, what that was all about? 
11 A. We got a call from Merce at Tolsma Auto. I think I 
12 testified earlier that Tolsma Auto had one or both of the 
13 cars there, and it was still sitting there. It hadn't been 
14 moved, because it was totaled, and it builds up charges. 
15 Q. Usually when a car is totaled, you move it to an 
16 auto salvager, like Barger Mattson, so you can sell the car 
17 to them and quit the storage charges? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. And for some reason, that hadn't been done? 
20 A. That's right. 
21 Q. Okay. And then Nancy Allen, presumably Don Allen's 
22 wife, had called and complained that she thought there was 
23 more damage to the motor mount from the accident? 
24 A. Right. 
25 Q. And you were going to take a look at that? 
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Nancy Allen under Mr. Piercy's policy; correct? 
2 A. Right, $128. 
3 Q. For property damage to the Allen's 1991 Chrysler? 
4 A. Right. 
5 Q. Okay. And then if we go to the next page, you 
6 paid -- Mutual of Enumclaw paid $1,215 to Dale Piercy; 
7 correct? 
8 A. Right. 
9 Q. For what? 
10 A. The two calves valued at - it shows there 675 pounds 
11 at 90 cents a pound. 
12 Q. And then the next check was for $1,479.30 to Art's 
13 Service; correct? 
14 A. That's right. 
15 Q. Again, paid under Mr. Piercy's policy? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. Do you know what that is for, can you tell? 
1B A. It just says an invoice for Nancy Allen. 
19 Q. So that would have been to repair Nancy Allen's 
20 vehicle? 
21 A. I assume, yes. 
22 Q. Okay. And then the next check is for $425.09 to 
23 Enterprise Rent-A-Car? 
24 A. Right. 
25 Q. Under Mr. Piercy's policy? 
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A. Yes. 
2 Q. That \AJOu!d have been foi a rental vehicle for one of 
3 the two, either Ms. Hansen or Ms. Allen; correct? 
4 A. That's right. 
5 Q. And then the last page of the exhibit, a check for 
6 $150 payable to Tracy Hansen under Mr. Piercy's policy; 
7 correct? 
8 A. Right. 
9 Q. And, again, that would be for some type of damage 
10 sustained by Hansen as a result of this incident? 
11 A. Right. 
12 Q. And then the final check is $1,125 payable to 
13 Tracy Hansen under Mr. Piercy's policy; is that correct? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. And, again, that would be -- well, you have got for 
16 the total loss of her Dodge Aries; correct? 
17 A. That's right. 
18 Q. And you were holding back 150 bucks until she gave 
19 you the title to the vehicle? 
zo A. That's right. 
?1 Q. So, would you conclude from all of this that Mutual 
!2 of Enumclaw paid under Mr. Piercy's policy for all of the 
!3 damages caused to the Allens and the Hansens? 
!4 A. Right. 
!5 Q. And would you also conclude that Mutual of Enumclaw 
35 
Q. When you talk to insureds about claims involving 
2 auto/livestock collisions, was it your practice when you were 
3 an adjuster with Mutual of Enumclaw to discuss with the 
3-3-10 
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paid Mr. Piercy fo .bss of the two calves? 
2 A. Right. 
3 Q. That is how you would handle the claim if the claim 
4 had occurred within a herd district; correct? 
5 MR. PECK: Objection. 
6 MR. WALTON: Let me rephrase. 
7 THE COURT: Foundation is the same. 
8 Q. BY MR. WALTON: Would that suggest to you that you 
9 interpreted -- let me rephrase. 
10 We have already talked about how you need to 
11 determine whether this incident happened within a herd 
12 district or an open range; correct? 
13 A. Right. 
14 Q. And you determined, based on what we have just gone 
15 through, that it happened in which one? 
16 A. I determined that it was not open range. 
17 Q. And that it was? 
18 A. What I am getting to is, it can be an area set aside 
19 for open range. But if they fence them in, it is my 
20 understanding it is no longer open range and, therefore, the 
21 rancher is responsible to keep his cattle off the road. 
22 And all I said here, it was not open range. I made 
23 no reference to any herd district. 
24 Q. You concluded it was not open range; fair? 
25 A. Yes. Yes. 
2 
3 
THE COURT: Mr. Evett? 
MR. EVETT: I have no questions, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Peck? 
36 
4 insureds the distinction between herd district and open range 4 
5 so that the insured would know whether the insurance policy 
6 was going to pay or the insured was going to be paid by the 
7 other guy's insurance? 
B A. I am sure that came up in conversation, yes. 
Q. That's part of what you do when you are talking to 
your insureds? 
A. Right. 
Q. So you feel confident you probably had that 
conversation with Mr. Piercy during the handling of this 
claim? 
A. I would think so. 
Q. Just let me review my notes, and I may be done. 
A. Sure. 
Q. Have you and I ever talked about this claim? 
A. Never. 
Q. Have you talked to Mr. Saetrum's office about this 
claim? 
A. Yes, I did. 
MR. WALTON: Mr. Axness, thank you very much. That's 
all I have. And I apologize for disturbing you for your 
well-earned retirement. 
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5 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
6 QUESTIONS BY MR. PECK: 
7 Q. I am going to be fairly brief, Mr. Axness. I think 
8 you explained yourself fairly well. 
9 So if my understanding is correct at the time of 
10 October 5, 2001, it was your understanding that if the 
11 rancher was involved in an incident that had fenced in his 
12 cows, that that created a situation where there was no longer 
13 open range status? 
14 A. That's right. 
15 Q. And now on your note in your - that we went over in 
16 Exhibit 1, on the, let's see, down at the bottom, MOE, No. 3, 
17 it is your handwritten notes about the call you had with 
18 Mr. Piercy on there, evidently you gained the information 
19 that the cattle --
20 MR. WALTON: Which date are you looking at? 
21 MR. PECK: This is the October 12th call. 
22 MR. WALTON: Thank you. 
23 Q. BY MR. PECK: October 12 call with insured, and it 
24 states that the cattle - or the two calves got through a 
25 fence; is that correct? 
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Page 5 ) Page 7 I I . DALE W. PrERCY, /1k.. prnh~hf,, 1'71 ~t.:--··-L. ---L.-L.I .. '81\ 1980 >vvav1y IL LLUVll1511 J:llVUi:1ULJ V, • 2 first duly.s\v~rn,to tell the truth relating to said 2 Q. And did you teach ag education or did you teach 
3 cause, testified as follows: 3 lots of different stuff? I 4 EXMtflNA TION 4 A. Lots of different stuff. 
5 QUESTIONSBYlVfR. WALTON: 5 Q. Kind of did what substitute teachers do? 
6 Q. Would you state your name for the record, 6 A. Yeah. When they needed you, you went. I 7 please. 7 Q. Did you ever teach ag education? 
8 A. Da.ve Piercy. 8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. Anet what's your age, Mr. Piercy? 9 Q. What is ag education? What kind of topics are I 10 A. 57. IO covered by that discipline? 
11 Q. Where do you reside? 11 A. It covers mechanics and maintenance and 
12 A. Parma, Idaho. 12 farming, cattle. I assume that's the basics. I 13 Q. Give me a little bit of -- what do you do? Let 13 Q. You're married? 
14 me ask you that first. 14 A. Yes. 
15 A . .I'm a farmer and rancher. 15 Q. To Ramona Plaza? I 16 Q. And how long have you been a farmer and a 16 A. Yeah. ~ ' -! 
17 rancher? 17 Q. How do you say that name? 
18 A. Since I was probably seven years old, so 50 18 A. It's Ramona Plaza. 
' 
19 years. 19 Q. As I understand, you were married in May 28, 
20 Q. Where have you farmed and ranched? 20 1994. 
' 
21 A. Parma area. 21 A. Sounds right. 
22 Q. All your life? 22 Q. I wasn't going to ask you the date because I 
23 A. Yes. 23 didn't want to embarrass you if you didn't remember. I 24 Q. Did you go to school? 24 How many kids you got? 
25 A. Yes. 25 A. None. 
\.<;J 
-------·-------------- ··--
Page 6 Page 8 I Q. Where did you go to school? 1 Q. First marriage? 
2 A. In Panna. 2 A. Yes. 
' 
3 Q. Graduated high school? 3 Q. Okay. So you've live -- you lived and grew up 
4 A. Yes. 4 in the Parma area. 
5 Q. And then did you have any post high school 5 A. Yes. I 6 education? 6 Q. Been there all your life essentially. 
7 A. Yes. I graduated the University of Idaho. 7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. What was your study up there? 8 Q. Except you went away to University of Idaho. I 9 A. Agriculture and teaching. 9 A. Yeah. 
IO Q. So did you get a degree in agriculture and 10 Q. Served in the military? 
11 teaching or -- 11 A. Yes. I 12 A. Ag education, yes. 12 Q. And I think I cut you off there. You went to 
13 Q. What does that prepare you for? 13 the University of Idaho and you were going to say 
14 A. Basically to teach. 14 something. I 15 Q. And who do you teach? Who would you teach with 15 A. Well, when I was seven years old, we moved to 
16 that degree is what I really meant to ask? 16 Parma. 
17 A. High school students. 17 Q. Where were you born? I 18 Q. Have you taught? 18 A. Ontario, Oregon. 
19 A. Yes. 19 Q. Do you remember May 20th -- excuse me, 
20 Q. Where have you taught? 20 March 20th, 2005? Which I'll tell you is the date of I 21 A. I substitute taught, in Fruitland, Adrian, 21 this accident that we're here today for. 
22 Parma. 22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. So you never were a full-time teacher? 23 Q. Got a pretty good memory of the events of that I 24 A. No. 24 day? 
25 Q. What years did you substitute teach? 12J68 A. Yes. 
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And it calls for a legal conclusion, 1. Q. (BYMR. WALTON): I r words, outside of the 
2 enclosures. 
3 A. I try to keep my cattle in the pasture. 
4 Q. It's accurate to say, is it not, that you've 
5 been a cattleman in Canyon County for -- what did you 
6 tell me -- 50 years; right? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. **As of March 20th, 2005, all lands upon which 
9 livestock are pastured in Canyon County are lands which 
10 are enclosed by fences; correct? 
11 MS. MEIKLE: Objection to the form of the question 
12 and calls for a legal conclusion. 
13 Counsel, if you're asking him all lands in Canyon 
14 County, you're asking for a legal conclusion. And I'm 
15 going to object --
16 MR. WAL TON: Go ahead. Have at it. 
17 MS. MEIKLE: -- and ask him not to respond. 
18 MR. WALTON: Well, you're going to take a risk 
19 because I'm going to take this before the Court. 
20 So you're instructing him not to respond? 
21 MS. MEIKLE: I'm objecting to --
22 MR. WALTON: You're free to object. 
23 MS. MEIKLE: It calls for a legal conclusion. 
24 , MR. WALTON: It actually doesn't. It's a factual 
25 question. 
MS.ME 
2 "enclosed." 
3 Q. (BY MR. WALTON): Go ahead and answer. 
4 A. Should I answer? 
5 MS. MEIKLE: And, again, I'm going to instruct you 
6 not to, because I think you're asking for a legal 
7 conclusion as to enclosed -- if the livestock are 
8 enclosed within Ada County. 
9 MR. WALTON: First ofall, it's Canyon County. 
. 10 MS. MEIKLE: Canyon County, I'm sorry. 
' 11 MR. WAL TON: I think "enclosed by a fence" is 
' 12 something a third-grader understands, Sandra. It's a 
13 factual issue, and I'll ask the Court to rule on this. 
' 14 We can come back another day, Mr. Piercy, and I'm 
: 15 sorry we'll have to do it. But that's fine. 
: 16 MS. MEIKLE: Are you asking a different question 
! 17 than the one you asked before? 
! 18 MR. WAL TON: I asked what I asked. You objected. 
: 19 You instructed him not to answer. I'm moving on. 
: 20 MS. MEIKLE: Well, I'm asking you to clarify your 
! 21 question. 
! 22 MR WALTON: What was difficult about it, Sandra? 
i 23 Really, honestly, what was difficult about that? 
I 24 MS. MEIKLE: You're asking Mr. Piercy --
! 25 Q. (BY MR.WALTON): Mr. Piercy, let me ask you 
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1 Q .. **To your knowledge are all lands upon which this question. 
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2 livestock are pastured in Canyon County enclosed by 
3 fences? It's that simple. 
4 MS. MEIKLE: Objection to the form of the question. 
5 And I'm instructing him not to answer. It calls for a 
6 legal conclusion. 
7 MR. WALTON: Okay. 
8 Q. Mr. Piercy, are you aware of any lands in 
9 Canyon County where livestock is pastured that is not 
10 enclosed by a fence? 
11 MS. MEIKLE: Objection to the form of the question. 
12 Again, it calls for a legal conclusion. 
13 MR. WAL TON: Whether or not there are lands that 
14 livestock are pastured that is not enclosed by a fence 
15 in Canyon County is a legal conclusion? That's a 
16 factual issue. 
17 MS. MEIKLE: It depends on the definition of each 
2 All the cattle in Canyon County are fenced in, 
3 aren't they? 
4 MS. MEIKLE: Objection to the form of the question. 
5 THE WITNESS: Should I answer? 
6 MS. MEIKLE: Do you know the answer to the 
7 question? 
8 THE WITNESS: No. 
9 Q. (BY MR. WAL TON): What cattle are not fenced in? 
i 10 A. There's different boundaries and fences on 
other different ranches. 
12 Q. Well, when you say "not fenced in," you mean 
13 like there's sometimes rivers that keep the cattle in; 
14 right? 
15 A. Yes. 
' 16 Q. Let's rephrase it then. 
17 You're not aware of any cattle in Canyon County 
18 one of those words. "Enclosed" -- you're asking for : 18 that roam free, are you? 
'19 Mr. Piercy to -- 19 MS. MEIKLE: Objection to the fonn of the question. 
20 MR. WALTON: Okay. Let me rephrase. Let me 20 THE WITNESS: I don't understand what you mean by 
21 rephrase. : 21 "roam free." Where? 
22 Q. **To your knowledge, is there any livestock in i 22 Q. (BY MR. WALTON): Outside of boundaries such as 
23 Canyon County that is not enclosed inside ofa fence? ; 23 fences, rivers, or natural barriers that contain the 
24 MS. MEIKLE: Objection to the form of the question. , 24 livestock. 
25 Q. (BY MR. WALTON): Go ahead and answer. 25 MS. MEIKLE: Objection to the fonn of the question. 
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You can answer if you understand. 
THE WITNESS: No. 
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Q. (BY MR. WAL TON): What do you mean "no"? 
A~ Ever)rthing·is contained;. . 
Q. Okay. That's what I thought. Thanks. 
MR. EVETT: Would this be a good time to take a 
7 break? 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
MS. :rvIBIKLE: I'd like to take one. 
MR. WAL TON: Fine by me. 
(Recess taken.) 
MR. WALTON: Let's go on the record. 
Would you mark that as an exhibit for me. 
(Exhibit 8 marked.) 
} 
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1 A. North of Pa ·Highway 95. 
2 Q. The lands to the west ofWamstad Road are 
3 leased lands, you've told me. 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. And approximately how many acres are colored in 
6 by you to the west ofWamstad? 
7 A. Approximately 150. 
8 Q. And how many lands -- how many acres do you 
9 lease for ranching? 
' 10 
11 
12 
A. Approximately 200. 
Q. So where is the other 50 acres? 
A. It's on the Snake River. 
14 Q. (BY MR. WAL TON): Mr. Piercy, I'm handing you 14 
15 Exhibit 8. On Exhibit 8 there is a road going down the 15 
Q. South of here -- south of that map? 
A. It would be northeast. 
Q. Oh, northeast. Okay. 
16 middle of the photograph that's colored in orange that 
17 is Warnstad Road; correct? 
18 A. Correct. 
19 Q. And then there's a road colored in yellow that 
20 is Lee Lane; correct? 
21 A. Correct. 
22 Q. And you have been kind enough to color in for 
23 me some lands both to the east and to the west of 
24 Wamstad Road and north of the Boise River; correct? 
25 A. Correct. 
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1 Q. And what are those lands that you've colored in 
2 for me in orange? 
3 A. Those are pasturelands. 
4 Q. And are those lands then where you run cattle? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. And how many acres of that is owned by-- what 
7 portion of that is owned by you? 
8 A. The east side of the road. 
9 Q. And do you lease the west side of the road? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. And approximately how many acres are on the 
12 east side of the road? 
13 A. The pasture alone is 60 acres. 
14 Q. You say "the pasture alone." Is there 
15 something aside from the pasture on the east side of the 
l 6 road that you owned? 
17 A. River and wildlife area. 
18 Q. And I forget how many acres you told me you own 
I 9 that you ranch. 
20 A. I'm thinking it was approximately 120. 
21 Q. So this is about half of the land that you own 
22 that you ranch is shown on Exhibit 8? 
23 A. Yes, sir. 
24 Q. And the other lands that you own are where in 
25 relation to these lands? 
16 Now, the pasture from which this bull escaped is 
17 part of the orange that you've colored in on Exhibit 8, 
18 is it not? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. Where were the rest of your cattle on March 20, 
21 '05? 
22 A. I do not know. 
23 Q. Would they have been in some of the lands 
24 depicted on Exhibit 8? 
25 A. No. 
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Q. You're sure of that? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. And when you say you don't know, what other 
4 possible locations could they have been in? 
5 A. On the 50 acres that we referred to earlier. 
6 Q. By the Snake River? 
7 A. Yes. And on the home place and --
8 Q. Your home place is north of Parma; correct? 
9 A. Correct. 
i 10 Q. How many acres do you have there? 
i 11 A. Four short 80s; approximately 300. 
' 12 Q. So your belief is they were either on the 
13 50 acres by the Snake River or on the home place, as you 
14 referred to it? 
15 A. Not all of them. There may have been other 
16 pastures and hayfields that I had rented from other 
17 farmers and --
: 18 Q. I see. But were the pastures that you've 
: 19 colored in on Exhibit 8 devoid of any livestock aside 
l 20 from the nine bulls that were in this one pasture that 
21 we've referred to this morning? 
' 22 A. There could have been mules and horses down 
' 23 there too. 
i 
i 24 Q. I see. In some of the pasturelands that you've 1 ~t{jlored in on Exhibit 8? 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
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DALE PIERCY, individually, 
Plaintiff, 
CANYON COUNTY, LUIS GUZMAN, 
individually and JENNIFER SUTTON, 
individually, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV05-4848 
DEFENDANT PIERCY'S 
MEMORANDUM IN OBJECTION 
TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS AND FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
COMES NOW the above-entitled Defendant Dale Piercy, by and through his counsel of 
record, and responds to Co-Defendant Sutton's Motion for Reconsideration and Plaintiff 
Guzman's Motion to Reconsider. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The factual background has been established by the evidence at the trial in this matter and 
the subsequent offering of the testimony of Mr. Axness. The relevant factual background has 
been submitted to this Court in a number of briefs including Defendant Piercy's recent Response 
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to Motions to Reconsider. The parties had a hearing on the issues relating to the validity of the 
Canyon County herd district established in 1982 (1982 ordinance) on June 14, 2010. Due to the 
fact that a new argument was raised by Plaintiff regarding an amendment to I.C. § 31-857 this 
Court allowed additional time for briefing to be submitted on that issue. 
This Court also stated that it wanted to have the entire matter regarding herd districts 
submitted to it for decision at a subsequent hearing set for August 11, 2010. This hearing will 
include Defendant Piercy's Second Motion for Summary Judgment. For the convenience of the 
Court, Defendant Piercy is attaching its previous briefing relating to issues regarding his Second 
Motion for Summary Judgment and incorporates his previous briefing into the present brief. 
(See Exhibit 4) The issues and arguments addressed in that brief have not changed since it was 
filed approximately a year ago. 
Therefore, the present Memorandum will be limited to addressing the amendment to 
I.C. § 31-857. Prior to a 2009 amendment to I.C. § 31-857, it read: 
School, road, herd and other districts - Presumption of validity of creation or 
dissolution. - Whenever any school district, road district, herd district, or other district has 
heretofore been, or shall hereafter be, declared to be created, established, disestablished, 
dissolved, or modified, by an order of the board of county commissioners in any county of the 
state ofldaho, a legal prima facie presumption is hereby declared to exist, after a lapse of two (2) 
years from the date of such order, that all proceedings and jurisdictional steps preceding the 
making of such order have been properly and regularly taken so as to warrant said board in 
making said order, and the burden of proof shall rest upon the party who shall deny, dispute, or 
question the validity of said order to show that any of such preceding proceedings or 
jurisdictional steps were not properly or regularly taken; and such prima facie presumption shall 
be a rule of evidence in all courts in the state of Idaho. 
The 2009 amendment to I.C. § 31-857 simply added another sentence to the statute as 
follows: "No challenge to the proceedings or jurisdictional steps preceding such an order, shall 
be heard or considered after seven (7) years has lapsed from the date of the order." 
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The 2009 amendment went into effect on July 1, 2009. See attached Exhibit 1, Idaho Session 
Laws Ch. 43, p. 124 
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
This Court should deny Mr. Guzman's motion to dismiss relating to the 2009 amendment 
to LC. § 31-857 (2009 amendment) because (1) the 2009 amendment is not retroactive and (2) 
the 2009 amendment is unconstitutional. 
A. The 2009 Amendment to Idaho Code § 31-857 is Not Retroactive, and the Seven-Year 
Statute of Limitations Begins From the Date of Enactment, July 1, 2009 
Based upon a reading of the 2009 amendment, a review of the legislative history and 
relevant case law, the 2009 amendment is not retroactive and is no bar to Defendant Piercy' s 
challenge of the 1982 ordinance. 
Judge Petrie has ruled that the 1982 ordinance was invalid. This ruling was the result of 
the trial of the declaratory judgment action which bifurcated the issue of the validity of the 1982 
ordinance from the main negligence and damages part of the present lawsuit. In hindsight, it 
would have probably have been more practical to have assigned a separate case number to the 
declaratory judgment action. However, there can be no doubt that Judge Petrie did bifurcate the 
matter because a separate court trial was held. 
Plaintiff now asserts that the 2009 amendment acts to void Judge Petrie's decision and to 
make the 1982 ordinance valid by making it immune to any challenge. 
1. Standard of Adjudication 
Plaintiffs argument is an affirmative defense. It is axiomatic that Plaintiff has the burden 
of proving his affirmative defense. Idaho Code § 73-101 states, "No part of these compiled laws 
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is retroactive, unless expressly so declared." Plaintiff must prove that the 2009 amendment itself 
was expressly declared to be retroactive. 
2. Legal Reasoning 
Mr. Guzman has failed to show that the 2009 amendment includes an express declaration 
of retroactivity or that Idaho case law supports making this type of amendment retroactive. 
There has been no evidence provided or showing made by Plaintiff Guzman that the 2009 
amendment was expressly declared to be retroactive. The 2009 amendment only adds a 
seven-year (7) statute of limitations to original statute (where no previous statute of limitations 
had existed before) by adding a second sentence to the statute. The second sentence does not 
mention that it relates back to the previous version of Idaho Code § 31-857 which applies a 
two-year rebuttable presumption of procedural and jurisdictional validity to the creation or 
modification of districts done at any time. The language of the 2009 amendment does not include 
language that the year statute of limitations should be retroactive. There is no reason to interpret 
the language of the amendment to suggest that the Idaho legislature wanted the amendment to 
apply retroactively. Therefore, the language emphasized by Mr. Guzman in the first paragraph of 
Idaho Code § 31-857 is irrelevant to a determination of whether the new statute of limitations 
was intended by the legislature be considered retroactive. 
The legislative history also fails to show any intent by the legislature to apply the 2009 
amendment retroactively. There is no indication in the legislative history of H.B. 102 declaring 
that the amendment is to be retroactive. See, Exhibit 1, Idaho Session Laws Ch. 43, p. 124 and 
Exhibit 2, the minutes of the Idaho House and Senate legislative committees which considered 
and discussed H.B. 102. There is no indication in the title to H.B. 102, Exhibit 1, the first 
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paragraph which is all in capital letters, stating that the amendment is to be applied retroactively. 
There is nothing recorded in the minutes of either of the two committees which states that the 
amendment is to apply retroactively. See, Exhibit 2, attached. 
Finally, there is no indication or other reference, in the Statement of Purpose for H.B. 
102, that the amendment is to apply to causes of action which have already accrued. The 
Statement of Purpose reads: 
This bill establishes a standard seven year statute of limitations for procedural and 
jurisdictional challenges to the creation of governmental districts under Idaho law. This 
will eliminate unreasonably delayed legal challenges to the procedures used by the 
County Commission after seven years have passed, the districts are in place and have 
been relied upon by the citizens and the county. 
Statement of Purpose RS18452 (H.B. 102), attached as Exhibit 3. 
In fact, looking at the Statement of Purpose, it appears that the amendment was intended 
to apply only to the creation of future governmental districts. Based upon the language in the 
Statement of Purpose, the amendment applies only to those districts created after the enactment 
of the amendment. Furthermore, the amendment took effect on July 1, 2009, the date when all 
approved legislation in the 2009 session took effect, except for those acts in which the 
Legislature declared an emergency and were enacted immediately upon the signing of the act by 
the Governor. Thus, the legislative history and Statement of Purpose of H.B. 102 supports only a 
prospective application of the amendment. 
Idaho case law establishes that the 2009 amendment should only be applied prospective. 
Idaho Code § 73-101 states, "No part of these compiled laws is retroactive, unless expressly so 
declared." Numerous Idaho cases cite this statute and state that a statute will not be applied 
retroactively without clear legislative intent to that effect. See, e.g., University of Utah Hosp. on 
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Behalf of Harris v. Pence, 104 Idaho 172, 174, 657 P.2d 469, 471 (1982) and cases cited therein. 
It is also the case that Idaho appellate courts have held that statutory changes which materially 
affect substantial rights should only apply prospectively. Statutory changes which are only 
procedural can be applied retroactively. Esquivel v. State, 128 Idaho 390, 392, 913 P .2d 1160, 
1162 (1996)(five-year statute of limitations on applications for post-conviction relief). However, 
analysis of these cases shows that the application of a newly amended statute of limitation begins 
from the date the legislation took effect. 
The facts in University of Utah Hosp. on Behalf of Harris v. Pence, 104 Idaho 172, 174, 
657 P.2d 469, 471 (1982), are similar to those in the present case. In the present case, the Idaho 
Legislature amended Idaho Code §31-857 to add a statute of limitations where none had existed 
before. The amendment became effective on July 1, 2009, nearly six months after Judge Petrie's 
decision invalidating the 1982 Ordinance. In University of Utah Hosp. on behalf of Harris v. 
Pence, Plaintiff hospital filed an application for aid for the medically indigent with the Twin 
Falls County Clerk within a year of the hospital admission. The medical indigency statute, Idaho 
Code § 31-3504, was then amended reducing the one-year statute to a 45-day period of 
limitations from the date of admission to file the application. This statutory provision became 
effective July 1, 1976 (1976 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 121), a time subsequent to the admission and 
release of the Harrises' child from the hospital. The hospital's claim for payment was denied; suit 
was filed; and summary judgment was granted to defendant. The hospital then appealed. 
The Idaho Supreme Court stated: 
Applied retroactively, the 1976 version of LC. § 31-3504 would have required 
the application to have been made by April 10, 1976, some two and a half months before 
the effective date of the law. Clearly, such retroactive application would unfairly penalize 
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the appellant for failure to comply with a statute of which it had no notice. This court 
could not countenance such a result inasmuch as there is no expression of legislative 
intent that the 1976 version ofl.C. § 31-3504 be applied retroactively. Nonetheless, it 
does not follow that the prior version of the statute would remain in effect after July 1, 
1976. From that date forward the appellant had fair notice of the new requirements of 
when an application for medical indigency benefits had to be filed and had forty-five days 
in which to make such application. 
An examination of the relevant case law from other jurisdictions indicates that a 
statute is not made retroactive merely because it draws upon facts antecedent to its 
enactment for its operation. Holt v. Morgan, 128 Cal.App.2d 113, 274 P.2d 915 (1954); 
Hill v. City of Billings, 134 Mont. 282, 328 P.2d 1112 (1958); Earle v. Froedtert Grain & 
Malting Co., 197 Wash. 341, 85 P.2d 264 (1938; Lewis v. City of Medina, 13 Wash.App. 
501, 535 P.2d 150 (1975). As the California Supreme Court reasoned in Holt v. Morgan, 
supra, "[t]he contention [as here made by the appellant] is based on a misunderstanding of 
'retroactive' as a legal concept." 274 P.2d at 917. In this regard, it is to be observed 
further that there is almost universal agreement that when a statutory period of limitation 
is amended to reduce the limitation period, the party whose right accrues before the 
effective date of the amendment cannot be heard to complain if he is given the full time 
allowed for action according to the terms of the amended statute from and after the 
effective date of the amended statute. Olivas v. Weiner, 127 Cal.App.2d 597, 274 P.2d 
476 (1954); Greenhalgh v. Payson City, 530 P.2d 799 (Utah 1975); Day & Night Heating 
Co. v. Ruff, 19 Utah 2d 412, 432 P.2d 43 (1967); O'Donoghue v. State, 66 Wash.2d 787, 
405 P.2d 258 (1965); Earle v. Froedtert Grain & Malting Co., supra. 
UniversityofUtahHosp. onBehalfofHarrisv. Pence, 104Idahoat 174, 175,657P.2dat471, 
472 (1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court then quoted from Olivas v. Weiner, 127 Cal.App.2d 597, 274 
P.2d 476 (1954) as follows: 
It has repeatedly been held that the Legislature may reduce a statute of limitations and 
that the new period applies to accrued causes of action provided a reasonable time is 
allowed within which to assert the cause. Estate of Whiting, 110 Cal.App. 399, 294 P. 
502; Estate o/Venners, 119 Cal.App. 417, 419, 6 P.2d 544; Thompson v. County of Los 
Angeles, 140 Cal.App. 73, 76, 35P.2d'185; Norton v. City of Pomona, 5 Cal.2d 54, 65, 
53 P.2d 952; Kline v. San Francisco U School Dist., 40 Cal.App.2d 174, 176, 104 P.2d 
661, 105 P.2d 362; Scheas v. Robertson, 38 Cal.2d 119, 125, 238 P.2d 982; Crothers v. 
Edison Elec. Co., CC., 149 F. 606; Terry v. Anderson, 96 U.S. 628, 24 L.Ed. 365. 
A statute is not made retroactive merely because it draws upon facts existing prior to its 
enactment. Thus changes in procedural law have been held applicable to existing causes 
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of action. The effect of such statutes is actually prospective in nature since they relate to 
the procedure to be followed in the future. National Automobile & Cas. Ins. Co. v. 
Downey, 98 Cal.App.2d 586, 590, 220 P.2d 962; Argues v. National Superior Co., 67 
Cal.App.2d 763, 778, 155 P.2d 643; Earle v. Froedtert Grain & Malting Co., 197 Wash. 
341, 85 P.2d 264. Olivas v. Weiner, 274 P.2d at 478, 479. 
University of Utah Hosp. on Behalf of Harris v. Pence, 104 Idaho at 17 5, 657 P .2d at 4 72 (1982). 
Finally, the Idaho Supreme Court quoted from the above-cited Washington case stating, 
"Similarly, in Earle v. Froedtert Grain & Malting Co., supra, the court stated that '[t]he 
limitation prescribed by the new statute commenced when the cause of action was first subjected 
to the operation of the statute, that is, upon its effective date.' 85 P.2d at 266." 
Applying the reasoning of the Idaho Supreme Court in University of Utah Hosp. on 
Behalf of Harris v. Pence, to the facts of the present case, it is clear that the amendment to Idaho 
Code § 31-857 is not retroactive, but actually prospective in operation. The seven-year statute of 
limitations added by the amendment begins on the date of enactment, July 1, 2009. To apply the 
seven-year statute of limitations from the date of the 1982 Ordinance to the facts of this case 
would unfairly penalize Defendant Piercy for failure to comply with a statute of which he had no 
notice. 
The reasoning of University of Utah Hosp. on Behalf of Harris v. Pence, has been 
followed by Idaho's appellate courts in cases involving Idaho Code§ 14-4902, Idaho's version of 
the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act [UPCPA]. Esquivel v. State, 128 Idaho 390, 391, 
913 P.2d 1160, 1161 (1996); Martinez v. State, 130 Idaho 530, 534, 944 P.2d 127, 13l(Ct. App. 
1997); LaFon v. State, 119 Idaho 387, 389-90, 807 P.2d 66, 68-69 (Ct. App. 1991); and 
Mellinger v. State, 113 Idaho 31, 32, 740 P.2d 73,74 (Ct. App. 1987). Effective July 1, 1979, the 
UPCP A was amended to provide a five-year limitation period for filing an application for 
post-conviction relief. Prior to 1979, the UPCPA, like Idaho Code § 31-857 prior to 2009, had no 
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period of limitations at all. In Mellinger, the Idaho Court of Appeals decided the issue of whether 
the five-year limitation period mandated by the amendment applied to a conviction entered 
before the effective date of the amendment. In finding that it did, the Court of Appeals cited and 
followed University of Utah Hosp. on Behalf of Harris v. Pence agreeing with the district court 
that the five-year period of limitations for filing an application began on the date of July 1, 1979, 
the effective date of the amended statute. The Court of Appeals stated further that the amendment 
was being applied prospectively because retroactive application of such a time limitation would 
be contrary to general principles of law and Idaho Code § 73-101. Mellinger v. State, 113 Idaho 
31, 33-34, 740 P.2d 73, 74-75 (Ct. App. 1987). 
Thus, following the reasoning of Mellinger and the other cases construing the amendment 
to the UPCPA adding a period of limitations, the amendment to Idaho Code § 31-857 should 
construed the same way. The seven-year period of limitations should begin on July 1, 2009, the 
day of enactment. Therefore, Defendant Piercy's challenge to the 1982 Ordinance was made 
within the newly-enacted period of limitations, and is not foreclosed or barred by the period of 
limitations. The amendment to Idaho Code § 31-857 is to be applied prospectively. To do 
otherwise would mean that no one could ever challenge the validity of the 19 82 Ordinance or any 
other governmental district prior to July 1, 2002, as the period of limitations would have already 
run. To do so would unfairly penalize litigants, including Defendant Piercy, for failure to comply 
with a statute of which they and he had no notice. 
Piaintiffs have cited the case of Chase Securities Corporation v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 
304, 65 S. Ct. 113 7 (1945) for the rule that the Minnesota Legislature's "fix" of their period of 
limitations in their securities fraud statute which revived a cause of action for securities fraud for 
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Donaldson and other claimants, should be applied to Judge Petrie's decision invalidating the 
1982 Ordinance. However, the facts in Chase are distinguishable from the facts in our case. 
Plaintiff Donaldson wanted to rescind a purchase of securities as void under the Minnesota Blue 
Sky Laws. Defendant Chase argued that the action was barred by the existing statute of 
limitations. Defendant argued that once it had a decision in its favor, the state legislature could 
not revive Plaintiffs cause of action and put a new statute of limitations in place. The new statute 
of limitations allowed actions under the Blue Sky Laws to be brought within six years after 
delivery of the securities, or where delivery had occurred more than five years prior to the 
effective date of the act, one year after the date of enactment. 
The U.S. Supreme Court pointed out that the Minnesota Supreme Court, in the initial 
appeal, had ruled only that the Blue Sky Law six-year statute of limitations had not been tolled 
on the grounds that Chase was absent from the state. All other issues were remanded without 
prejudice to the trial court. While the proceedings were pending in the trial court, the Minnesota 
legislature amended the Blue Sky Law adding a specific statute of limitation applicable to actions 
raised by plaintiff in the suit based on violations of the Blue Sky Laws as above. The effect of the 
amendment was to abolish any defenses Chase might make under the previous statute of 
limitation. In a second appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court found that securities had to be 
registered, and this was violated by the sale. It also held that the action was one for damages in 
tort to recover the purchase price of unregistered securities, that the newly enacted statute of 
limitations was applicable, and that this had the effect of lifting the bar of the general limitation 
statute, and in doing so, did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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The U. S. Supreme Court held that as the case stood in the state court, Chase's statutory 
immunity was not fully judged. Thus, the action of the legislature in amending the statute of 
limitations did not deprive it of a judgment in its favor. The Supreme Court relied upon the case 
of Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 62, 5 S.Ct. 209 (1885), which had held that a lapse of time had not 
invested a party with title to real or personal property, and a state legislature, consistent with the 
Fourteenth Amendment, may repeal or extend a statute of limitations, even after the right of 
action had been barred. The plaintiff was then restored his remedy, and the defendant was 
deprived of his defense that the action was barred by the previous statute of limitations. The 
Fourteenth Amendment does not make an act of state legislation void merely because it has some 
retrospective operation. 
So, the facts in Chase were that a securities purchaser tried to get his money back because 
defendant sold him unregistered securities. Purchaser waited longer that the general statute of 
limitations to bring his action against defendant. While the case was pending, the state legislature 
amended the specific securities statute of limitation to, in effect revive plaintiff's cause of action. 
In our case, instead of reviving a cause of action, Plaintiffs would have this Court extinguish the 
defense of Defendant Piercy by retroactively applying a newly enacted statute of limitations 
when Defendant Piercy had no notice of the statute. Also, instead of a case pending on 
procedural motions prior to a trial, as in Chase, in our case, there has been a full trial and a 
decision by the finder of fact and law, Judge Petrie. Both the facts and the application of the law 
in Chase are distinguishable from the facts and law in the present case. Chase should not be 
followed. 
The net effect of the 2009 amendment to Idaho Code § 31-857 is to extend the Canyon 
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County Commissioners' liability on the 1982 Ordinance for seven years until 2016. The 
amendment to Idaho Code § 31-857 is not retroactive not only because there is no evidence of 
legislative intent to do so, but because Idaho's appellate courts have ruled that it is prospective 
beginning on the date of its enactment on July 1, 2009. Defendant Piercy requests this Court deny 
Plaintiffs' motions to reconsider, and move forward with the remainder of the case. 
B. The 2009 Amendment is Unconstitutional 
The 2009 amendment violates the substantive and procedural due process rights guaranteed 
by the Idaho and U.S. Constitutions. 
1. The 2009 Amendment Violates Mr. Piercy's Rights to Procedural Due Process 
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated: 
Procedural due process requires that "there must be some process to ensure that the 
individual is not arbitrarily deprived of his rights in violation of the state or federal constitutions." 
Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v. Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 91, 982 P.2d 917, 926 (1999); quoting: 
State v. Rhoades, 121Idaho63, 72, 822 P.2d 960, 969 (1991). 
The Idaho Supreme Court also held, "Due process 'is not a concept to be applied rigidly in 
every matter. Rather, it 'is a flexible concept calling for such procedural protections as are 
warranted by the particular situation."" Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co., 133 Idaho at 91; quoting: 
City of Boise v. Industrial Comm'n, 129 Idaho 906, 910, 935 P.2d 169, 173 (1997); quoting: In re 
Wilson, 128 Idaho 161, 167, 911 P.2d 754, 760 (1996). 
"A procedural due process inquiry is focused on determining whether the procedure 
employed is fair. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 'prohibits deprivation of 
life, liberty, or property without 'fundamental fairness' through governmental conduct that offends 
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the community's sense of justice, decency and fair play."' Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 136, 
Idaho 63, 72, 28 P.3d 1006, 1015 (2001); quoting: Maresh v. State of Idaho Dep't of Health and 
Welfare, 132 Idaho 221, 225-226, 970 P.2d 14, 19-20 (1998); citing: Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 
412, 432-34, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1146-47, 89 L.Ed.2d 410, 428-29 (1986). 
The courts must engage in a two-step analysis in determining whether there has been a 
violation of procedural due process. Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 136, Idaho 63, 72, 28 P .3d 
1006, 1015 (2001). The first step is to ascertain either a liberty or property under the Idaho 
Constitution or under the U.S. Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Once a court has determined that a 
property interest exists, it can determine what process is due. Id. A court must determine if 
sufficient notice and hearing were afforded to meet the due process requirements. Simmons v. 
Board of Trustees of Independent School Dist. No. I, 102 Idaho 552, 553, 633 P.2d 1130, 1131 
(1980). 
"Whether a property interest exists can be determined only by an examination of the 
particular statute, rule or ordinance in question." Bradbury, 136 Idaho at 72, 28 P.3d at 1015; See 
also: Fergusen v. Board of Trustees of Bonner County Sch., 98 Idaho 359, 363, 564 P.2d 971, 975 
(1977). 
In the present matter, Mr. Piercy has more than one property interest at stake. Mr. Piercy 
has an interest in being able to have his cattle roam in open range without being subject to liability 
for accidents caused when his cattle wander onto the roadway. Idaho statutes allow the state to 
abrogate that right by the creation of a herd district. See: I.C. § 25-2402-2404. In taking away this 
property right, the Idaho Legislature required that counties provide notice and an opportunity to be 
heard prior to the property right being taken by creation of a herd district. See: LC. § 25-2402-2404. 
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By providing for the right to have notice and an opportunity to be heard, Mr. Piercy gained 
the right to challenge that process. The 2009 amendment essentially abrogates the process provided 
under the state herd district laws by making it impossible to challenge the lack of the process after 
seven years have expired. The legislature is impermissibly stating in one section that there is a right 
to due process, but then eliminating that right by not allowing for enforcement of that right. A right 
that cannot be enforced is no right at all. 
Mr. Guzman may argue that the right to process may be enforced within the first seven 
years after the ordinance is enacted. This argument begs the question as to whether allowing a mere 
seven years to enforce a right to due process is adequate process. Looking at the 2009 amendment 
to Idaho Code § 31-857, it is clear that it violates the notions of fair play which underpin the idea of 
due process. For the more egregious the violation of due process in passing a herd district 
ordinance, the more likely the ordinance will ultimately be upheld. Under the 2009 amendment, if 
county commissioners can keep an ordinance in complete secret for seven years, then it is 
unassailable. 
It is not difficult to see that the 2009 amendment actually encourages violations of due 
process. A simple example may be illustrative. County commissioners wanting to create or modify 
a school district could simply meet in secret and pass the ordinance they wish to pass. The 
commissioners would simply include in the ordinance that the ordinance would not be enforced 
until seven years had transpired from the date of enactment. Thereby the commissioners 
successfully insulate their ordinance from any chailenges. The other parties may argue that this 
would not occur, but it already has occurred in the present case. 
Mr. Piercy proved at the trial in this matter that the Canyon County Commissioners failed to 
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provide notice or an adequate opportunity for the residents of Canyon County to be heard on the 
1982 ordinance. Mr. Piercy was oblivious of the creation of the herd district due to the 
commissioners acting in secret. Now, following the trial of this matter, Mr. Guzman states that the 
2009 amendment makes the 1982 ordinance untouchable despite the fact that Mr. Piercy was not 
provided the due process the herd district statutes require. 
It would be frightening to think that a statute that essentially allows a legislative body to bar 
challenges to laws passed without due process could be interpreted as being constitutional. The 
legislature could use such laws to dismantle the rights of its citizens by making their rights 
unenforceable. In the present case, the 2009 amendment violates Mr. Piercy's due process right to a 
notice and hearing before having his property rights diminished and an additional liability imposed 
upon him. 
2. The 2009 Amendment Violates Substantive Due Process 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has held that, "Substantive due process includes, inter alia, a 
general protection against state action that is arbitrary and capricious." Nelson v. Hayden, 138 Idaho 
619, 622, 67 P.3d 98, 101 (Ct.App. 2003). "Due process of law is not necessarily satisfied by any 
process which the Legislature may by law provide, but by such process as safeguards and protects 
the fundamental, constitutional rights of the citizen." Abrams v. Jones, 35 Idaho 532, 535, 207 P. 
724, 727 (1922). 
"Substantive due process is guaranteed by both the Idaho and United Stated Constitutions, 
and requires that 'a statute bear a reasonable relationship to a permissible legislative objective."' 
Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v. Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 90, 982 P.2d 917, 925 (1999); quoting: In 
re McNeely, 119 Idaho 182, 189, 804 P.2d 922, 918 (Ct.App. 1991). 
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The stated legislative reason for the 2009 amendment is to, "eliminate unreasonably 
delayed legal challenges to the procedures used by the County Commission after seven years 
have passed, the districts are in place and have been relied upon by the citizens and the county." 
The 2009 amendment is not rationally related or does it bear a reasonable relationship to the 
stated goal. By enacting an absolute bar on challenges to the due process requirements of county 
ordinances, the legislature has capriciously cut off legitimate due process challenges without 
allowing any inquiry into whether a challenge has been unreasonably delayed. Also, using a 
statute of limitation's bar in this context makes the unreasonable and arbitrary assumption that 
any challenge to an ordinance after seven years is unreasonable, and that any ordinance in 
existence for seven years has become relied upon by the county and its citizens. 
The 2009 amendment is as reasonable a statute for eliminating delayed challenges to 
ordinances as cutting off someone's foot is a reasonable way to ensure that a person will not get 
ingrown toenails. Just because a suggested method is effective does not make it reasonable. The 
2009 amendment tramples upon the very notions of fair play and justice upon which is the basis of 
the fundamental rights of due process. A citizen's right to challenge a law which has been enacted 
through a deprivation of due process should not receive a judicial stamp of approval. 
The 2009 amendment should be found to violate both substantive and procedural due 
process and be declared unconstitutional. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The 2009 amendment has no bearing on this matter as it is prospective in effect, and it is 
unconstitutional as it violates substantive and procedural due process. 
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DATED this 30th day of July 2010. 
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013'7 s 
CHAPTER43 
(H.B. No. 102) 
AN ACT 
RELATING TO COUNTIES; AMENDING SECTION 31-857, IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE 
THAT CHALLENGES TO PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTIONAL STEPS 
PRECEDING ORDERS RELATING TO THE CREATION, ESTABLISHMENT, 
DISESTABLISHMENT, DISSOLUTION OR MODIFICATION OF CERTAIN 
DISTRICTS SHALL NOT BE HEARD OR CONSIDERED FOLLOWING THE LAPSE 
OF A SPECIFIED PERIOD OF TIME. 
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State ofldaho: 
SECTION 1. That Section 31-857, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby amended to 
read as follows: 
31-857. SCHOOL, ROAD, HERD AND OTHER DISTRICTS-PRESUMPTION 
OF VALIDITY OF CREATION OR DISSOLUTION. Whenever any school district, road 
district, herd district, or other district has heretofore been, or shall hereafter be, declared to be 
created, established, disestablished, dissolved, or modified, by an order of the board of county 
commissioners in any county of the state of Idaho, a legal prima facie presumption is hereby 
declared to exist, after a lapse of two (2) years from the date of such order, that all proceedings 
and jurisdictional steps preceding the making of such order have been properly and regularly 
taken so as to warrant said board in making said order, and the burden of proof shall rest upon 
the party who shall deny, dispute, or question the validity of said order to show that any of such 
preceding proceedings or jurisdictional steps were not properly or regularly taken; and such 
prima facie presumption shall be a rule of evidence in all courts in the state of Idaho. No 
challenge to the proceedings or jurisdictional steps preceding such an order. shall be heard or 
considered after seven (7) years has lapsed from the date of the order. 
Approved March 23, 2009. 
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MINUTES 
HOUSE JUDICIARY, RULES AND ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE 
DATE: February 11 , 2009 
TIME: 
PLACE: 
MEMBERS: 
ABSENT/ 
EXCUSED: 
GUESTS: 
MOTION: 
MOTION: 
RS18452: 
MOTION: 
RS18491: 
1:30 p.m. 
Room 240 
Chairman Clark, Vice Chairman Smith(24) , Representatives Nielsen, 
Shirley, W ills, Hart, McGeachin, Bolz, Labrador, Luker, Kren , Boe, 
Burgoyne, Jaquet, Killen 
Representative Wills 
Representative Lake; Patricia Tobias , Administrative Director of the 
Courts; Bill von Tagen, Deputy Attorney General; Hannah Saona, ACLU 
of Idaho; Erin Armstrong , Lobbyist; LaMont Anderson , Deputy Attorney 
General 
Chairman Clark called the meeting to order at 1 :30 p.m. and asked the 
members to review two sets of minutes. 
Representative Luker moved to approve the minutes of the meeting held 
on February 5, 2009, as written . Motion carried by voice vote. 
Representative Bolz moved to approve the minutes of the meeting held 
on February 9, 2009, as written . Motion carried by voice vote. 
Chairman Clark recognized Representative Lake to explain the 
proposed legislation. This bill establishes a standard seven year statute 
of limitations for procedural and jurisdictional challenges to the creation of 
governmental districts under Idaho law. This will eliminate unreasonably 
delayed legal challenges to the procedures used by the County 
Commission after seven years have passed, the districts are in place and 
have been relied upon by the citizens and the county. 
Representative Luker moved to introduce RS18452. Motion carried 
by voice vote. 
The Chairman recognized Patricia Tobias, Administrative Director of the 
Courts, to explain . This piece of legislation has a long history of 
legislative support and interest in monitoring the assets of those persons 
who need protection under a conservatorship or guardianship case filed 
in the district court. In 2005 the Legislature adopted H 131 , which 
established the Guardianship Pilot Project, requiring annual reports to the 
Legislature and providing a sunset clause. 
Section 1 of this legislation repeals the sunset provision relating to the 
Guardianship Pilot Project fund , allowing the pilot project fees and 
funding to go forward after July 1, 2009. 
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DATE: 
TIME: 
PLACE: 
MEMBERS: 
ABSENT/ 
EXCUSED: 
GUESTS: 
MOTION: 
H0143: 
MOTION: 
H0102: 
MOTION: 
MINUTES 
HOUSE LOCAL GOVERNMENT COMMITTEE 
February 18, 2009 
1:30 p.m. 
Room 316 
Chairman Barrett, Vice Chairman Bilbao, Representatives Collins, Clark, 
Bayer, Chadderdon, Henderson, Palmer, Boe, Burgoyne, Higgins 
Justin Ruen, Association of Idaho Cities; Barbara Jorden, Idaho Trial 
Lawyers Association; Ken Howard, Association of Idaho Cities 
Chairman Barrett called the meeting to order at 1:31 p.m. 
Meeting minutes from February 16, 2009, were introduced for approval. 
Representative Higgins moved to approve the minutes of February 16, 
2009 as written. Motion passed on a voice vote. 
Chairman Barrett welcomed Representative Luker to the committee. 
He shared that H0143 is a fix-it bill that makes it clear that implied 
consent to annexation was not to apply to Category A He stated that as 
per Representative Clark's request, he had given Representative Clark a 
copy of the court case that brought to light the need for this legislation. 
Representative Clark moved to send H0143 to the floor with a DO PASS 
recommendation. Motion carried on a voice vote. 
Representative Lake was welcomed to the committee, to present 
H0102. He stated that this bill began in Judiciary and Rules because of a 
Jefferson County court case alleging that a Herd District had not been 
created appropriately. 
H0102 establishes that if a district is created, established, disestablished, 
dissolved, or modified, challenges shall not be heard or considered 
following the lapse of a certain period of time. 
Representative Burgoyne moved to send H0102 to the floor with a DO 
PASS recommendation. Arguing in favor of the motion, Representative 
Clark stated that he and other Representatives on the committee had 
heard this bill presented in the Judiciary and Rules committee, and that it 
is a great idea. Chairman Barrett called for a vote on the motion; motion 
carried on a voice vote. 
01. 
-----------------------------r-~---------·--- ·-·-·-
) \ 
MINUTES 
SENATE LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND TAXATION COMMITTEE 
DATE: 
TIME: 
PLACE: 
MEMBERS 
PRESENT: 
MEMBERS 
ABSENT/ 
EXCUSED: 
CONVENED: 
NOTE: 
MINUTES: 
HB 102 
MOTION: 
VOTE: 
February 26, 2009 
3:00 p.m. 
Room 211 
Chairman Hill, Vice Chairman Heinrich, Senators Corder, McKague, 
Jorgenson, Werk, and Bilyeu 
Senators McKenzie and Stegner 
Chairman Hill called the meeting to order at 3:02 p.m. on Thursday, 
February 26, 2009 with a quorum present. 
The sign-in sheet, testimonies, and other related materials will be retained 
with the minutes in the committee office until the end of the session and will 
then be located on file with the minutes in the Legislative Services Library. 
Senator Werk moved to accept the minutes of February 17, 2009. 
Senator Jorgenson seconded the motion. 
The motion carried by unanimous voice vote. 
RELATING TO COUNTIES to establish a statute of limitations for 
challenges to the creation of governmental districts under Idaho law. 
Senator Jorgenson explained that, in Idaho, all areas of the State outside 
a city or incorporated area, are considered to be open range unless the 
county commissioners make a determination of a herd district. The 
difference between open range and a herd district is very important. In 
open range, an animal is free to roam wherever it may choose and the 
owner has no liability. When a herd district is created, the animal owner 
has the responsibility to keep the animals fenced in and is liable for 
damages the animals may cause outside the fenced area . In cases 
involving a herd district, the validity of the district has been questioned due 
to the historical circumstances of the determination. This bill clarifies the 
issue of whether a district is either established or disestablished and that 
the duty of proof falls on anyone but the county. If the county has acted 
and gone through the process of establishing a district, it is a matter of law. 
Senator Werk asked if the bill was about statute of limitation issues 
regarding whether or not the district was properly created. Senator 
Jorgenson concurred. 
Senator Werk moved to send HB 102 to the floor with a do pass 
recommendation. Senator Heinrich seconded the motion. 
The motion carried by unanimous voice vote. Senator Jorgenson will 
sponsor this bill. 
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STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
RS18452 
This bill establishes a standard seven year statute of limitations for procedural and jurisdictional 
challenges to the creation of governmental districts under Idaho law. This will eliminate 
unreasonably delayed legal challenges to the procedures used by the County Commission after 
seven years have passed, the districts are in place and have been relied upon by the citizens and 
the county. 
FISCAL NOTE 
This bill will have no negative impact. 
Contact: 
Name: Representative Dennis M. Lake 
Office: 
Phone: (208) 332-1000 
Statement of Purpose I Fiscal Note 
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Rodney R. Saetrum, ISBN: 2921 
Ryan B. Peck, ISBN: 7022 
SAETRUM LA \V OFFICES 
Post Office Box 7425 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Telephone: (208) 336-0484 
Attorneys for Defendant Dale Piercy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD WDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN A"t\TD FOR THE COlJNTY OF CA.NYON 
LUIS J. GUZMAN, individually, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DALE PIERCY, individually, and JE1'.11\TIFER 
SUTTON, individually, 
Defendants. 
DALE PIERCY, individually, 
Plaintiff, 
CANYON COlJNTY, LUIS GUZMAN, 
individually and JENNIFER SUTTON, 
individually, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CVOS-4848 
REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S AND 
CO-DEFE:l\1DANT SUTTON'S 
OBJECTIONS TO DEFENDANT 
PIERCY'S SECOND MOTION 
FORSUMMARYJUDGMENT 
COMES NOW the above-entitled Third Party Plaintiff Dale Piercy, by and through its 
counsel ofrecord, and responds to Plaintiffs and Co-Defendant Sutton's Objections to Third 
Party Plaintiff Piercy's Second Motion for Summary Judgment. 
REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S At'(D CO-DEFEI'i1DA..~T SUTTON'S OBJECTIONS TO 
DEFE.N'DANT PIERCY'S SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMA.RY JUDGMENT - 1 
I. FACTUAL A.l\""D PROCEDURl\L BACKGROUND 
The factual background was provided in Mr. Piercy's original memorandum. In 
addition, the following facts and procedural background are relevant due to the objections made 
by Co-Defendant Sutton and Plaintiff Guzman. 
At the time of the accident, Mr. Piercy was cited for violation of Canyon County Code 
§03-05-17. Mr. Piercy contested the citation in Canyon County Criminal Case No. 
CR-2005-7773. Mr. Piercy was found not guilty of this offense. (Affidavit of Ryan B. Peck, 
Exhibit A.) 
For purposes of the J\1r. Piercy's Second Motion for Summary Judgment, Mr. Piercy is 
not disputing that the accident occurred within a herd district created by an ordinance enacted in 
1908 or that the 1908 herd district is valid. 
There is also no dispute that there are no cattle guards or fences enclosing the 1908 herd 
district in particular at the border where Wamstad Road crosses over the Boise River. 
II. STANDARD OF ADJUDICATION 
The standard on summary judgment is set forth in Mr. Piercy' s original memorandum and 
is not in dispute. The objections to Mr. Piercy' s Second Motion for Summary Judgment require 
some additional analysis of laws regarding statutory interpretation. 
The construction of a legislative act presents a pure question of law for this Court to decide. 
Crawford v. Dept. of Corrections, 133 Idaho 633, 635, 991 P.2d 358, 360 (1999). Courts also 
exercise free review over the interpretation of statutes. Adamson v. Blanchard, 133 Idaho 602, 
605, 990 P.2d 1213, 1216, (1999)(construing Idaho Code§ 25-2118 and Idaho Code§ 25-2119 
together as they were adopted at the same time.) 
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"Courts are empowered to resolve ambiguities in statutes by ascertaining and giving effect 
to legislative intent." Easleyv. Lee, Ill Idaho 115, 118, 721P.2d215, 218 (1986) citing: Nampa 
Lodge No. 1389 v. Smylie, 71Idaho212, 229 P.2d 991 (1951). "The act should be construed in its 
entirety and as a whole for the purpose of ascertaining the legislative intent, and where different 
sections reflect light upon each other they are regarded as in pari materia." Id. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has also held, "'all parts of a statute should be given meaning,' 
and the Court '\vill construe a statute so that effect is given to its provisions, and no part is rendered 
superfluous or insignificant.'" Moreland v. Adams, 143 Idaho 687, 690, 152 P.3d 558, 561 (2007) 
citing: Idaho Cardiology Associates, P.A. v. Idaho Physicians Network Inc., 141 Idaho 223, 226, 
108 P.3d 370, 373 (2005). 
III. Legal Analysis 
Mr. Piercy is immune from liability in this lawsuit because: (1) this Court mled that Mr. 
Piercy's bull was being pastured in an open range area; (2) I.C. § 25-2118 in conjunction with Idaho 
range law and LC. § 25-2402, create immunity for Mr. Piercy's bull being in the 1908 herd district; 
and (3) Mr. Piercy cannot be held civilly liable under Canyon County Ordinance 03-05-17. 
I. Mr. Piercy's Bull was Being Pastured in an Open Range Area 
Based upon this Court's decision from the trial on Mr. Piercy' s Amended Declaratory 
Judgment Action the 1982 herd district ordinance was invalid, and therefore, the area upon which 
Mr. Piercy pastured his bull is open range. (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment in 
Bifurcated Portion of Trial.) Mr. Piercy is aware that Plaintiff Guzman and Co-Defendant Sutton 
are attempting to revisit this Court's decision, but that is a separate motion. (See: Response to 
Motions to Reconsider Prior Court Rulings and Motion for Sanctions) 
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II. Mr. Piercy is Immune from Liability in the 1908 Herd District 
Mr. Piercy is protected from liability by the open range laws and policy of Idaho as 
expressed in Idaho Supreme Court cases and the Idaho Code. 
Idaho has always been a state that follows the 'fence out' rule of open range. ]vforeland v. 
Adams, 143 Idaho 687, 689, 152 P.3d 558, 560 (2007). The 'fence out' rule places upon 
landoVvners the duty to construct fences to keep open range cattle from entering their property. Id 
After the enactment of legal fence laws, landovmers in open range areas could hold another 
landoVvner liable if they enclosed their property in a legal fence. Then, if a cattle ovvner' s livestock 
broke through the fence, the OVvner of the cattle could be liable to the landowner. 
The Idaho Legislature later made it possible for landowners to impose the 'fence in' rule in 
certain areas by creating a herd district. Id The 'fence in' rule makes it the responsibility of cattle 
oVvners to enclose their animals. 
The Idaho Legislature enacted I.C. § 25-2118 and LC. § 25-2119 in 1961. These statutes 
were enacted to specifically address the liability of livestock on a highway. Idaho Code§ 25-2118 
specifically addresses the liability to an ov.vner regarding cattle upon a highway in an open range 
area. Idaho Code § 25-2119 generally deals with livestock on highways in herd district areas. 
Neither of these statutes specifically addresses the issue of an open range cow that wanders into an 
unenclosed herd district. 
Two years later in 1963, the Idaho Legislature filled the gap between LC. § 25-2118 and 
LC. § 25-2119, by enacting a revision to LC. § 25-2402 which "exclude[s] liability for livestock 
roaming into a herd district from open range unless the district is inclosed by a lawful fence." 
Easley v. Lee, 111 Idaho 115, 118, 721 P.2d 215, 218 (1986). The Idaho Supreme Court 
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interpretation of the Idaho Legislature's intent in amending I.C. § 25-2402 is controlling in this 
case. Further, it is supported by the common law of Idaho. Essentially, LC. § 25-2402 as 
amended in 1963 reasserts the 'fence out' rule regarding boundaries between herd districts and open 
range. 
Without this rule, the designation of open range becomes meaningless. It is well settled 
that one of the policies of open range is to save m:vners of livestock the expense of maintaining 
fences around their property. If a livestock ovvner in open range were liable for livestock that 
wandered into an adjacent herd district, then the livestock mvner would be required to fence the 
border between open range and the herd district area. This would run precisely contrary to the 
longstanding 'fence out' rule of open range. 
A herd district neighbor is also required to 'fence out' from open range livestock. The 
amendment of LC. § 25-2402 in 1963 made it clear that it was the Idaho Legislature's intent that the 
common law 'fence out' rule applied whether the neighbor was a single landowner or a herd 
district. The cost to maintain a fence around the herd district is the responsibility of the 
landmvners within the herd district as indicated by the provisions of LC. § 25-2402-2408, which 
allow for the taxing of landowners in a herd district to construct a fence enclosing the herd district. 
Co-Defendant Sutton argues that the 1908 herd district is exempt from the 'fence out' rule. 
This argument is based upon the idea that the amendment to I.C. § 25-2402 came in 1963, and 
therefore, does not apply to the 1908 herd district. This argument would not only run contrary to 
the long-standing 'fence out' rule of open range, but would make the statutes regarding open range 
meaningless. The Ida..lio Supreme Court has held that, "'all parts of a statute should be given 
meaning,' and the Court 'will construe a statute so that effect is given to its provisions, and no part 
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is rendered superfluous or insignificant."' Morelandv. Adams, 143 Idaho 687, 690, 152 PJd 558, 
561 (2007) citing: Idaho Cardiology Associates, PA. v. Idaho Physicians Netvvork, Inc., 141 Idaho 
223, 226, 108 P.3d 370, 373 (2005). 
Almost all herd districts in Canyon County, and in other counties in this state, were created 
prior to 1963. This Court has been provided with all the herd district ordinances in Canyon County 
and with the exception of the invalid 1982 ordinance, they were all passed prior to 1963. 
Therefore, if all herd districts created prior to 1963 were exempt from the 'fence out' rule with 
regard to open range livestock, then all the statutes governing open range would be meaningless. 
Even those livestock owners within open range would have to fence in their livestock or construct 
and maintain a fence around the entire open range area for fear their livestock would roam into a 
herd district that was not created after 1963. This would nullify the open range statutes designed to 
protect ow11ers oflivestock in open range. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Easley, stated that the intention of the Idaho Legislature was to 
"exclude liability for livestock roaming into a herd district from open range." Easley v. Lee, 111 
Idaho 115, 118, 721 P.2d 215, 218 (1986). Idaho law is designed to maintain the protections of 
open range by enforcing the 'fence out' rule with any landowner in open range or herd district 
bordering open range despite when it was created. 
III. Mr. Piercy Cannot be Negligent Per Se under Canyon County Ordinance 03-05-17 
Canyon County Ordinance 03-05-17 only provides a criminal penalty and cannot be used 
to support a civil claim of negligence. Canyon County Code 03-05-03, "Purpose and Authority'', 
states in pertinent part, "This article is also designed to help solve the problems caused by 
'livestock', ... from running at large in the county." Both sections 03-05-17 (2) and (4) state that 
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"it shall be unlawful" for livestock (subsection 2) and animals (subsection 4) for animals to be at 
large on county roads, and section 03-05-29 (1) states that "violations of the provisions of this 
article shall be a misdemeanor and shall be punished as set fo1ih in Idaho Code 18-113". In other 
words, Canyon County has made it a misdemeanor crime to have livestock or other defined animals 
at large on the roads of the county. 
This is a similar approach taken by the Benewah County Commissioners which was 
discussed in Benewah County Cattlemen's Ass 'n, Inc. v. Board of County Com h of Benewah 
County, 105 Idaho 209, 668 P.2d 85 (1983). In Benewah County, the county commissioners 
enacted an ordinance which prohibited livestock running at large in the county. As noted by the 
Supreme Court of Idaho, "The ordinance expressly leaves unaffected civil liability arising from 
trespassing livestock." Id. at 211, 688 P.2d at 87, see also 105 Idaho 213, 214, 688 P.2d 89, 90. 
\Vhile agreeing that Canyon County validly exercised its police power to create the above 
sections of its Code, the status of this ordinance is similar to that found in Benewah County which 
precluded civil liability for violation of the ordinance. As a result of the Benewah County decision, 
a livestock owner could be criminally liable for violation of the county ordinance by allowing his 
livestock to run at large within Benewah County, but would not be civilly liable should that 
livestock be hit by a vehicle and cause damages because the livestock was in open range and I.C. § 
25-2118 coupled ·with LC. § 25-2402 provides complete immunity. Co-Defendant Sutton and 
Plaintiff Guzman cannot rely on the Benewah case for the proposition that Mr. Piercy is negligent 
because state statute specifically provides civil immunity for Mr. Piercy. 
It is the same with the present case and the above Canyon County Code sections. Canyon 
County has made it a misdemeanor crime to have livestock running at large within the county. 
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However, for those portions of the county still in "open range" status, such as where Defendant 
Piercy resides, there is no civil liability for any damages caused by livestock running at large under 
sections 25-2118 and 25-2402. 
A Canyon County ordinai1ce cannot place liability upon a person who is specifically free 
from liability under State Statute. It would be absurd to hold that a county has more power than 
the Idaho Legislature. 
Mr. Piercy was cited for violation of Canyon County Ordinance 03-05-17. Mr. Piercy 
contested the charge and was found not guilty. As discussed, there is no civil penalty for a 
violation of this ordina11ce where a party is provided immunity by Idaho State statute. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Mr. Piercy is immune from liability in this lawsuit under Idaho common law, I.C. § 25-2118 
in conjunction with I.C. § 25-2402. Mr. Piercy requests that this Court grant summary judgment 
on his behalf 
DA TED this 6th day of August 2009. 
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES 
By 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Defendant Jennifer Sutton ("Sutton"), by and through her counsel of record, Elam & Burke, 
P.A., hereby responds to Defendant Piercy's Memorandum in Objection to Plaintiffs Motion to 
Dismiss and for Reconsideration. 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Sutton respectfully refers this Court to the Factual History and Procedural Background 
section set forth in the Memorandum in Support of Defendant Jennifer Sutton's Motion for 
Reconsideration filed July 30, 2009. Sutton generally agrees with the summary of the recent 
procedural history as set forth in Defendant Piercy' s Memorandum in Objection to Plaintiffs Motion 
to Dismiss and for Reconsideration. 
Because the hearing set for August 11, 2010 will include argument regarding Defendant 
Piercy' s Second Motion for Summary Judgment, Sutton respectfully refers this Court to Defendant 
Sutton's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Piercy' s Second Motion for Summary Judgment, 
filed ~fay 22, 2009, and the argument commencing on page 19 of Jennifer Sutton's Brief Regarding 
Defenses on Reconsideration, filed June 2, 2010, and incorporates the previous briefing into this 
brief. 
As instructed by the Court, this Memorandum will only address arguments regarding the 
amendment to Idaho Code § 31-857. 
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III. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
A. THE AMENDMENT TO IDAHO CODE § 31-857 APPLIES RETROACTIVELY 
AND BARS PIERCY'S CHALLENGE TO THE ORDER ESTABLISHING THE 1982 
HERD DISTRICT. 
Sutton respectfully refers to and incorporates the arguments on this issue made in the 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff/Defendant, Luis J. Guzman's Motions for Reconsideration and 
Motion to Dismiss, filed on or about May 26, 2010. In addition, Sutton makes the following 
arguments. 
Idaho Code§ 73-101 states "[n]o part of these compiled laws is retroactive, unless expressly 
so declared." Idaho Code§ 73-101. "[A] statute is not applied retroactively unless there is 'clear 
legislativeintenttothateffect."' Gaileyv. Jerome County, 113 Idaho430, 432, 745P.2d1051, 1053 
(1987). It has long been held by the Idaho Supreme Court that a statute does not have to use the 
word "retroactive" to evidence clear legislative intent: 
We think it is sufficient if the enacting words are such that the 
intention to make the law retroactive is clear. In other words, if the 
language clearly refers to the past as well as to the future, then the 
intent to make the law retroactive is expressly declared within the 
meaning of [Idaho Code§ 73-101]. 
Peavy v. McCombs, 26 Idaho 143, __ , 140 P. 965, 968 (1914). 
In order to interpret and give effect to the intent of the legislature, 
[N]ot only must the literal wording of the statute be examined, but 
also account must be taken of other matters, such as the context, the 
object in view, the evils to be remedied, the history of the times and 
of the legislation upon the same subject, public policy, 
contemporaneous construction, and the like. In re Gem State 
Academy Bakery, 70 Idaho 531-541, 224 P.2d 529, 535. Generally, 
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effect must be given, if possible, to every word, clause and sentence 
of a statute. State v. Alkire, 79 Idaho 334, 317 P .2d 341. 
Messenger v. Burns, 86 Idaho 26, 29-30, 382 P.2d 913, 915 (1963). 
The plain, unambiguous language of Idaho Code § 31-857 sets forth clear legislative intent 
that the statute applies retroactively and bars Dale Piercy's ("Piercy's") challenge to the 1982 herd 
district order. 
Idaho Code § 31-857 was originally enacted in 1935, and included language making it 
applicable to certain orders of the board of county commissioners made prior to the statute's 
enactment: 
Whenever any school district, road district, herd district, or other 
district has heretofore been, or shall hereafter be, declared to be 
created, established, disestablished, dissolved, or modified, by an 
order of the board of county commissioners in any county of the State 
ofldaho, a legal prima facie presumption is hereby declared to exist, 
after a lapse of five years from the date of such order, that all 
proceedings and jurisdictional steps preceding the making of such 
order have been properly and regularly taken so as to warrant said 
board in making said order, and the burden of proof shall rest upon 
the party who shall deny, dispute, or question the validity of said 
order to show that any of such preceding proceedings or jurisdictional 
steps were not properly or regularly taken; and such prima facie 
presumption shall be a rule of evidence in all courts in the State of 
Idaho. 
1935 Idaho_Sess. Laws ch. ?9, g _!• p.134 (emphasi~ adde~),'. 
The statute was subsequently amended in 1989 and in 2009. The 2009 amendment added 
the following: "No challenge to the proceedings or jurisdictional steps preceding such an order, shall 
be heard or considered after seven (7) years has lapsed from the date of the order." Idaho Code § 
31-857; see also, 2009 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 43, § 1, p. 124-125. 
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The 2009 amendment did not include additional language evidencing retroactive application; 
however, since the original version of Idaho Code § 31-857 expressly applied to certain orders 
passed by the county commissioners prior to the effective date of the statute, so too does the 2009 
amendment. See, Stuartv. State, 149 Idaho 35, __ , 232 P.3d 813, 822 (2010) (Amendments to 
statute did not include language indicating retroactive application; however, original enactment of 
statute included language making it applicable to convictions prior to the statute's enactment. Court 
concluded retroactive language applied to amendments.) It would not make sense to review and 
analyze the amendatory language in a vacuum. To interpret the amendment as not applying 
retroactively would have the effect of nullifying the retroactive language in the pre-2009 statute. See, 
Stuart, 149 Idaho at_, 232 P.3d at 822. 
Even though the statutory language indicating retroactive application is clear and 
unambiguous, a review of the legislative history only bolsters this conclusion. Contrary to Piercy' s 
assertions, a review of the legislative history leads to only one conclusion: the legislature intended 
to apply the 2009 amendment retroactively. First, Representative Lake asserted the purpose of the 
proposed amendment was to "eliminate unreasonably delayed legal challenges to the procedures used 
by the County Commission after seven years have passed, the districts are in place and have been 
relied upon by the citizens and the county." Minutes from the House Judiciary, Rules and 
Administration Committee, February 11, 2009. 
Representative Lake later expressly stated this amendment was the result of a "Jefferson 
County court case alleging that a Herd District had not been created appropriately." Minutes from 
the House Local Government Committee, February 18, 2009 (emphasis added). 
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Additionally, Senator Jorgenson stated the purpose of the amendment as follows: 
In cases involving a herd district, the validity of the district has been 
questioned due to the historical circumstances of the determination. 
This bill clarifies the issue of whether a district is either established 
or disestablished and that the duty of proof falls on anyone but the 
county. If the county has acted and gone through the process of 
establishing a district, it is a matter of law. 
Minutes from the Senate Local Government and Taxation Committee, February 26, 2009. 
Finally, the Statement of Purpose states: 
This bill establishes a standard seven year statute of limitations for 
procedural and jurisdictional challenges to the creation of 
governmental districts under Idaho law. This will eliminate 
unreasonably delayed legal challenges to the procedures used by the 
County Commission after seven years have passed, the districts are 
in place and have been relied upon by the citizens and the county. 
Taken together, the legislative intent is clear. The enactment of the statute of limitations is 
to preclude challenges to old districts, and can only be read to apply retroactively. Many districts, 
like the herd district at issue in this case, were established twenty-five plus years ago, and society 
has ordered itself around the existence of these districts. To assert the statute of limitations begins 
to run on the effective date of July 1, 2009, does not make sense when the purpose of the amendment 
is to preclude challenges to old districts. It was not the legislature's intent to grant another seven 
years to challenge procedural defects in a one hundred year old herd district statute - such 
interpretation would not solve the problem sought to be fixed by the amendment to Idaho Code § 31-
8571• 
1This absurd result is precisely what Piercy seeks here, as he has repeatedly challenged 
the validity of the 1905 herd district where the accident in this case occurred. 
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Piercy relies on University of Utah Hosp. on Behalf of Harris v. Pence, which is 
distinguishable on its facts since the statute at issue in that case was not expressly retroactive. 
104 Idaho 172, 657 P.2d 469 (1983). 
Based on the foregoing, the statute oflimitations in Idaho Code § 31-857 applies to this case, 
and Piercy is barred from challenging the order establishing the1982 herd district. 
Alternatively, should this Court determine the amendment to Idaho Code § 31-857 does not 
have retroactive application, Piercy is still barred from challenging the order establishing the 1982 
herd district because, ifthe amendment is not retroactive, it is inapplicable, and Idaho Code § 5-224 
has already barred Piercy' s challenge. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has previously held that a new statute of limitations cannot revive 
old claims. As fully briefed and argued to this Court, Piercy' s challenge to the order establishing the 
1982 herd district is barred by the application of Idaho Code § 5-224, the four-year general statute 
of limitations. Accordingly, the 2009 amendment cannot be applied to resurrect Piercy's challenge 
to the herd district order. 
In Idaho, a new statute of limitations does not revive an old time barred claim. In Gailey v. 
Jerome County, 113 Idaho 430-431, 745 P.2d 1051-1052 (1987), a minor son and an adult son 
sustained personal injuries in an automobile accident. On November 7, 1984, one hundred and 
seventy-one (171) days after the accident, the injured parties and their parents (hereafter the 
"Gaileys") filed a notice of tort claim against Jerome County. Id. at 431, 745 P .2d at I 052. On July 
1, 1985, an amendment to the tort claim statute went into effect extending the claim filing period 
from 120 to 180 days. Id. (Emphasis added.) The complaint was filed on September 5, 1985. Id. 
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Jerome County moved for summary judgment on the ground the notice of claim was not timely filed. 
Id. The district court granted summary judgment, and the Gaileys appealed. Id. 
The Idaho Supreme Court held the 1985 amendment extending the time to file the notice of 
claim could not be applied retroactively. Id. at 433, 745 P.2d at 1054. The time for filing the notice 
of claim had expired long before the 1985 amendment became effective. Id. at 432, 745 P.2d at 
1053. The Court concluded, in part, that the Gaileys failed to timely file the notice of claim within 
120 days as required by the statute effective at the time; therefore to apply the amendment to those 
claims would improperly enlarge the rights of the Gaileys whose claims had been barred under the 
former statute. Id. at 433, 745 P.2d at 1054. Furthermore, the Court found defendants had a vested 
right under the prior statute to an absolute defense to the Gaileys claims, which retroactive 
application of the amendment would destroy. Id. The Court concluded the 1985 amendment 
extending the time to file a notice of claim was inapplicable, and affirmed the trial court's dismissal 
of the Gaileys claims. Id. 
Following the rationale in Gailey, and assuming the Court finds the 2009 amendment to 
Idaho Code § 31-857 is not retroactive, this Court should find the amendment to Idaho Code § 31-
857 is inapplicable. Piercy mistakenly asserts no statute of limitations applies to challenging the 
validity of a county order based on procedural deficiencies. As previously argued at length, the 
"catch-all" statute of limitations applies to the facts of this case. Idaho Code § 5-224; see also 
Canady v. Coeur d'Alene Lumber Co., 21 Idaho 77, 120 P. 830 (1911) (applied the statute of 
limitations to preclude challenge to an ordinance.) 
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Idaho Code§ 5-224, provides an action "must be commenced within four ( 4) years after the 
cause of action shall have accrued." In this case, the cause of action accrued the date the order 
establishing the 1982 herd district went into effect. See, Canady, 21 Idaho 77, 120 P. 830. 
Therefore, Piercy' s time to challenge the order establishing the 1982 herd district expired long before 
the 2009 amendment to Idaho Code § 31-857 went into effect. Under Gailey, the 2009 amendment 
does not revive his challenge, which was already barred by§ 5-224 when he made it. 
B. THE 2009 AMENDMENT IS CONSTITUTIONAL. 
1. Statutory Construction. 
The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises free 
review. Stuartv. State, 149 Idaho 35, __ , 232 P.3d 813, 818 (2010) (additional citations omitted). 
The party challenging a statute on constitutional grounds bears the burden of establishing that the 
statute is unconstitutional and "must overcome a strong presumption of validity." Doe Iv. Doe, 13 8 
Idaho 893, 903, 71 P.3d 1040, 1050 (2003) (additional citations omitted). Every reasonable 
presumption must be indulged in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. State v. Pontier, 95 Idaho 
707, 711, 518 P.2d 969, 973 (1974) (additional citations omitted). The legislature is presumed to 
have acted within its constitutional power. Worthen v. State, 96 Idaho 175, 179, 525 P.2d 957, 961 
(1974) (additional citations omitted). 
The party challenging a statute on constitutional grounds must show the statute is 
unconstitutional "on its face" or "as applied." Am. Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2 v. Idaho Dept. Water 
Res., 143 Idaho 862, 870, 154 P.3d 433, 441 (2007) (additional citations omitted). A facial challenge 
requires a showing that the statute in question is unconstitutional in all applications and is purely a 
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question oflaw. Id. (additional citations omitted). By contrast, an "as applied" challenge requires 
a showing that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to the offending conduct. Id. (Additional 
citations omitted). It appears Piercy is solely making an "as applied" challenge. 
2. The 2009 Amendment to Idaho Code § 31-857 Does Not Violate Procedural Due 
Process. 
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "prohibits deprivation oflife, liberty, 
or property without 'fundamental fairness' through governmental conduct that offends the 
community's sense of justice, decency and fair play." Maresh v. State, Dept. of Health and Welfare 
ex rel. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221, 225-226, 970 P.2d 14, 18-19 (1998) (additional citations omitted). 
Furthermore, "due process is not a concept rigidly applied to every adversarial confrontation, but 
instead is a flexible concept calling for such procedural protections as are warranted by the particular 
situation." Id at 226, 970 P.2d at 19. (Additional citations omitted). 
For purposes of determining whether an individual's due process rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment have been violated, a court must engage in a two-step analysis. Id. It must first decide 
whether the individual's threatened interest is a liberty or property interest under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Id. (Additional citations omitted). 
Only after a court finds a liberty or property interest will it reach the next step of analysis, 
in which it determines what process is due. Id. (Additional citations omitted). 
Whether a property interest exists can be determined only by an examination of the particular 
statute or ordinance in question. Id. (Additional citations omitted.) A person must have more than 
an abstract need or desire for a benefit in order to have a property interest therein. Id. at 227, 970 
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P.2d at 20. (Additional citations omitted.) Further, that person must have more than a unilateral 
expectation in the benefit; instead, she must have c:i. "legitimate claim of entitlement to it." Id 
(Additional citations omitted.) 
"The Fourteenth Amendment's procedural protection of property is a safeguard of the security 
of interests that a person has already acquired in specific benefits." Id. at 226, 970 P .2d at 19, citing 
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). 
Examples of potentially protected property interests include drivers' licenses, welfare 
benefits, unemployment insurance, homestead exemptions, Social Security, workers' compensation 
and medical licenses. See, Ides, Allan and Christopher N. May, Examples & Explanations: 
Constitutional Law - Individual Rights. 2nd Ed., Aspen Law & Business, 2001. 
Piercy has failed to support his argument that open range status is a clearly protected property 
interest. Furthermore, title 25, chapter 24, Idaho Code demonstrates there is no such constitutional 
right because it grants counties the right to create herd districts. Idaho Code§ 25-2401. The statutes 
simply do not entitle Piercy to certain benefits, nor do they create an expectation that property is 
open range. Piercy has no legitimate claim of entitlement to open range property status. 
Consequently, he does not have a property interest protected by the constitution. 
Even assuming Piercy does have a protected property interest, Piercy has failed to show the 
statutes providing notice and an opportunity to be heard violate due process. Rather, Piercy asserts 
the 2009 amendment to Idaho Code § 31-857 somehow violates the statutory provision regarding 
notice and an opportunity to be heard. This argument is flawed. 
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It is well established that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not 
prohibit a state from attaching reasonable time limitations to the assertion of federal constitutional 
rights. Martinezv. State, 130 Idaho 530, 534, 944P.2d127, 131 (Ct. App.1997)(additional citations 
omitted). The test is whether the defendant has had "a reasonable opportunity to have the issue as 
to the claimed right heard and determined." Id. (Additional citations omitted.) The current statute 
of limitations for a challenge to the validity of an ordinance is four ( 4) years pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ 5-224. The 2009 amendment expanded the statute oflimitations to seven (7) years. Even applied 
retroactively, four or seven years is more than a reasonable amount of time in which to pursue a 
claim for relief. See, Martinez, 130 Idaho at 535, 944 P.2d at 132 (reaffirming that a one year statute 
of limitations is a reasonable amount of time within which to file an application for post-conviction 
relief.) Therefore, there is no merit to Piercy's argument that procedural due process was violated. 
3. The 2009 Amendment to Idaho Code§ 31-857 Does Not Violate Substantive Due 
Process. 
The United States and Idaho Constitutions protect against state deprivation of a person's "life, 
liberty, or property, without due process oflaw." Idaho Dairymen's Ass'n, Inc. v. Gooding County, 
148 Idaho 653, __ , 227 P.3d 907, 915 (2010), citing U.S. Const. amend. XIV,§ 1; Idaho Const. 
art. 1, § 13. In order to prevail on a substantive due process claim, the state action that deprives a 
person of life, liberty, or property must be arbitrary, capricious, or without a rational basis. Idaho 
Dairymen's Ass 'n Inc., 148 Idaho at __ , 227 P.3d at 915, citing Pace v. Hymas, 111 Idaho 581, 
586, 726 P.2d 693, 698 (1986). Conversely, a substantive due process violation will not be found 
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if the state action "bears a reasonable relationship to a permissible legislative objective." Id., citing 
McNeely v. State, 119 Idaho 182, 189, 804 P .2d 911, 918 (Ct.App.1990) (citing State v. Reed, 107 
Idaho 162, 167, 686 P.2d 842, 847 (Ct.App.1984)). 
Piercy' s claim the 2009 amendment to Idaho Code§ 31-857 violates substantive due process 
is without merit. First, as argued above, there is no evidence or case law supporting Piercy's claim 
that he has a constitutionally protected property interest. Second, even if the Court finds Piercy h~s 
a property interest, the 2009 amendment to Idaho Code § 31-857 bears a reasonable relationship to 
a permissible legislative objective. 
The 2009 amendment precludes a challenge to the proceedings or jurisdictional steps 
preceding certain orders of the board of county commissioners after seven (7) years from the date 
of the order. The purpose of the amendment, as discussed in greater detail above, is to protect 
existing school, road, herd, or other districts from stale claims. Similar to the facts of this case, many 
of these districts have been in existence for decades. A challenge to the creation of such districts 
would require review of evidence that through the passage of time no longer exists due to destruction 
or death, and/or reliance on faded memories. Therefore, the amendment is valid because the 
government has sufficient reason to want to avoid stale claims. Furthermore, the expressed 
legislative purpose of the 2009 amendment is to "eliminate unreasonably delayed legal challenges 
to the procedures sued by the County Commission after seven years have passed, the districts are in 
place and have been relied upon by the citizens and the county." Statement of Purpose. Such 
purpose clearly bears a reasonable relationship to a permissible legislative objective. 
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It is well established that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not 
prohibit a state from attaching reasonable time limitations to the assertion of federal constitutional 
rights. Martinezv. State, 130Idaho530,534,944P.2d 127, 131 (Ct.App.1997)(additionalcitations 
omitted). The test is whether the defendant has had "a reasonable opportunity to have the issue as 
to the claimed rightheard and determined." Id. (Additional citations omitted.) The current statute 
oflimitations for a challenge to the validity of an ordinance is four ( 4) years pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ 5-224. The 2009 amendment expanded the statute oflimitations to seven (7) years. Even applied 
retroactively, four or seven years is more than a reasonable amount of time in which to pursue a 
claim for relief. See, Martinez, 130 Idaho at 535, 944 P.2d at 132 (reaffirming that a one year statute 
oflimitations is a reasonable amount of time within which to file an application for post-conviction 
relief.) Therefore, there is no merit to Piercy' s argument that procedural due process was violated. 
3. The 2009 Amendment to Idaho Code§ 31-857 Does Not Violate Substantive Due 
Process. 
The United States and Idaho Constitutions protect against state deprivation of a person's "life, 
liberty, or property, without due process oflaw." Idaho Dairymen's Ass'n, Inc. v. Gooding County, 
148 Idaho 653, __ , 227 P.3d 907, 915 (2010), citing U.S. Const. amend. XIV,§ 1; Idaho Const. 
art. 1, § 13. In order to prevail on a substantive due process claim, the state action that deprives a 
person of life, liberty, or property must be arbitrary, capricious, or without a rational basis. Idaho 
Dairymen's Ass 'n Inc., 148 Idaho at_, 227 P.3d at 915, citing Pace v. Hymas, 111Idaho581, 
586, 726 P.2d 693, 698 (1986). Conversely, a substantive due process violation will not be found 
if the state action "bears a reasonable relationship to a permissible legislative objective." Id., citing 
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McNeely v. State, 119 Idaho 182, 189, 804 P.2d 911, 918 (Ct.App.1990) (citing State v. Reed, 107 
Idaho 162, 167, 686 P.2d 842, 847 (Ct.App.1984)). 
Piercy' s claim the 2009 amendment to Idaho Code § 31-857 violates substantive due process 
is without merit. First, as argued above, there is no evidence or case law supporting Piercy' s claim 
that he has a constitutionally protected property interest. Second, even if the Court finds Piercy has 
a property interest, the 2009 amendment to Idaho Code § 31-857 bears a reasonable relationship to 
a permissible legislative objective. 
The 2009 amendment precludes a challenge to the proceedings or jurisdictional steps 
preceding certain orders of the board of county commissioners after seven (7) years from the date 
of the order. The purpose of the amendment, as discussed in greater detail above, is to protect 
existing school, road, herd, or other districts from stale claims. Similar to the facts of this case, many 
of these districts have been in existence for decades. A challenge to the creation of such districts 
would require review of evidence that through the passage of time no longer exists due to destruction 
or death, and/or reliance on faded memories. Therefore, the amendment is valid because the 
government has sufficient reason to want to avoid stale claims. Furthermore, the expressed 
legislative purpose of the 2009 amendment is to "eliminate unreasonably delayed legal challenges 
to the procedures sued by the County Commission after seven years have passed, the districts are in 
place and have been relied upon by the citizens and the county." Statement of Purpose. Such 
purpose clearly bears a reasonable relationship to a permissible legislative objective. 
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Finally, it is well-established the legislature may establish statutes oflimitations. Stuart v. 
State, 149 Idaho 35, __ , 232 P.3d 813, 820 (2010). Because such authority is vested with the 
legislature, there cannot be a substantive due process violation. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Idaho Legislature has provided us with a bright line test to determine whether the 1982 
herd district challenged by Piercy is valid. Under § 31-857, the herd district is valid, as more than 
seven years have passed since the order creating the district. The amendments to § 31-857 simply 
express the unifying characteristic of the common law and statutory defenses asserted by Guzman 
and Sutton, which is that at some point a statute, ordinance, or law is immune from procedural 
challenge. Idaho counties should not have to worry about countering procedural challenges to old 
herd, school, road, and other districts. § 31-857 does not allow it, nor do the common law and 
statutory defenses asserted by Guzman and Sutton. 
DATED this~ day of August 2010. 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
By:--r.~=t".<--'-~-fifV ______ _ 
Joshua S. Evett, of the firm 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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In his July 30, 2010 legal memorandum, Defendant Piercy raises two arguments in 
opposition to Plaintiffs motion to dismiss his Eighth Affirmative Defense (which defense 
alleges that the 1982 herd district is invalid): 
I. That the July 1, 2009 legislative amendment to IC. 31-857 is.not retroactive; 
and 
2. That applying such statute retroactively violates Piercy' s rights to due 
process. 
Both of Piercy's arguments are without merit. Piercy's Eighth Affirmative Defense 
must be dismissed, and the 1982 herd district must be declared valid pursuant to I.C. 31-857. 
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF 31-857 
" ... [I}f the language (of the statute) clearly refers to the past as well as the future, then 
the intent to make the law retroactive is expressly declared ... " and the statute will be applied 
retroactively. Peavy v. McCombs, 26 Idaho 143, 149 P. 965 (1914), at p. 968. 
By clear, unequivocal and express language I.C. 31-857 (as amended July 1, 2009) 
applies to herd districts "heretofore" or "hereafter" created. The statute clearly refers to both 
the past as well as the future. I.C. 31-857 therefore applies retroactively. Since it has been 
more than 7 years since the creation of the herd district, Piercy' s defense that the herd district 
was not validly created must be dismissed, because I.C. 31-857 prohibits any "challenge to the 
proceedings or jurisdictional steps preceding" the order creating the herd district. 
PIERCY'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS 
Piercy' s rights to due process have not been violated by the legislative amendment to 
I.C. 31-857. 
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A legislature may alter the statute of limitations without violating a litigant's rights of 
due process. No less than the U.S. Supreme Court has so held. Chase v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 
304 (1945). 
The irony of Piercy' s position is worth mentioning. Piercy complains loudly that his 
rights to contest the validity of the 1982 herd district were unfairly taken away by the 
legislative amendment to I. C. 31-857. Piercy cleverly ignores that he had some 23 years to 
contest the validity of the statute. Though Piercy claims he didn't know of the enactment of the 
1982 herd district, it is uncontested that when the herd district was created, notice of creation of 
the herd district was published in the primary Canyon County newspaper. 
And Piercy knew of the herd district, his protestations to the contrary notwithstanding. 
It is undisputed that Piercy has farmed and ranched in Canyon County for some 50 years (some 
25 years before, and some 25 years after the herd district was created). It can not be seriously 
contested that Piercy told his insurer that the area was "not open range" in 2001. It is 
undisputed that Piercy' s insurer paid for damage caused by Piercy' s livestock in this exact 
same area, because the area was "not open range". And under Idaho law, if an area is not open 
range, it is herd district. Piercy' s neighbor and witness, E. G. Johnson (another long time 
Canyon County rancher) knew of the 1982 herd district. It is undisputed that all of Canyon 
County has been treated as a herd district since 1982. 
Piercy has had plenty of time to contest the validity of the herd district. He elected to 
sit on his rights for 23 years. He lived and operated for 23 years under the 1982 herd district 
rule of law, keeping all his livestock enclosed (as one would do in a herd district, and as all 
ranchers did throughout Canyon County, per Piercy' s own testimony). He may not now contest 
the validity of the herd district. Per IC. 31-857, the 1982 herd district is now unassailable. 
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SUTTON'S BRIEF 
Plaintiff adopts and incorporates herein the additional arguments advanced by Sutton in 
her brief filed in response to Piercy's brief of August 6, 2010. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons enumerated herein, and for the additional reasons enumerated in 
Plaintiffs May 25, 2010 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motions to Dismiss and for 
reconsideration, Plaintiff Guzman requests that the Court declare the 1982 herd district valid, 
and that the Court Dismiss Piercy' s Eighth Affirmative Defense. 
. t-rV 
DATED this _\O_ day of August, 2010. 
CHASAN & WALTON, L.L.C. 
~Si~: ~~:::::.---
By~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
Timothy C. Walton, of the firm 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Louis J. Guzman 
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Procedural History 
The relevant facts and procedural history of this action have been reiterated multiple 
times in the pleadings filed in the action. A procedural history relevant to this particular order is 
recited in this court's Order on Motion to Reconsider filed December 7, 2009. On December 7, 
2009, this court issued the Order on Motion to Reconsider which allowed the parties to revisit 
limited issues regarding Judge Petrie' s ruling on the validity of the 1982 Canyon County herd 
district ordinance. The court is reconsidering the Co-Defendant Jennifer Sutton (Sutton) and 
Plaintiff Luis J. Guzman's (Guzman) assertion that the Defendant, Dale Piercy's (Piercy) attack 
on the validity of the Canyon County's 1982 Herd District Ordinance is barred by equitable 
estoppel, estoppel by !aches and applicable statutes of limitations. 
On January 21, 2009, Judge Petrie filed his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment In Bifurcated Portion of Trial declaring Canyon County's 1982 Herd District 
Ordinance invalid. Judge Petrie subsequently retired and on April 15, 2009 this court was 
assigned to preside over this case. Guzman and Sutton appealed Judge Petrie's declaratory 
action order. The appeals were dismissed by the Idaho Supreme Court without prejudice on the 
grounds that the appeals constituted interlocutory appeals of the trial court's declaratory action 
ruling. On May 5, 2009, Piercy filed a second Motion for Summary Judgment. Guzman's May 
22, 2009 response to Piercy' s summary judgment motion reasserted the estoppel and statute of 
limitation defenses. Although not captioned as a motion to reconsider, Guzman's opposition 
alleged that those issues had not been fully addressed by Judge Petrie in his order. On July 30, 
2009 Sutton filed a Motion to Reconsider pursuant to IRCP l l(a)(2)(B). The court subsequently 
entered the above referenced Order on Motion to Reconsider. On May 3, 2010, the court heard 
testimony from Paul Axness, a former insurance adjuster who handled claims made by and 
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against Piercy in the past. On May 26, 2010, Guzman filed a Motion for Reconsideration and 
Motion to Dismiss, along with supporting memorandum and affidavit. Guzman's May 26, 2010 
Motion did not cite any particular Rule of Civil Procedure as a basis for the motion, but did 
indicate it was based on Idaho Code §31-857. The court will treat Guzman's motion to 
reconsider as an IRCP 1 l(a)(2)(B) motion. The procedural basis for Guzman's motion to 
dismiss Piercy' s Eighth Affirmative Defense is not as easily identified. Sutton filed her Brief 
Regarding Defenses on Reconsideration on June 2, 2010. Piercy filed a Response to Motions to 
Reconsider and supporting affidavit on June 8, 2010. Sutton filed a Reply and supporting 
affidavit on June 10, 2010. Oral argument was held on June 14, 2010, however, the argument on 
the Motion to Dismiss was continued. On July 30, 2010, Piercy filed a Memorandum in 
Objection to Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss and For Reconsideration, along with supporting 
affidavit. Sutton filed a Memorandum in Response on August 6, 2010, and Guzman filed a 
Reply Memorandum on August 9, 2010. Oral argument was held on August 11, 2010. The 
court attempted to schedule a telephonic hearing to rule on the pending issues in October 2010. 
Because of participant availability issues, the court scheduled the pending issues for December 9, 
2010 oral ruling. On December 9, 2010, the court entered its oral ruling on the record regarding 
the pending motions to reconsider and the motion to dismiss affirmative defense. This written 
memorialization of the court's December 9, 2010 oral ruling has been prepared and filed to 
provide a written record of the court's ruling for appellant purposes. This written memorandum 
is consistent with and reiterates the oral ruling. During the December 9, 2010 hearing, the court 
also raised the issue of whether the ruling rendered Piercy' s May 5, 2009 second motion for 
summary judgment moot. After discussion, this court allowed that Piercy's attorney could 
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provide supplemental briefing and reschedule that motion for summary judgment for hearing if 
he and his client determined that the motion for summary judgment remained viable. 
Motion for Reconsideration - The Estoppel Issues 
Quasi-estoppel 
Guzman and Sutton have asserted the defense of Quasi-Estoppel and Estoppel by Laches to 
Piercy' s declaratory action. This court, as a matter of discretion, has allowed the parties to 
present evidence on and reassert these doctrines in order to ensure that these issues have been 
fully considered and addressed by the court. 
Quasi-estoppel is a doctrine applicable to situations in which it would be unconscionable 
to allow a party to assert a right that is inconsistent with a previously asserted position in such a 
manner to impose prejudice or harm on another party, the party asserting the doctrine. Weitz v. 
Green, 148 Idaho 851, 230 P.3d 743 (2010) citing, Willig v. State, Dept. of Health & Welfare, 
127 Idaho 259, 261, 899 P.2d 969, 971 (1995). In order for quasi-estoppel to apply, a party must 
show: (1) the offending party took a different position than his or her original position, and (2) 
either (a) the offending party gained an advantage or caused a disadvantage to the other party; (b) 
the other party was induced to change positions; or ( c) it would be unconscionable to permit the 
offending party to maintain an inconsistent position from one he or she has already derived a 
benefit or acquiesced in. Mortensen v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 149 Idaho 437, 235 P.3d 387 
(2010), citing Terrazas v. Blaine County, 147 Idaho 193, 200 n. 3, 207 P.3d 169, 176 n. 3 (2009). 
In adopting the doctrine of quasi-estoppel the Idaho Supreme Court in KTVB, Inc. v. Boise City, 
94 Idaho 279, 486 P.2d 992 (1971) found that "[t]he requirements for proper application of quasi 
estoppel are, then, that the person against whom it is sought to be applied has previously taken an 
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inconsistent position, with knowledge of the facts and his rights, to the detriment of the person 
seeking application of the doctrine." Id, at 282,995. In more recent cases, the Court has required 
evidence that "the party to be estopped must have either gained some advantage against the other 
party, produced a disadvantage to the other party, or the other party must have been induced to 
change positions." Grover v. Wadsworth, 147 Idaho 60, 205 P.3d 1196 (2009), citing C & G, Inc. 
v. Canyon Highway Dist. No. 4, 139 Idaho 140, 145, 75 P.3d 194, 199 (2003). 
The court has considered the evidence presented as well as the extensive briefing and 
arguments presented by the parties and concludes that the Piercy was not barred by the doctrine 
of quasi-estoppel from challenging the legitimacy of the 1982 Canyon County Herd District 
Ordinance. In reaching this conclusion, the court considered all relevant evidence presented to 
the court including the articulated history of Piercy residing in and ranching in Canyon County, 
the propounded deposition testimony and the testimony of Paul Axness, retired insurance 
adjuster. In his testimony, Mr. Axness acknowledged the entry of notations in his adjuster's 
notes indicating that he had concluded the Wamstad Lane location of the October 12, 2001 
collision between two motor vehicles and cattle belonging to Piercy did not occur on open range. 
One of the notations was made at approximately the same time as he had engaged in a 
conversation with Mr. Piercy. Axness did not recall whether Piercy advised him that the location 
of the accident was not open range. He opined that he would have reached the "not open range" 
conclusion if he had been advised that the cattle had escaped from a fenced-in location. In this 
case, Mr. Axness received information that the cattle had escaped from a fenced-in area. This 
testimony suggests the Mr. Axness could have reached the "not open range" conclusion based on 
his conversation with Mr. Piercy or someone else and based on being advised of the same or 
because he had been advised that the struck livestock had escaped from a fenced-in area. He was 
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uncertain why he had reached that conclusion. The livestock struck in that circumstance as well 
as in this case had escaped from a fenced-in location. None of the evidence presented before the 
court suggests that Mr. Piercy intentionally allowed his cattle to roam the countryside unfenced. 
Mr. Piercy is a Canyon County rancher, who has continuously resided and worked in Canyon 
County for approximately fifty years. He has resided and worked in Canyon County for as long 
as the challenged 1982 ordinance has been in effect. He contends he was uncertain, but believed 
the bull in question was pastured in an open range district. Despite Piercy' s testimony, it would 
be logical to assume that he would investigate and determine with certainty the open range or 
herd district status of his lands. 
However, the court does not find that quasi-estoppel applies to Piercy's challenge to the 
1982 Canyon County herd district because there has not been sufficient evidence presented of 
record to establish: (1) that Piercy had previously taken an inconsistent position (although the 
evidence of record suggests that his insurance company may have taken an inconsistent position) 
to the detriment of a person seeking to enforce the doctrine; and (2) that Piercy gained an 
advantage or caused a disadvantage to another other party or that the other party was induced to 
change positions or that it would be unconscionable to allow him to take an inconsistent position 
to one that he had previously benefitted from. 
With regard to the first alternative quasi-estoppel theory, there was no evidence presented 
to the court that the parties to this action have ever had a prior relationship with each other in 
which Piercy could have taken or did take an inconsistent position on the herd district issue. 
Furthermore, the evidence presented to the court was insufficient to establish that Piercy, rather 
than his insurance company, asserted an inconsistent position regarding the existence of a herd 
district relative to prior cattle/vehicle collision claims handled by his insurance company. 
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Similarly the evidence presented to the court is insufficient to support the "unconscionability" 
alternative of the quasi-estoppel defense to Piercy's attack on the 1982 Canyon County herd 
district ordinance. The argument that Piercy "unconscionably" benefitted from the herd district 
by not having free roaming livestock trespass on his property or that he has been able to operate 
his motor vehicles on Canyon County public roadways with the confidence that he was safe from 
free roaming cattle while simultaneously maintaining silence on the validity of the herd district 
ordinance until this case arose is a far too broad and speculative assertion to satisfy the specific 
element of "benefitting from a prior inconsistent position" to satisfy that particular element of the 
quasi-estoppel doctrine. An example of the type of evidence that might be sufficient to meet the 
"unconscionabilty" theory of quasi-estoppel would be an injured person asserting a claim against 
another person on the basis that he or she should have been protected by compliance with the 
herd district restrictions while simultaneously or subsequently asserting the opposite position in a 
lawsuit in with he or she is the respondent to a similar claim. That is not the situation in this 
case. The evidence is not clear as to what Piercy knew regarding the existence or validity of the 
challenged herd district. 
Guzman and Sutton's argument that the court should reconsider Judge Petrie's October 9, 
2007 order regarding the validity of the 1982 Canyon County herd district ordinance on the basis 
of quasi-estoppel is denied. 
Estoppel by Laches 
Estoppel by !aches has often been referred to as a defense created in equity and is related 
to equitable estoppel. Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 92 P.3d 386 (2004). The determination of 
the applicability of !aches to an action is a question of fact within the province of the trial court 
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and thus, the trial court's determination is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. The Idaho 
Supreme Court has found that "[b]ecause application of !aches is discretionary, the standard of 
review on appeal is whether the trial court properly found (1) a lack of diligence by the party 
against whom the defense is asserted, and (2) prejudice to the party asserting the defense." Id. 
citing Preservation Coalition, Inc. v. Pierce, 667 F.2d 851, 854 (9th Cir.1982). The elements of 
!aches are (1) the defendant's invasion of plaintiffs right; (2) a delay in the assertion of the 
plaintiffs right; (3) a lack of knowledge by the defendant that the plaintiff would assert that 
right; and ( 4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is granted to the plaintiff or 
the suit is not held to be barred. Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce, Inc. 137 Idaho 352, 48 P.3d 124 
(2002). See also Winn v. Eaton, 128 Idaho 670, 917 P.2d 1310 (Ct. App.1996). Laches is 
derived from disfavor for "antiquated or stale demands" or "long acquiescence in the assertion of 
adverse rights" Abrams v. Porter, 128 Idaho 869, 920 P.2d 386 (1996), citing Johnson v. Strong 
Arm Reservoir Irrigation Dist., 82 Idaho 478, 487, 356 P.2d 67, 72 (1960). 
Sutton and Guzman have long relied on Alexander v. Trustees of Village of Middleton, 92 
Idaho 823, 452 P.2d 50 (1969) in support of their claim that estoppel by laches is applicable to 
Piercy's position on the validity of the 1982 Canyon County herd district ordinance. In 
Alexander, the plaintiffs challenged Middleton's annexation of the plaintiffs' land because the 
ordinance allowing the annexation violated state law. In upholding the trial court's dismissal of 
plaintiffs' claims, the Idaho Supreme Court relied on McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 
Volume 2, Section 7.09, which states "If the elements of estoppel are present, the owners of land 
over which the municipal corporation has exercised the powers and functions of government for 
a long period of time will be estopped from questioning the location of the municipal 
boundaries." Id. at 826, 452, P.2d at 53. The Alexander court also relied on a prior ruling in 
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Finucane v. Village of Hayden, 86 Idaho 199, 284 P.2d 236 (1963) in which the court held the 
following: 
Such rule has application even though the proceeding by which the municipal boundaries 
were extended are void, when by reason of lapse of time the municipal authority has been 
exercised, and there has resuited changed conditions involving extensive public and 
private interests. 
Such holdings are based upon public policy. Where a municipal corporation and the 
parties affected acquiesce in such action by the officials of the corporation, and transact 
business upon the theory that the land is located within the boundaries of the 
municipality, it is in the interest of the general public that such a rule be applied. 
Id. 
The court in Alexander found that that the plaintiffs were estopped from challenging the 
annexation because the annexation had occurred more than two years prior to the action, the 
plaintiffs were given notice of the intent to annex and the plaintiffs' land benefitted from the 
annexation. One of the considerations before the court in this case is the lapse of time that has 
passed since the ordinance was adopted, given that !aches is designed to prevent or limit stale or 
antiquated claims. While this element is not controlling, it is an important consideration before 
the court. Winn, supra. 
Guzman and Sutton have also relied on Telfer v. School District No. 31 of Blaine 
County, 50 Idaho 274, 295 P. 632 (1931). In that case, the landowners attempted to challenge a 
school district that was alleged to have been created without the proper procedures. However, 
the Idaho Supreme Court stated "We hold school district No. 31 having existed, exercising all 
the functions of a public school district of the state over its present well-defined territory as a 
public corporation for the past ten years, its legal entity is not subject to attack by a landowner 
within the district in an injunction proceeding against its officers." Id. at 634. 
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Estoppel by !aches is the more compelling of the two estoppel arguments asserted by 
Guzman and Sutton regarding Piercy's challenge to the 1982 Canyon County herd district 
ordinance. There has been a substantial lapse of time since the purported enactment of the 1982 
Canyon County herd district. Although the lapse of time is not to be controlling, this court must 
give the long passage of time since the enactment of the 1982 Canyon County herd district 
ordinance due regard along with considering the other relevant facts, circumstances and conduct 
of the parties. Given Mr. Piercy's fifty year history of residing and ranching in this county, his 
testimony that he believed the bull at issue in this case was pastured in an open range district 
stretches the bounds of credibility. However, to invoke estoppel by !aches, the proponent must 
present sufficient substantial evidence of all the elements of the doctrine. The passage of time 
alone is not sufficient to prevail under this equitable argument. In considering all the 
circumstances and conduct of the parties, the court cannot find that Guzman and Sutton have 
established by substantial and competent evidence all of the elements necessary to establish 
estoppel by !aches. In particular, the propounded evidence regarding Piercy's insurance 
company's prior position is inconclusive at best. The evidence of record is insufficient to 
establish that Piercy ever asserted or benefitted from a prior inconsistent position regarding the 
challenged ordinance or that he had actual knowledge of the existence or status of the asserted 
ordinance or otherwise engaged in any interaction with Canyon County or any of the parties 
regarding the enforcement of or acquiescence in the application of the ordinance in question. At 
best, the evidence demonstrates that he was simply silent on the issue. In light of this lack of 
evidence, Guzman and Sutton's request that this court reconsider and reverse Judge Petrie's 
October 9, 2007 ruling on the validity of the 1982 Canyon County herd district ordinance on the 
basis of estoppel by !aches is denied. 
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Motion for Reconsideration - The Statute of Limitations Issue 
Sutton and Guzman assert that the statutes of limitations set forth in Idaho Code §31-857 
and/or Idaho Code §5-224 preclude Piercy's challenge to the validity of the 1982 Canyon County 
herd district ordinance. This argument was presented in the context of Sutton and Guzman's 
motions to reconsider as well as Guzman's motion to dismiss Piercy's eighth affirmative 
defense. Pursuant to a ruling on a motion for summary judgment and Sutton's request, Judge 
Petrie directed Sutton to bring Canyon County into this case as a defendant in a interrelated, but 
independent declaratory action pursuant to Idaho Code §10-1201 and IRCP 57. The declaratory 
action was intended to provide a procedure for determining the validity of Canyon County's 
1982 herd district ordinance. Judge Petrie concluded that Canyon County was a necessary party 
to such a proceeding. Although Sutton was originally directed to bring the action against 
Canyon County, the parties subsequently stipulated to realign the parties in the declaratory action 
to properly and logically address the issues presented by that action. This was accomplished 
pursuant to the Stipulation to Amend Pleadings and Scheduling filed on September 4, 2008. 
Piercy was the named Plaintiff in the amended declaratory action against Canyon County. The 
stipulation realigning the parties included a provision purportedly limiting the assertion of 
timeliness defenses to Piercy' s filing of the amended declaratory action complaint. The 
provision in question read as follows: "That Canyon County, Mr. Guzman and Ms. Sutton waive 
any defenses they may have regarding the timing of the filing of Mr. Piercy' s Amended Action 
for Declaratory Relief' Piercy contends that this language precluded Guzman, Sutton and 
Canyon County from asserting any statute of limitations defense to Piercy' s complaint. Guzman 
and Sutton disagree, contending that provision was only included to address problems that might 
arise as result of the late realignment of parties and the filing of the amended action. This 
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stipulation was filed approximately one month before the October 8, 2008 bench trial 
commenced. Paragraph four of the stipulation also provided that Canyon County, Guzman and 
Sutton would be allowed to Answer the Amended Action for Declaratory Relief as provided for 
in the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Paragraph four appears to be inconsistent with the 
assertion that the responding parties knowingly agreed not to assert a statute of limitations 
affirmative defense particularly in light of their vigorous assertion of other affirmative defenses 
including the estoppel arguments. The analysis of the statute of limitations issue is further 
complicated by the fact that Canyon County never asserted a specific statute of limitations 
defense, which Piercy contends is dispositive of the issue in that Canyon County is the real party 
defendant in the declaratory action. Canyon County did assert a "limited statute of limitation by 
burden shifting" defense as its Fourth Affirmative Defense. Piercy argues that Sutton and 
Guzman lack independent standing to assert statute of limitations defenses to the declaratory 
action in light of the fact that Canyon County waived such a defense by failing to specifically 
assert it in its pleadings. Finally, although Sutton and Guzman specifically asserted the statute of 
limitations defense prior to Judge Petrie's ruling on the validity of the 1982 Canyon County Herd 
District, his order did not address the issue. Therefore, this court will consider and address the 
statute of limitations defense at this time. 
This court has determined that Sutton and Guzman did not waive their right to assert the 
statute of limitations defense when they entered the stipulation to realign the parties. If the 
litigants intended that the stipulation include a specific waiver by the respondents of their right to 
assert a statute of limitations defense, the stipulation should have specifically stated that the 
respondents waive all statute of limitations defenses. Canyon County waived the right to assert 
that defense to the declaratory action by failing to specifically plead it in its answer to the 
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amended declaratory action complaint. Sutton and Guzman have an articulated and identifiable 
financial interest in the outcome of the declaratory action and so this court will consider their 
statutes of limitations defense. Guzman has also filed a motion to dismiss Piercy' s eighth 
affirmative defense which alleges Piercy is immune from liability in this case because the struck 
bull escaped from an open range location. 
Idaho Code §31-857 
In its analysis, the court will address the statute of limitations provided for by Idaho Code 
§31-857 prior to addressing the statute of limitation set forth by Idaho Code 5-224. The 
applicability of Idaho Code §31-857 to the facts of this case was fully addressed by the attorneys 
as a part of the motion to reconsider Judge Petrie's declaratory action order as well as pursuant to 
Guzman's motion to dismiss Piercy's eighth affirmative defense. The statute oflimitations set 
forth in Idaho Code §31-857 did not exist at the time Judge Petrie considered and entered his 
order following the bench trial on Piercy' s declaratory action. This court can consider ne{V 
evidence or information in the process of reconsidering interlocutory orders entered by the court 
or its predecessor. The Idaho Supreme Court's dismissal of the parties' appeals confirm that 
Judge Petrie's order on the declaratory action was not a final appealable order. Therefore the 
court is treating it as an interlocutory order subject to a IRCP 1 l(a)(2)(B) motion to reconsider. 
For the reasons set forth below, the statute of limitations created by the Idaho State Legislature's 
2009 amendment to Idaho Code §31-857 will be applied by this court retroactively to time bar 
Piercy's challenge to the validity of the 1982 Canyon County herd district ordinance. 
The 2009 Amendment 
Idaho Code §31-857 provides that: 
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Whenever any school district, road district, herd district, or other district has heretofore been, or 
shall hereafter be, declared to be created, established, disestablished, dissolved, or modified, by 
an order of the board of county commissioners in any county of the state of Idaho, a legal prima 
facie presumption is hereby declared to exist, after a lapse of two (2) years from the date of such 
order, that all proceedings and jurisdictional steps preceding the making of such order have been 
properly and regularly taken so as to warrant said board in making said order, and the burden of 
proof shall rest upon the party who shall deny, dispute, or question the validity of said order to 
show that any of such preceding proceedings or jurisdictional steps were not properly or 
regularly taken; and such prima facie presumption shall be a rule of evidence in all courts in the 
state of Idaho. No challenge to the proceedings or jurisdictional steps preceding such an 
order, shall be heard or considered after seven (7) years has lapsed from the date of the 
order. 
This statute was enacted in 1935 and amended in 1989. The Idaho legislature further 
amended the statute in 2009 (effective July 1, 2009) by adding the last sentence "No challenge to 
the proceedings or jurisdictional steps preceding such an order, shall be heard or considered after 
seven (7) years has lapsed from the date of the order." Guzman and Sutton argue that the statute 
of limitations provision added by the 2009 amendment applies retroactively while Piercy argues 
the 2009 amendment only applies prospectively. Piercy also argues that a retroactive application 
of the newly adopted statute of limitations would violate his procedural and substantive due 
process rights. 
Retroactivity 
Idaho Code 73-101 provides that no statute is to be considered retroactive unless 
"expressly so declared." LC. 73-101. However, the Idaho appellate courts have determined that 
a statute need not make an express statement of retroactivity but that the legislature's intent that a 
statute be applied retroactively may be implied from the language of the statute. Kent v. Idaho 
Public Utilities Commission, 93 Idaho 618, 621, 469 P.2d 745, 748 (1970). In Idaho, a statute is 
not applied retroactively unless there is 'clear legislative intent to that effect." Wheeler v. Idaho 
Dept. of Health and Welfare, 147 Idaho 257, 207 P.3d 988 (2009). "A retrospective or 
retroactive law is one which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or 
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creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect to 
transactions or considerations already past." Id, citing 82 C.J.S. Statutes§ 407 (1999). 
In determining the intent of the legislature, a court may look to the literal wording of the 
statute along with "the context, the object in view, the evils to be remedied, the history of the 
times and of the legislation upon the same subject, public policy, contemporaneous construction, 
and the like." Messenger v. Burns, 86 Idaho 26, 29-30, 382 P.2d 913, 915 (1963). Guzman 
relies on Peavy v. McCombs, 26 Idaho 143, 140 P. 965 (1914) in which the Idaho Supreme Court 
stated that "it is sufficient if the enacting words are such that the intention to make the law 
retroactive is clear. In other words, if the language clearly refers to the past as well as to the 
future, then the intent to make the law retroactive is expressly declared .... " Thus, Guzman 
argues that the statute read as a whole specifically refers to herd districts created before and after 
July 1, 2009 and therefore is specifically retroactive. Sutton agrees, arguing that the language 
"heretofore created" indicates that the legislature intended that the code section be applicable to 
all districts created at or before the time J.C. 31-857 was enacted and that the language from 
legislative history of the amendment indicates that the legislature was concerned about limiting 
"unreasonably delayed legal challenges" to the districts impacted by J.C. 31-857. 
Piercy disagrees, citing the court to the University of Utah Hosp. on Behalf of Harris v. 
Pence, 104 Idaho 172, 174, 657 P.2d 469, 471 (1982) in support of his argument that the 2009 
amendment to Idaho Code 31-857 is not to be applied retroactively because there is not an 
"express declaration" of retroactivity. He argues that the rationale in that case has been applied 
to the amendment of the statute of limitations set forth in J.C. 31-3504 and J.C. 14-4902. In 
University of Utah Hospital, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized the following principle: 
[T]here is almost universal agreement that when a statutory period of limitation is 
amended to reduce the limitation period, the party whose right accrues before the 
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effective date of the amendment cannot be heard to complain if he is given the 
full time allowed for action according to the terms of the amended statute from 
and after the effective date of the amended statute. 
104 Idaho at 175, 657 P.2d at 472. 
Piercy argued the amendment adding the statute of limitations language should be read 
without consideration of the preexisting "heretofore or hereafter" language contained in the first 
sentence of the statute. Thus Piercy is arguing that that the statute of limitations enacted by the 
2009 amendment should not bar any proceeding challenging districts created before the passage 
of the amendment or at the very least until seven (7) years after the July 1, 2009 effective date of 
the amendment. Sutton argues that this interpretation would lead to an absurd result because 
most of the herd districts in the state were created more than 25 years ago and the specific 
language of the statute provides the prescribed statute of limitations commences running on the 
date of the order creating the district. Given the stated legislative purpose of eliminating stale 
claims challenging the validity of such districts, it would not make sense to limit the applicability 
of the amendment to districts created after July 1, 2009 or even to add another seven years to 
challenge districts created more than seven years prior the effective date of the amendment. This 
interpretation is supported by the literal, plain meaning of the language of the statute as well as 
the relevant legislative committee minutes and stated purpose for the amendment. 
All the parties rely on the legislative history of the 2009 amendment. On July 30, 2010, 
Piercy filed a Memorandum in Objection to Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss and for 
Reconsideration with attached exhibits detailing the steps taken by the Idaho Legislature when 
enacting the amendment. Exhibit 1 is a copy of H.B. No. 102 which states 
AN ACT RELATING TO COUNTIES; AMENDING SECTION 31-857, IDAHO 
CODE, TO PROVIDE THAT CHALLENGES TO PROCEEDINGS AND 
JURISDICTIONAL STEPS PRECEDING ORDERS RELATING TO THE 
CREATION, ESTABLISHMENT, DISESTABLISHMENT, DISSOLUTION OR 
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MODIFICATION OF CERTAIN DISTRICTS SHALL NOT BE HEARD OR 
CONSIDERED FOLLOWING THE LAPSE OF A SPECIFIED PERIOD OF 
TIME. 
Chapter 43, H.B. No 102, Exhibit 1 to Piercy July 30, 2010 Memorandum. 
Exhibit 2 to Piercy's Memorandum is a series of minutes for the House Judiciary, Rules and 
Administrative Comi-nittee held on February 11, 2009. The minutes indicate that Representative 
Lake was asked to explain the proposed legislation and provided: 
This bill establishes a standard seven year statute of limitation for procedural and 
jurisdictional districts under Idaho law. This will eliminate unreasonably delayed 
legal challenges to the procedures used by the County Commission after seven 
years have passed, the districts are in place and have been relied on by the citizens 
and the county. 
Exhibit 2 to Piercy July 30, 2010 Memorandum. 
Also included in Exhibit 2 is a minute for the House Local Government Committee held 
on February 18, 2009 in which Representative Lake presented House Bill 102 and the minutes 
state the following: 
He stated that this bill began in Judiciary and Rules because of a Jefferson County 
court case alleging that a Herd District had not been created appropriately. 
H0102 establishes that if a district is created, established, disestablished, 
dissolved or modified, challenges shall not be heard or considered following the 
lapse of a certain time period. 
Exhibit 2 to Piercy July 30, 2010 Memorandum. 
Finally, Exhibit 2 contains a minute from the Senate Local Government and Taxation 
Committee in which the following is stated: 
HB 102. RELATING TO COUNTIES to establish a statute of limitations for 
challenges to the creation of governmental districts under Idaho law. Senator 
Jorgenson explained that, in Idaho, all areas of the State outside a city or 
incorporated areas, are considered to be open range unless the county 
commissioners make a determination of a herd district. The difference between 
open range and a herd district is very important. In open range, an animal is free 
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to roam wherever it may choose and the owner has no liability. When a herd 
district is created, the animal owner has the responsibility to keep the animals 
fenced in and is liable for damages the animals may cause outside the fenced area. 
In cases involving a herd district, the validity of the district has been questioned 
due to the historical circumstances of the determination. This bill clarifies the 
issue of whether a district is established or disestablished and that the duty of 
proof falls on anyone but the county. If the county has acted and gone through 
the process of establishing a district, it is a matter of law. 
Senator Werk asked if the bill was about statute of limitations issues regarding 
whether the district was properly created. Senator Jorgenson concurred. 
Exhibit 2 to Piercy July 30, 2010 Memorandum. 
Finally, this court looks at the Statement of Purpose for the amendment provided by 
Exhibit 3 to Piercy's Memorandum in which the legislature states: 
This bill establishes a standard seven year statute of limitations for procedural and 
jurisdictional challenges to the creation of governmental districts under Idaho law. 
This will eliminate unreasonably delayed legal challenges to the procedures used 
by the County Commission after seven years have passed, the districts are in place 
and have been relied upon by the citizens of the county. 
Exhibit 3 to Piercy July 30, 2010 Memorandum. 
The court understands the parties' disparate interpretation of the applicability of this 
statutory amendment. However, this court finds that the Idaho legislature expressed, and a literal 
reading of the plain language of the statute confirms, the intent that the 2009 amendment creating 
a seven year statute oflimitations was to be applied retroactively to existing enumerated districts. 
To hold otherwise would eviscerate the stated purpose of eliminating "unreasonably delayed 
legal challenges" to the districts. Pursuant to IRCP 1 l(a)(2)(B), the court has reconsidered Judge 
Petrie's January 21, 2008 order invalidating the 1982 Canyon County herd district ordinance 
and concludes the statute oflimitations set forth in Idaho Code §31-857 bars Piercy's challenge 
to the validity of the ordinance. To that extent, Judge Petrie's January 21, 2009 Findings of Fact, 
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Conclusions of Law and Judgment In Bifurcated Portion of Trial is vacated and reversed and the 
declaratory relief action filed by Piercy in this case is dismissed. 
Guzman also filed a motion to dismiss Piercy' s eighth affirmative defense which asserts 
open range immunity. Guzman's attorney did not cite any particular procedural basis for this 
motion to dismiss an affirmative defense other than his reference to Idaho Code §31-857. It 
appears that the most appropriate procedure for seeking dismissal of an opposing party's 
affirmative defense would be an IRCP 56(b) motion for summary judgment. Since it may be 
disputed by the parties whether the Guzman's motion to dismiss Piercy's affirmative defense met 
the requirements of a IRCP 56(b) summary judgment proceeding, the court simple finds the 
motion has merit for the reasons set forth in this order and enters an order in limine precluding 
the presentation of evidence or argument of such affirmative defense during the jury trial of this 
action. The court will schedule a status conference to determine how and if the parties wish to 
further address the procedural appropriateness of the court granting an order dismissing this 
affirmative defense in the manner requested by Guzman. 
Idaho Code §5-224 
Prior to raising the issue of the 2009 amendment to Idaho Code 31-857, Sutton and 
Guzman asserted a statute of limitations defense to Piercy' s challenge to the 1982 Canyon 
County herd district ordinance pursuant to Idaho Code §5-224. If it is determined that the LC. 
§31-857 statute of limitations does not apply to Piercy's declaratory action, Sutton and Guzman 
maintain that the declaratory action is alternatively subject to the statute of limitations set forth 
by LC. §5-224. Although timely raised, this issue was not addressed by Judge Petrie in his 
declaratory action order so this court will also consider and decide the applicability of LC. §5-
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224 to Piercy's declaratory action in the alternative circumstance that I.C. §31-857 does not 
apply. Otherwise, the applicability ofldaho Code §5-224 is moot. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 57 and Idaho Code §10-1201 et seq. both refer to the 
process of obtaining declaratory relief as an "action." Idaho Code §5-240 defines an "action" as 
a special proceeding of a civil nature. Idaho Code §5-201 provides that "[ c ]ivil actions can only 
be commenced within the periods prescribed in this chapter after the cause of action shall have 
accrued, except when in special cases a different limitation is prescribed by statute." Idaho Code 
§5-224 provides that, "(a]n action for relief not hereinbefore provided for must be commenced 
within four ( 4) years after the cause of action shall have accrued." 
The Idaho Supreme Court has treated cases before it involving declaratory actions as 
"civil actions." See Smith v. State Board of Medicine of Idaho, 74 Idaho 191, 194, 259 P.2d 
1033, 1034 (1953)("this is a civil action, albeit for a declaratory judgment."); Freiburger v. J-U-
B Engineers, Inc., 141 Idaho 415, 423-24, 111 P.3d 100, 108-109)(2005)(award of attorney fees 
in declaratory judgment action pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3) which allows for the recovery 
of attorney fees in "any civil action."). 
Thus if it is determined upon appellate review that the statute of limitations set forth in 
Idaho Code §31-857 does not apply to the facts of this case, this court concludes that as a civil 
action, declaratory actions fall within the "catch all" statute of limitations provision of I.C. §5-
224. 
Assuming I.C. §5-224 alternatively applies to Piercy's declaratory relief action, the court 
must also determine when the declaratory cause of action accrued. Sutton relies on Canady v. 
Coeur d'Alene Lumber Co., 21 Idaho 77, 120 P. 830, 831 (1911). As noted by Sutton in her 
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brief, the Idaho Supreme Court granted a "nonsuif' at the conclusion of the plaintiff's case at 
trial stating: 
It is next contended that appellant's cause of action, if she had one, was barred by 
the statute of limitations (subd. 1 of section 4054 and sections 4037, 4038, and 
4060, Rev. Codes). We think, under the facts of this case, that this action is barred 
by the statute oflimitations: and that this action should have been brought at least 
within five years from the date such cause of action arose. We think it sufficiently 
appears that appellant sat by when Ordinances Nos. 71 and 75 were passed in 
1900, and more than nine years before this action was commenced, and made no 
complaint of any damages having been sustained to her property by reason of said 
ordinances and the vacation of the streets. And, again, in 1905, when Ordinance 
No. 115 was passed, she made no protest or objection of any kind. She knew that 
the Creur d'Alene Lumber Company was expending a great deal of money in 
establishing its lumber plant upon said blocks and a portion of one of the streets, 
and made no protest of any kind whatever to the city, and made no claim for 
damages to her property as resulting from the passage of said ordinances. The first 
time she complained of damage to her property, so far as the record shows, was 
when she commenced this action, June 15, 1909. 
Id, at 835. 
Piercy has denied specific knowledge of the status of the 1982 Canyon County herd 
district ordinance prior to the accident that spawned this lawsuit. He has acknowledged farming 
in Canyon County for essentially his entire life, including the time period during which the 1982 
Canyon County herd district ordinance was enacted by the Canyon County Board of 
Commissioners. He also admits involvement with local cattle ranching associations and other 
cattle ranchers residing in Canyon County prior to and since 1982. Paul Axness' testimony 
suggests that Piercy has had to consider herd district versus open range concerns prior to the 
accident at issue in this case. While the testimony of Paul Axness was insufficient to meet the 
required elements of the estoppel claims, it still suggests that Piercy should have and may have 
considered whether his property was subject to herd district restrictions prior to the accident that 
is the basis of this action. Piercy has argued that he was unaware of the 1982 Canyon County 
herd district ordinance because of the deficiency in notice provided by the Board of 
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Commissioners at the time the 1982 herd district ordinance was created. There was actual public 
notice given of the Board of Commissioners intent to consider and possibly adopt the ordinance. 
Following the enactment of this ordinance in 1982, Canyon County's public institutions 
recognized and disseminated information indicating that lands located in Canyon County were 
subject to the purported herd district. This status would have also been confirmed by the 
relevant public records regarding this challenged ordinance. This court fmds that there was 
sufficient evidence that Piercy should have been aware of the enactment of the 1982 Canyon 
County herd district ordinance at the time of its enactment that his declaratory action accrued and 
the four year statute of limitations established by LC. §5-224 commenced to run on the date the 
1982 Canyon County herd district ordinance was adopted by the Canyon County Board of 
Commissioners. This statute of limitations would have run in 1986. Therefore, Piercy was 
alternatively time barred from filing the declaratory action challenging the validity of the 1982 
Canyon County herd district by Idaho Code §5-224. 
Piercy's Due Process Arguments 
Piercy raises a due process objection to the retroactive application of the amended Idaho 
Code 31-857 seven year statute of limitations to Piercy's declaratory action. He argues that such 
an interpretation of the amendment violates both his procedural and substantive due process 
rights. The general rule is that a party challenging a statue on constitutional grounds "must 
overcome a strong presumption of validity." Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 136 Idaho 63, 
68, 28 P.3d 1006, 1011 (2001) citing Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v. Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 
982 P .2d 917 (1999). A second applicable general rule is that "a legislative act should be held to 
be constitutional until it is shown beyond a reasonable doubt that it is not so, and that the law 
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should not be held to be void for repugnancy to the Constitution in a doubtful case." Id, citing 
Sanderson v. Salmon River Canal Co.,45 Idaho 244, 256, 263 P.32, 35 (1927). Whenever 
possible, a trial court should construe a statute in such a manner to achieve a constitutional result. 
Id. 
In analyzing a procedural due process claim, the court must determine whether the 
procedure meets the minimal requirements of notice and a hearing if a potential deprivation of a 
significant life, liberty, or property interest may occur. Id. Minimal requirements are met when 
the process ensures that the individual is not "arbitrarily deprived of his rights in violation of the 
state or federal constitutions." Id, citing Aberdeen-Springfield, supra. This determination 
involves a two-step analysis in which the court must first determine whether the threatened 
interest is a liberty or property interest under the relevant Constitution and if the court finds such 
an interest exists, the court must then determine which process is due. Id. 
In this case, Piercy claims that he has a protected property interest that has been 
impacted by the enactment of the seven year statute of limitations amendment to Idaho Code 
§31-857. He argues that he has property interest in the ability to allow his cattle to roam on open 
range without being subject to liability. He next argues that ifthe Idaho legislature is going to be 
allowed to deprive him of that right, he should be afforded the proper notice and opportunity to 
be heard on the issue. His argument is misguided. First, he has failed to demonstrate that he has 
a protected property right in preserving or maintaining open range status on his property. The 
Idaho Code clearly allows the regulation of such matters in its statutory provisions authorizing 
counties to create herd districts. 
However, even assuming Piercy has a protected property interest in preserving open 
range status, his argument that the 2009 amendment to Idaho Code §31-857 as applied violated 
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his right to notice and to be heard does not survive careful scrutiny. The test to be applied to 
such argument is whether the person asserting the constitutional violation has had a reasonable 
opportunity to have the disputed issue heard and determined. The right identified is his right to 
protect or preserve open range status for his lands. Since the 1982 Canyon County herd district 
ordinance was adopted approximately 29 years ago, Piercy has fully had an opportunity to 
challenge the ordinance whether the four year or seven year statute of limitations is applied. 
The 2009 amendment to Idaho Code §31-857 likewise does not violate Piercy's 
substantive due process rights. A substantive due process claim requires that the challenged 
statute "bear a reasonable relationship to a permissible legislative objective." Aberdeen-
Springfield, supra. When a statute is challenged on this ground, the court must determine ifthe 
statute deprives a person of life, liberty, or property and if so, whether that deprivation has a 
rational basis. Id. As set forth above, the court does not find the statute deprives Piercy of life, 
liberty or a protected property interest. If it does involve such a deprivation, the court must 
determine if the statutory provision bears a reasonable relationship to a permissible legislated 
objective. 
Piercy argues that the seven year statute of limitations is not rationally related to the State 
ofldaho's stated goal of reducing the number of stale, unreasonably delayed legal challenges to 
the procedures utilized to create herd and other districts. This court disagrees. The legislative 
history set forth above clearly sets out the rational legislative objective of the 2009 amendment 
which is the protection of long existing districts created pursuant to the statute from stale claims 
contesting the validity of the district. Such stale challenges present difficulties for obtaining and 
reviewing important evidence that may no longer exist due to the loss or destruction of records 
and the death, unavailability or faded memories of important witnesses. Likewise there is 
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rationale basis in confirming the legitimacy of such entities that citizens have relied upon for a 
number of years and if disputed, to encourage timely challenges to the entities existence. The 
legislature's 2009 amendment to Idaho Code §31-857 fulfills the rationale basis requirement by 
bearing a reasonable relationship to a permissible legislative objective and does not violate 
substantive due process rights. Piercy's procedural and substantive objections to the coUJ."t's 
application of the amended Idaho Code §31-857 to the facts of this case are denied. 
CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
For the reasons set forth above, this court has reconsidered Judge Petrie's January 21, 
2009 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment In Bifurcated Portion of Trial and 
vacates and reverses his decision on the basis that Dale Piercy's September 11, 2008 Amended 
Action For Declaratory Relief is time barred by Idaho Code §31-857 and/or in the alternative by 
Idaho Code §5-224. Dale Piercy's September 11, 2008 Amended Action For Declaratory Relief 
is hereby dismissed with prejudice. Canyon County's 1982 herd district ordinance is valid. This 
ordinance has been in effect for nearly twenty nine years. Piercy' s declaratory action challenging 
its validity was not filed within seven years or four years of its enactment. Jennifer Sutton 
and/or Luis J. Guzman's attorneys shall submit a proposed judgment in compliance with IRCP 
54(a) within ten days of this order. Any request for an award of costs and attorney fees shall be 
submitted pursuant to applicable Idaho rule, statute or prec~t. A f£<_ 
11.wr::I~~f ~~~. er 2011 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
OCT 0 ~ 2011 
The undersigned certifies that on __ cfay of September 2011 s/he served a true and correct 
copy of the original of the foregoing document on the following individuals in the manner 
described: 
Joshua S. Evett 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Timothy C. Walton 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1069 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Ryan Peck 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 7425 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Carl Ericson 
Canyon County Prosecutor's Office 
1115 Albany 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
whens/he caused the same to be deposited into the U.S. Mails, sufficient postage attached. 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the Court 
WRITTEN ORDER MEMORIALIZING ORAL RULING ON PLAINTIFF/DEFENDANT 
LUIS J. GUZMAN'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND MOTION TO DISMISS 
AND DEFENDANT JENNIFER SUTTON'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER- 26 
1418 
Rodney R. Saetrum, ISB: 2921 
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SAETRUM LAW OFFICES 
3046 S. Bown Way 
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D 
_P.M. 
Boise, Idaho 83706 
Telephone: (208) 336-0484 
Attorneys for Defendant Dale Piercy 
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
T. CRAWFORD, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
LUIS J. GUZMAN, individually, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DALE PIERCY, individually, and JENNWER 
SUTTON, individually, 
Defendants. 
DALE PIERCY, individually, 
Plaintiff, 
CANYON COUNTY, LUIS GUZMAN, 
individually and JENNIFER SUTTON, 
individually, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CVOS-4848 
STIPULATION TO ALLOW A 
IRCP 54(b) CERTIFICATION 
IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED, by and between Plaintiff Luis Guzman, 
Co-Defendant Jennifer Sutton, Co-Defendant Dale Piercy and Third-Party Defendant Canyon 
County, through their attorneys of record: 
1. That the judgment to be issued by this Court dismissing the Amended Action for 
Declaratory Relief should be certified as a final judgment pursuant to IRCP 54(b); 
2. That there is no just reason for delay in certifying the judgment as a final judgment 
pursuant to IRCP 54(b ); 
3. That allowing the requested certification and appeal of the judgment regarding the 
Amended Action for Declaratory Relief is in the interests of judicial efficiency and justice; 
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Court. 
4. That the final judgment attached hereto as Exhib.it A should be executed by this 
' ~ C\,V\;v..tG ~ ~· 
DATEDthisjQ_dayof~ 011. 
DATED this __ day of December 2011. 
DATED this __ day of December 2011. 
DATED this __ day of December 2011. 
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES 
CHASAN & WALTON LLC 
Timothy C. Walton 
Attorney for Plaintiff Luis Guzman 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
Joshua S. Evett 
Attorney for Co-Defendant Sutton 
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING 
ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
Carlton R. Ericson 
Attorney for Canyon County 
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4. That the :On.al judgment attached hereto H!S Exhibit A $hould be executed by th.is 
Court. 
DATED tbis _day of December 2011. 
,,.--
::1 T 
DATED this Z LyofDcx::em.bcr2011. 
DAT.ED rhls _day of Decembci; 2011. 
DATED this _day of December 2011. 
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES 
RyanB.Peck 
Attorneys for Defendant Dale Piercy 
CHASAN & WALTONLLC 
Timothy C. Walton 
Attorney for Plaintiff Luis Guzman 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
Joshua S. Evett 
Attorney for Co-Defendant Sutton 
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING 
ATTORNEY'S OFFlCE 
Carlton R. Eric.'lon 
Attorney for CanYon County 
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4. That the final judgment attached hereto as fu:lu"bit A should be executed by this 
Coun. 
DATED this __ day of December 2011. 
SAET.ROM LAW OFFICES 
RyanB.Peck 
Attorneys for Defendant Dale Piercy 
DATED this __ day of December 2011. 
CHASAN & W Af,TON LLC 
Thnothy C. Walton 
Attorney for Plaintiff Luis Guzman 
~ ~.,)~_2.D\'2.. 
DATEDthis __ dayof~l. 
DATED this __ day of December 2011. 
ELAM &BURKE, P.A. 
S.Evett 
ey for Co-Defendant Sutton 
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING 
ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
Carlton R. :Ericson 
Attorney for Canyon County 
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Court. 
4. That the fmal judgment attached hereto as &hlblt A shol.lld be executed by this 
DATED this_ day of Decembe:r 2011. 
DATED this __ day of December 2011. 
DATED th.is __ day of December 201i. 
"('&. . . 
DAIBDthis /~ dayofDecember20U. 
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES 
Ryan B. Peck 
Attorneys for Defendant Dale Piercy 
CHASAN & WALTON ILC 
'Timothy C. Walton 
Attomey for Plaintiff Luis Guzman 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
JoshuaS. Evett 
Attomey for Co-Defendant Sutton 
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING 
ATIORNEY'S OFFICE 
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Carlton R Ericson 
Attorney for Canyon County 
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RodneyR. Saetrum, ISB: 2921 
Ryan B. Peck, ISB: 7022 
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES 
3046 S. Bown Way 
Boise, Idaho 83706 
Telephone: (208) 336-0484 
Attorneys for Defendant Dale Piercy 
F L E D 
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
T. CRAWFORD, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
LUIS J. GUZMAN, individually, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DALE PIERCY, individually, and JENNIFER 
SUTTON, individually, 
Defendants. 
DALE PIERCY, individually, 
Plaintiff, 
CANYON COUNTY, LUIS GUZMAN, 
individually and JENNIFER SUTTON, 
individually, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV05-4848 
FINAL JUDGMENT AND IRCP 
54(b) CERTIFICATE 
This matter having come before this Court pursuant to Defendant Luis Guzman's Motion 
for Reconsideration and Motion to Dismiss and Co-Defendant Jennifer Sutton's Motion for 
Reconsideration and this Court having heard oral arguments on the matter and having reviewed the 
entire record and pursuant to this Court's order issued on October 5, 2011, and good cause 
appearing therefor; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED: 
That Defendant Dale Piercy' s Amended Action for Declaratory Relief is dismissed with 
prejudice. 
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I , , 
DATED this _Q__~anuary 2012. 
RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE 
With respect to the issues determined by the above judgment or order it is hereby 
CERTIFIED, in accordance with Rule 54(b), IRCP, that the court has determined that there is no 
just reason for delay of the entry of a final judgment and that the court has and does hereby direct 
that the above judgment or order shall be a final judgment upon which execution may issue and 
an appeal may be take~ a~ed by the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
DATED this J.L day of January 2012. 
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SAETRUM LAW OFFICES 
3046 S. Bown Way 
Boise, Idaho 83706 
Telephone: (208) 336-0484 
Attorneys for Defendant Dale Piercy 
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
K CANNON, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
LUIS J. GUZMAN, individually, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
DALE PIERCY, individually, 
Co-Defendant/ Appellant 
and JENNIFER SUTTON, individually, 
Co-Defendant/Respo 
ndent. 
DALE PIERCY, individually, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
CANYON COUNTY, LUIS GUZMAN, individually 
and JENNIFER SUTTON, individually, 
Defendants/Respond 
ents. 
Case No. CV05-4848 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: The above named RESPONDENTS, CANYON COUNTY, and its attorneys 
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, 1115 Albany, Caldwell, ID 83605, 
LUIS GUZMAN, and his attorneys of record, Chasan & Walton, LLC, P.O. Box 
1069, Boise, ID 83707, and JENNIFER SUTTON, and her attorneys ofrecord, 
Elam & Burke, P.A., 251 East Front Street, Suite 300, Boise, ID 83701, and the 
CLERK of the above-entitled Court. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Appellant, DALE PIERCY, appeals against Respondents to the 
Idaho Supreme Court from the: 
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FINAL JUDGMENT AND IRCP 54(b) CERTIFICATE, entered in the 
above-entitled action on the 13th day of January, 2012, the HONORABLE Bradley 
S. Ford presiding. 
WRITTEN ORDER MEMORALIZING ORAL RULING ON 
PLAINTIFF/DEFENDANT, LUIS J. GUZMAN'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION AND MOTION TO DISMISS AND DEFENDANT 
JENNIFER SUTTONS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, entered in the 
above-entitled action on the 5th day of October, 2011, the HONORABLE Bradley S. 
Ford presiding. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the orders 
described in paragraph 1 above are appealable under and pursuant to I.AR. 1 l(a)(3) or (4). 
are: 
3. The preliminary statement of issues on appeal which the Appellant intends to assert, 
(1) Whether the District Court erred in dismissing Appellant's Amended 
Action for Declaratory Relief and overturning the results of the trial on the merits. 
(2) Whether the District Court erred in allowing Respondents Guzman 
and Sutton to raise certain statute of limitations defenses. 
(3) Whether the District Court erred in preventing Appellant from 
challenging Canyon County's herd district despite statute of limitations defenses 
raised by Respondents Guzman and Sutton. 
(4) Whether the District Court erred in finding that the amendment to 
LC. § 31-857 was to be applied retroactively and that the statute of limitations 
created by that amendment should run from the time of the creation of the herd 
district. 
(5) Whether the District Court erred in finding that the amendment to 
I.C. § 31-857 was constitutional under the Idaho and U.S. Constitution. 
4. No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5(a). Appellant requests the preparation of a reporter's standard transcript as defined in 
the Idaho Appellate Rule 25(c). 
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5(b ). Appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the reporter's 
transcript: 
(a) The transcript of the hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment of 
September 6, 2007. 
(b) The transcript of the Trial of October 8, 2008. 
(c) The transcript of the hearing on Second Motion for Summary Judgment of 
October 13, 2009. 
(d) The transcript of the Evidentiary Hearing where Paul Axness testified on 
May3, 2010. 
(e) The transcript of the hearing on motions of June 14, 2010. 
(f) The transcript of the hearing on motions of August 11, 2010. 
(g) The transcript of the Oral Ruling of December 9, 2010. 
6. Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the CLERK'S record 
in addition to those automatically included under Idaho Appellate Rule 28: 
(1) Complaint; 
(2) Amended Complaint; 
(3) Answer and Demand for Jury Trial; 
( 4) Second Amended Complaint; 
(5) Answer to Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury 
Trial; 
(6) Answer to Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial; 
(7) Defendant Piercy' s Motion for Summary Judgment; 
(8) Memorandum in Support of Defendant Piercy' s Motion for Summary 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
1428 
Judgment; 
(9) Affidavit of Ryan B. Peck; 
(10) Affidavit of Michael A. Pope; 
( 11) Affidavit of Rosemary Thomas in Support of Defendant Piercy' s Motion 
for Summary Judgment; 
(12) Affidavit of Jerry Deal; 
(13) Affidavit of Dennis Sorrell; 
( 14) Affidavit of Dale Piercy; 
(15) Third Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial; 
(16) Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Defendant Piercy's Motion for 
Summary Judgment; 
(17) Affidavit of Glenn Koch; 
(18) Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Piercy's Motion for 
Summary Judgment; 
(19) Affidavit of Erika Rivera in Opposition to Defendant Piercy's Motion for 
Summary Judgment; 
(20) Affidavit of Luis Guzman in Opposition to Defendant Piercy' s Motion for 
Summary Judgment; 
(21) Affidavit of Walton in Opposition to Defendant Piercy's Motion for 
Summary Judgment; 
(22) Affidavit of Rosemary Thomas in Opposition to Defendant Piercy' s 
Motion for Summary Judgment; 
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(23) Affidavit of Linda Hansen in Opposition to Defendant Piercy's Motion for 
Summary Judgment; 
(24) Affidavit of Glenn 0. Koch in Opposition to Defendant Piercy's Motion 
for Summary Judgment; 
(25) Affidavit of Don Allen in Opposition to Defendant Piercy' s Motion for 
Summary Judgment; 
(26) Affidavit of Bill A. Staker in Opposition to Defendant Piercy' s Motion for 
Summary Judgment; 
(27) Defendant Sutton's Opposition to Defendant Piercy's Motion for 
Summary Judgment; 
(28) Affidavit of Jennifer Sutton; 
(29) Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Defendant Piercy' s Motion for 
Summary Judgment; 
(30) Second Affidavit of Dale Piercy; 
(31) Second Affidavit of Ryan B. Peck; 
(32) Affidavit of Dawn McClure; 
(33) Amended Notice of Hearing; 
(34) Third Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Defendant Piercy' s 
Motion for Summary Judgment; 
(35) Second Affidavit of Rosemary Thomas in Support of Defendant Piercy' s 
Motion for Summary Judgment; 
(36) Defendant Sutton's Answer to Third Amended Complaint and Demand for 
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Jury Trial; 
(37) Answer to Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint; 
(38) Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike, or in the 
Alternative, Plaintiffs' Second Memorandum Opposing Piercy' s Motion 
for Summary Judgment; 
(39) Defendant Sutton's Supplement Brief in Opposition to New Arguments 
and Facts Raised by Piercy; 
( 40) Affidavit of Meghan E. Sullivan in Support of Defendant Sutton's 
Opposition to Defendant Piercy' s Motion for Summary Judgment; 
(41) Reply to Plaintiffs' and Co-Defendant's Responding Memorandum and 
Motion to Strike Co-Defendant's Supplemental Brief; 
(42) Order Denying Defendant Piercy's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Joining Canyon County, and Holding All Other Motions in Abeyance 
Until the Herd District's Validity is Resolved; 
(43) Action for Declaratory Judgment; 
( 44) Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider; 
( 45) Answer of Third Party Defendant Canyon County, Idaho; 
(46) Defendant Sutton's Response and Joinder in Plaintiffs' Motion to 
Reconsider; 
(47) Defendant Piercy's Objection to Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider; 
( 48) Order for Dismissal with Prejudice; 
( 49) Order for Dismissal with Prejudice of Claims by Erika Rivera Only; 
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(50) Order from Scheduling Conference Setting Bench Trial on Challenge to 
Canyon County Herd Districts; 
(51) Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider (No Hearing); 
(52) Response to Plaintiff's Motion for a Ruling on Plaintiff's Motion to 
Reconsider; 
(53) Order on Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider; 
(54) Plaintiff's Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Reconsideration; 
(55) Order on Motion to Reconsider; 
(56) Order of Clarification; 
( 57) Third Party Defendant Canyon County's Pre-Trial Statement; 
(58) Pretrial Memorandum; 
(59) Plaintiff's Pre-Trial Conference Statement; 
(60) Defendant Sutton's Pretrial Memorandum; 
(61) Stipulation to Amend Pleadings and Scheduling; 
(62) Order to Amend Pleadings and Scheduling; 
(63) Amended Action for Declaratory Relief; 
(64) Plaintiff Guzman's Answer to Amended Action for Declaratory Relief; 
(65) Third Party Defendant Sutton's Answer to Amended Action for 
Declaratory Relief; 
(66) Supplemental Pretrial Memorandum; 
(67) Third Party Defendant Canyon County's Answer to Plaintiff Piercy' s 
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Amended Action for Declaratory Relief; 
(68) Stipulation Regarding Exhibits, Undisputed Facts and Witnesses; 
(69) Defendant Piercy' s Closing Memorandum; 
(70) Plaintiff Guzman's Post Trial Memorandum in Support of Upholding the 
Validity of Canyon County's 1982 Herd District; 
(71) Defendant Canyon County's Closing Argument and Post Trial Brief; 
(72) Post-Trial Memorandum; 
(73) Defendant Piercy's Reply Brief; 
(74) Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment in Bifurcated Portion 
of Trial; 
(75) Defendant Piercy's Second Motion for Summary Judgment; 
(7 6) Memorandum in Support of Defendant Piercy' s Second Motion for 
Summary Judgment; 
(77) Affidavit of Ryan B. Peck in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment; 
(7 8) Plaintiff Guzman's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Piercy' s 
Second Motion for Summary Judgment; 
(79) Defendant Sutton's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Piercy's 
Second Motion for Summary Judgment; 
(80) Defendant Sutton's Motion for Reconsideration; 
(81) Memorandum in Support Defendant Sutton's Motion for Reconsideration; 
(82) Affidavit of Joshua S. Evett in Support of Defendant Sutton's Motion for 
Reconsideration; 
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(83) Reply to Plaintiff's and Co-Defendant Sutton's Objections to Defendant 
Piercy' s Second Motion for Summary Judgment; 
(84) Second Affidavit of Ryan B. Peck in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment; 
(85) Response to Motions to Reconsider Prior Court Rulings and Motion for 
Sanctions; 
(86) Plaintiff/Defendant Guzman's Motion for Reconsideration; 
(87) Reply Brief in Support of Defendant Sutton's Motion for Reconsideration; 
(88) Order on Motion to Reconsider; 
(89) Plaintiff/Defendant Guzman's Motions for Reconsideration and Motion to 
Dismiss; 
(90) Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff/Defendant Guzman's Motions for 
Reconsideration and Motion to Dismiss; 
(91) Affidavit of Timothy C. Walton in Support of Plaintiff/Defendant 
Guzman's Motions for Reconsideration and Motion to Dismiss; 
(92) Jennifer Sutton's Brief Regarding Defenses on Reconsideration; 
(93) Response to Motions to Reconsider; 
(94) Affidavit of Ryan B. Peck; 
(95) Sutton's Reply to Piercy's Response to Motions to Reconsider; 
(96) Affidavit of Joshua S. Evett in Support of Sutton's Reply to Piercy's 
Response to Motions to Reconsider; 
(97) Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss and for 
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Reconsideration; 
(98) Sutton's Memorandum in Response to Defendant Piercy' s Memorandum 
in Objection to Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss and for Reconsideration; 
(99) Written Order Memorializing Oral Ruling on Plaintiff/Defendant 
Guzman's Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Dismiss and 
Defendant Suttons Motion for Reconsideration; and 
(100) Stipulation to Allow a IRCP 54(b) Certification. 
(101) Judgment and 54(b) Certification. 
7. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter. 
(b) That the clerk of the Third Judicial District Court as been paid the 
estimated fee of $1,543.75.00 for preparation of the reporter's transcript. 
(c) That the estimated fee of $100.00 for preparation of the clerk's record has 
been paid. 
( d) That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
( e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Idaho Appellant Rule 20. 
DA TED this '22!!!._~ay of February 2012. 
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this~of February 2012, I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document to be served by the method indicated below and addressed to: 
Timothy C. Walton 
CHASAN & WALTON LLC 
1459 Tyrell Lane 
P.O. Box 1069 
Boise, ID 83701-1069 
Joshua S. Evett 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
251 East Front Street, Suite 300 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701 
Carlton R. Ericson 
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
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___ U.S. Mail 
___ Hand Delivery 
___ Overnight Mail 
K Facsimile 
___ U.S. Mail 
___ Hand Delivery 
___ Overnight Mail 
>( Facsimile 
___ U.S. Mail 
___ Hand Delivery 
___ Overnight Mail 
X. Facsimile 
<t_'. 
Rodney R. Saetrum, ISB: 2921 
Ryan B. Peck, ISB: 7022 
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES 
3046 S. Bown Way 
Boise, Idaho 83706 
Telephone: (208) 336-0484 
Attorneys for Defendant Dale Piercy 
E B ~.k-P.M. 
MAR 1 ! 2012 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
K CANNON, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
LUIS J. GUZMAN, individually, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
DALE PIERCY, individually, 
Co-Defendant/ Appellant 
and JENNIFER SUTTON, individually, 
Co-Defendant/Respo 
ndent. 
DALE PIERCY, individually, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
CANYON COUNTY, LUIS GUZMAN, individually 
and JENNIFER SUTTON, individually, 
Defendants/Respond 
ents. 
Case No. CV05-4848 
AMENDED NOTICE OF 
APPEAL 
TO: The above named RESPONDENTS, CANYON COUNTY, and its attorneys 
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, 1115 Albany, Caldwell, ID 83605, 
LUIS GUZMAN, and his attorneys of record, Chasan & Walton, LLC, P.O. Box 
1069, Boise, ID 83707, and JENNIFER SUTTON, and her attorneys of record, 
Elam & Burke, P.A., 251 East Front Street, Suite 300, Boise, ID 83701, and the 
CLERK of the above-entitled Court. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Appellant, DALE PIERCY, appeals against Respondents to the 
Idaho Supreme Court from the: 
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FINAL JUDGMENT AND IRCP 54(b) CERTIFICATE, entered in the 
above-entitled action on the 13th day of January, 2012, the HONORABLE Bradley 
S. Ford presiding. 
WRITTEN ORDER l\.1EMORALIZING ORAL RULING ON 
PLAINTIFF/DEFENDANT, LUIS J. GUZMAN'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION AND MOTION TO DIS:MISS AND DEFENDANT 
JENNIFER SUTTONS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, entered in the 
above-entitled action on the 5th day of October, 2011, the HONORABLE Bradley S. 
Ford presiding. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the orders 
described in paragraph 1 above are appealable under and pursuant to LA.R. 1 l(a)(3) or (4). 
are: 
3. The preliminary statement of issues on appeal which the Appellant intends to assert, 
(1) Whether the District Court erred in dismissing Appellant's Amended 
Action for Declaratory Relief and overturning the results of the trial on the merits. 
(2) Whether the District Court erred in allowing Respondents Guzman 
and Sutton to raise certain statute of limitations defenses. 
(3) Whether the District Court erred in preventing Appellant from 
challenging Canyon County's herd district despite statute of limitations defenses 
raised by Respondents Guzman and Sutton. 
( 4) Whether the District Court erred in finding that the amendment to 
LC. § 31-857 was to be applied retroactively and that the statute of limitations 
created by that amendment should run from the time of the creation of the herd 
district. 
(5) Whether the District Court erred in finding that the amendment to 
LC. § 31-857 was constitutional under the Idaho and U.S. Constitution. 
4. No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
S(a). Appellant requests the preparation of a reporter's standard transcript as defined in 
the Idaho Appellate Rule 25(c). 
Al\.1ENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
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5(b ). Appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the reporter's 
transcript: 
(a) The transcript of the hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment of 
September 6, 2007. 
(b) The transcript of the Trial of October 8, 2008. 
(c) The transcript of the hearing on Second Motion for Summary Judgment of 
October 13, 2009. 
( d) The transcript of the Evidentiary Hearing where Paul Axness testified on 
May 3, 2010. 
(e) The transcript of the hearing on motions of June 14, 2010. 
(f) The transcript of the hearing on motions of August 11, 2010. 
(g) The transcript of the Oral Ruling of December 9, 2010. 
6. Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the CLERK'S record 
in addition to those automatically included under Idaho Appellate Rule 28: 
(1) Complaint; 
(2) Amended Complaint; 
(3) Answer and Demand for Jury Trial; 
(4) Second Amended Complaint; 
(5) Answer to Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury 
Trial; 
(6) Answer to Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial; 
(7) Defendant Piercy's Motion for Summary Judgment; 
(8) Memorandum in Support of Defendant Piercy' s Motion for Summary 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
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Judgment; 
(9) Affidavit of Ryan B. Peck; 
(10) Affidavit of Michael A. Pope; 
(11) Affidavit of Rosemary Thomas in Support of Defendant Piercy's Motion 
for Summary Judgment; 
(12) Affidavit of Jerry Deal; 
(13) Affidavit of Dennis Sorrell; 
(14) Affidavit of Dale Piercy; 
(15) Third Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial; 
( 16) Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Defendant Piercy' s Motion for 
Summary Judgment; 
(17) Affidavit of Glenn Koch; 
( 18) Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Piercy' s Motion for 
Summary Judgment; 
(19) Affidavit of Erika Rivera in Opposition to Defendant Piercy's Motion for 
Summary Judgment; 
(20) Affidavit of Luis Guzman in Opposition to Defendant Piercy' s Motion for 
Summary Judgment; 
(21) Affidavit of Walton in Opposition to Defendant Piercy's Motion for 
Summary Judgment; 
(22) Affidavit of Rosemary Thomas in Opposition to Defendant Piercy' s 
Motion for Summary Judgment; 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 
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(23) Affidavit of Linda Hansen in Opposition to Defendant Piercy' s Motion for 
Summary Judgment; 
(24) Affidavit of Glenn 0. Koch in Opposition to Defendant Piercy's Motion 
for Summary Judgment; 
(25) Affidavit of Don Allen in Opposition to Defendant Piercy' s Motion for 
Summary Judgment; 
(26) Affidavit of Bill A. Staker in Opposition to Defendant Piercy's Motion for 
Summary Judgment; 
(27) Defendant Sutton's Opposition to Defendant Piercy' s Motion for 
Summary Judgment; 
(28) Affidavit of Jennifer Sutton; 
(29) Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Defendant Piercy's Motion for 
Summary Judgment; 
(30) Second Affidavit of Dale Piercy; 
(31) Second Affidavit of Ryan B. Peck; 
(32) Affidavit of Dawn McClure; 
(33) Amended Notice of Hearing; 
(34) Third Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Defendant Piercy' s 
Motion for Summary Judgment; 
(3 5) Second Affidavit of Rosemary Thomas in Support of Defendant Piercy' s 
Motion for Summary Judgment; 
(36) Defendant Sutton's Answer to Third Amended Complaint and Demand for 
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Jury Trial; 
(37) Answer to Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint; 
(38) Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike, or in the 
Alternative, Plaintiffs' Second Memorandum Opposing Piercy' s Motion 
for Summary Judgment; 
(39) Defendant Sutton's Supplement Brief in Opposition to New Arguments 
and Facts Raised by Piercy; 
( 40) Affidavit of Meghan E. Sullivan in Support of Defendant Sutton's 
Opposition to Defendant Piercy's Motion for Summary Judgment; 
(41) Reply to Plaintiffs' and Co-Defendant's Responding Memorandum and 
Motion to Strike Co-Defendant's Supplemental Brief; 
(42) Order Denying Defendant Piercy's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Joining Canyon County, and Holding All Other Motions in Abeyance 
Until the Herd District's Validity is Resolved; 
( 43) Action for Declaratory Judgment; 
( 44) Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider; 
( 45) Answer of Third Party Defendant Canyon County, Idaho; 
(46) Defendant Sutton's Response and Joinder in Plaintiffs' Motion to 
Reconsider; 
(47) Defendant Piercy's Objection to Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider; 
( 48) Order for Dismissal with Prejudice; 
( 49) Order for Dismissal with Prejudice of Claims by Erika Rivera Only; 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 6 
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(50) Order from Scheduling Conference Setting Bench Trial on Challenge to 
Canyon County Herd Districts; 
(51) Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider (No Hearing); 
(52) Response to Plaintiff's Motion for a Ruling on Plaintiffs Motion to 
Reconsider; 
(53) Order on Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider; 
(54) Plaintiff's Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Reconsideration; 
(55) Order on Motion to Reconsider; 
(56) Order of Clarification; 
(57) Third Party Defendant Canyon County's Pre-Trial Statement; 
(58) Pretrial Memorandum; 
(59) Plaintiff's Pre-Trial Conference Statement; 
(60) Defendant Sutton's Pretrial Memorandum; 
(61) Stipulation to Amend Pleadings and Scheduling; 
(62) Order to Amend Pleadings and Scheduling; 
(63) Amended Action for Declaratory Relief; 
(64) Plaintiff Guzman's Answer to Amended Action for Declaratory Relief; 
(65) Third Party Defendant Sutton's Answer to Amended Action for 
Declaratory Relief; 
(66) Supplemental Pretrial Memorandum; 
(67) Third Party Defendant Canyon County's Answer to Plaintiff Piercy's 
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Amended Action for Declaratory Relief; 
(68) Stipulation Regarding Exhibits, Undisputed Facts and Witnesses; 
(69) Defendant Piercy's Closing Memorandum; 
(70) Plaintiff Guzman's Post Trial Memorandum in Support of Upholding the 
Validity of Canyon County's 1982 Herd District; 
(71) Defendant Canyon County's Closing Argument and Post Trial Brief; 
(72) Post-Trial Memorandum; 
(73) Defendant Piercy' s Reply Brief; 
(7 4) Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment in Bifurcated Portion 
of Trial; 
(75) Defendant Piercy's Second Motion for Summary Judgment; 
(76) Memorandum in Support of Defendant Piercy' s Second Motion for 
Summary Judgment; 
(77) Affidavit of Ryan B. Peck in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment; 
(78) Plaintiff Guzman's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Piercy's 
Second Motion for Summary Judgment; 
(79) Defendant Sutton's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Piercy's 
Second Motion for Summary Judgment; 
(80) Defendant Sutton's Motion for Reconsideration; 
(81) Memorandum in Support Defendant Sutton's Motion for Reconsideration; 
(82) Affidavit of Joshua S. Evett in Support of Defendant Sutton's Motion for 
Reconsideration; 
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(83) Reply to Plaintiff's and Co-Defendant Sutton's Objections to Defendant 
Piercy's Second Motion for Summary Judgment; 
(84) Second Affidavit of Ryan B. Peck in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment; 
(85) Response to Motions to Reconsider Prior Court Rulings and Motion for 
Sanctions; 
(86) Plaintiff/Defendant Guzman's Motion for Reconsideration; 
(87) Reply Brief in Support of Defendant Sutton's Motion for Reconsideration; 
(88) Order on Motion to Reconsider; 
(89) Plaintiff/Defendant Guzman's Motions for Reconsideration and Motion to 
Dismiss; 
(90) Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff/Defendant Guzman's Motions for 
Reconsideration and Motion to Dismiss; 
(91) Affidavit of Timothy C. Walton in Support of Plaintiff/Defendant 
Guzman's Motions for Reconsideration and Motion to Dismiss; 
(92) Jennifer Sutton's Brief Regarding Defenses on Reconsideration; 
(93) Response to Motions to Reconsider; 
(94) Affidavit of Ryan B. Peck; 
(95) Sutton's Reply to Piercy' s Response to Motions to Reconsider; 
(96) Affidavit of Joshua S. Evett in Support of Sutton's Reply to Piercy' s 
Response to Motions to Reconsider; 
(97) Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss and for 
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Reconsideration; 
(98) Sutton's Memorandum in Response to Defendant Piercy's Memorandum 
in Objection to Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss and for Reconsideration; 
(99) Written Order Memorializing Oral Ruling on Plaintiff/Defendant 
Guzman's Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Dismiss and 
Defendant Suttons Motion for Reconsideration; and 
(100) Stipulation to Allow a IRCP 54(b) Certification. 
(101) Judgment and 54(b) Certification. 
7. I certify: 
court reporter: 
(a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the following 
Yvonne Hyde Gier 
3902 Rushmore Way 
Boise, Idaho 83709 
(b) That the clerk of the Third Judicial District Court as been paid the 
estimated fee of $1,543.75.00 for preparation of the reporter's transcript. 
( c) That the estimated fee of $100.00 for preparation of the clerk's record has 
been paid. 
( d) That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
( e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Idaho Appellant Rule 20. 
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DATED this \3~dayofMarch2012. 
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this l3~f March 2012, I caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing document to be served by the method indicated below and addressed to: 
Timothy C. Walton 
CHASAN & WALTON LLC 
1459 Tyrell Lane 
P.O. Box 1069 
Boise, ID 83701-1069 
Joshua S. Evett 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
251 East Front Street, Suite 300 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701 
Carlton R. Ericson 
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 11 
1447 
___ U.S. Mail 
___ Hand Delivery 
-~-Overnight Mail 
_'f_,_;___ Facsimile 
___ U.S. Mail 
___ Hand Delivery 
___ Overnight Mail 
~ Facsimile 
___ U.S. Mail 
___ Hand Delivery 
___ Overnight Mail 
:;(.. Facsimile 
fj,,1 
i r;. 
1' 
Joshua S. Evett, ISB #5587 
Meghan Sullivan Comad, ISB #7038 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
251 E. Front St., Ste. 300 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 343-5454 
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844 
j se@elamburke.com 
msc@elamburke.com 
Andrew M. Chasan, ISB #2100 
Timothy C. Walton, ISB #2170 
Chasan & Walton, LLC 
1459 Tyrell Lane 
P.O. Box 1069 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 345-3760 
Facsimile: (208) 345-0288 
andrew.chasan@chasanwalton.com 
timwalton2000@hotmail.com 
F I A.tPif3M 
MAR 1 4 2012 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
L SANDOVAL, DEPUTY 
Attorneys for Defendants/Respondents/Cross-Appellants 
Jennifer Sutton and Luis Guzman 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
LUIS J. GUZMAN, individually, 
Plaintiff/Respondent/Cross-Appellant, Case No. CV05-4848 
vs. 
DALE PIERCY, individually 
and 
Co-Defendant/ Appellant/Cross-
Respondent, 
JENNIFER SUTTON, individually, 
Co-Defendant/Respondent/ 
Cross-Appellant. 
DEFENDANTS LUIS GUZMAN AND 
JENNIFER SUTTON'S NOTICE OF 
CROSS-APPEAL 
DEFENDANTS LUIS GUZMAN AND JENNIFER SUTTON'S NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL - 1 
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·' ' 
DALE PIERCY, individually, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant/Cross-Respondent, 
vs. 
CANYON COUNTY, 
Defendant/Respondent, 
and 
LUIS GUZMAN, individually and 
JENNIFER SUTTON, individually, 
Defendants/Respondents/ 
Cross-Appellants. 
TO: The above named Cross-Respondent, Dale Piercy and his attorneys Rodney R. 
Saetrum and Ryan B. Peck, Saetrum Law Offices, 101 S. Capitol Blvd., Suite 
1800, P.O. Box 7425, Boise, Idaho 83707, and the Clerk of the above entitled 
Court. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named Cross-Appellants, Luis Guzman and Jennifer Sutton, appeal 
against the above named Cross-Respondent Dale Piercy to the Idaho Supreme Court from: (1) the 
Final Judgment and IRCP 54(b) Certificate, entered in the above-entitled action on the 13th day 
of January 2012, the Honorable Judge Bradley S. Ford presiding; and (2) the Written Order 
Memorializing Oral Ruling on Plaintiff/Defendant, Luis J. Guzman's Motion for 
Reconsideration and Motion to Dismiss and Defendant Jennifer Sutton's Motion for 
Reconsideration, entered in the above-entitled action on October 5, 2011, the Honorable Judge 
Bradley S. Ford presiding. 
DEFENDANTS LUIS GUZMAN AND JENNIFER SUTTON'S NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL- 2 
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2. That the parties have a right to cross-appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to 
Rule 1 l(a)(l) of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal, as currently identified and which 
the Cross-Appellants intend to assert, are: 
(1) Whether the district court erred in denying the Cross-Appellants' 
motion to reconsider and reverse the Court's Order Denying 
Defendant Piercy' s Motion for Summary Judgment, Joining 
Canyon County, and Holding All Other Motions in Abeyance Until 
the Herd District's Validity is Resolved, entered on or about 
October 9, 2007, based on estoppel by laches; and 
(2) Whether the district court erred in denying the Cross-Appellants' 
motion to reconsider and reverse the Court's Order Denying 
Defendant Piercy's Motion for Summary Judgment, Joining 
Canyon County, and Holding All Other Motions in Abeyance Until 
the Herd District's Validity is Resolved, entered on or about 
October 9, 2007, based on quasi-estoppel. 
(3) Whether the district court erred in denying the Cross-Appellants' 
motion to reconsider and reverse the Court's Order Denying 
Defendant Piercy's Motion for Summary Judgment, Joining 
Canyon County, and Holding All Other Motions in Abeyance Until 
the Herd District's Validity is Resolved, entered on or about 
October 9, 2007, based on equitable estoppel. 
4(a). Is an additional reporter's transcript requested? No. 
5. I certify that: 
(a) The cross-appellate filing fee has been paid; and 
(b) Service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
Rule 20 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
DEFENDANTS LUIS GUZMAN AND JENNIFER SUTTON'S 
·NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL - 3 
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DATED this \ VJJl-day of March, 2012. 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
By:~d~~i.:J.j_~cr--___ _ 
Joshua S. Evett, of the firm 
DATED this f 3 ~of March, 2012. 
Attorneys for Defendant Jennifer Sutton 
CHASAN & WALTON, LLC 
DEFENDANTS LUIS GUZMAN AND JENNIFER SUTTON'S 
NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL - 4 
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. C asan, of the firm 
s for Plaintiff Luis Guzman 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thd !Jlf_ day of March, 2012, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document to be served as follows: 
Timothy C. Walton 
Chasan & Walton, LLC 
P.O. Box 1069 
Boise, ID 83701 
Attorneys for Luis Guzman 
Ryan B. Peck 
Saetrum Law Offices 
P.O. Box 7425 
Boise, ID 83707 
Attorneys for Dale Piercy 
Carlton R. Ericson 
Canyon County Deputy Prosecutor 
1115 Albany 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
Attorneys for Canyon County 
/ 
U.S. Mail 
__ Hand Delivery 
__ Federal Express 
Facsimile 
__ /U.S. Mail 
__ Hand Delivery 
__ Federal Express 
Facsimile 
/ U.S. Mail 
__ Hand Delivery 
__ Federal Express 
Facsimile 
ibrtb-' 
Jo@u: S. Evett 
DEFENDANTS LUIS GUZMAN AND JENNIFER SUTTON'S 
NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL- 5 
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Andrew M. Chasan, ISB #2100 
Timothy C. Walton, ISB #2170 
CHASAN &WALTONLLC 
Park Center Pointe 
1459 Tyrell Lane 
Post Office Box 1069 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1069 
Telephone: (208) 345-3760 
Facsimile: (208) 345-0288 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent 
Cross-Appellant Luis J. Guzman 
_F _ _,I A.k \/~ 9M. 
MAR 2 2 2012 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
J HEIDEMAN, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
LUIS J. GUZMAN, individually, ) 
) 
Plaintiff/Respondent/Cross-Appellant, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
DALE PIERCY, individually, ) 
) 
Co-Defendant/ Appellant/Cross-Respondent, ) 
) 
and ) 
) 
JENNIFER SUTTON, individually, ) 
) 
Co-Defendant/Respondent/Cross-Appellant. ) 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~) 
) 
DALE PIERCY, individually, ) 
) 
Plaintiff/ Appellant/Cross-Respondent, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
CANYON COUNTY, ) 
) 
Defendants/Respondent, ) 
Plaintiff/Respondent's Request for Additional Record - Page 1 
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Case CV05-4848 
REQUEST FOR 
ADDITIONAL RECORD 
and 
LUIS GUZMAN, individually and 
JENNIFER SUTTON, individually, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendants/Respondents/Cross-Appellants. ) 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~- ) 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED APPELLANT/CROSS-RESPONDENT, Dale W. Piercy, and his 
attorneys, Ryan Peck and Rodney R. Saetrum, Saetrum Law Offices, 3046 S. Bown Way, 
P.O. Box 7425, Boise, Idaho 83707, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED 
COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that DALE W. PIERCY, Respondent/Cross-Appellant in 
the above entitled proceeding, hereby requests pursuant to Rule 19, I.A.R., the inclusion of the 
following material in the clerk's record in addition to that required to be included by the I.A.R. 
and the Notice of Appeal: 
1. Clerk's or Agency's Record: 
Affidavit of E. G. Johnson (and any and all exhibits 
attached thereto) filed on or about July 19, 2007 
Affidavit of Erika Rivera in Opposition to Defendant 
Piercy's Motion for Summary Judgment (and any 
and all exhibits attached thereto) filed on or about 
July 20, 2007 
Affidavit of Luis Guzman in Opposition to Defendant 
Piercy' s Motion for Summary Judgment (and any 
and all exhibits attached thereto) filed on or about 
July 20, 2007 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike and Notice of Hearing filed on 
or about August 24, 2007 
Affidavit of Deborah Schrecongost in Support of Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Strike filed on or about August 24, 2007 
Third Party Defendant Canyon County's First Amended 
Pre-Trial Statement (8/29/2008) 
Third Party Defendant Canyon County's Third Amended 
Pre-Trial Statement (10/3/2008) 
Plaintiff/Respondent's Request for Additional Record - Page 2 
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,_, 
Third Party Defendant Canyon County's Fourth Amended 
Pre-Trial Statement (10/6/2008) 
Third Party Defendant Canyon County's Fifth Amended 
Pre-Trial Statement (1017 /2008) 
Order Denying Defendant Piercy's [sic] Motion for 
Summary Judgment, joining Canyon County, 
and Holding all Other Motions in Abeyance 
Until the Herd District's Validity is Resolved, 
filed on or about October 9, 2007 
Notice of Hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider, 
filed on or about November 8, 2007 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider, 
filed on or about November 8, 2007 
Defendant Jennifer Sutton's Response and Joinder in 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider, filed on or 
about November 28, 2007 
Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider, filed on or about 
March 27, 2008 
Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Reconsideration, filed on or about 
April 21, 2008 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Piercy's 
Motion to Reconsider, filed on or about 
August 27, 2008 
Order Denying Defendant Piercy' s Motion to Reconsider, 
filed on or about September 23, 2008 
Defendant Sutton's Post-Trial Memorandum, filed on or 
about December 2, 2008 
Joint Exhibit #1, black and white map of herd districts 
Joint Exhibit #2, a geographical representation of herd 
districts (in color) that are of record in the County 
Recorder's Office 
Plaintiff/Respondent's Request for Additional Record - Page 3 
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Joint Exhibit #3, Canyon County Commissioner's Minutes, 
designated by book and page numbers listed on 
Joint Exhibit #2, which are herd district descriptions 
Joint Exhibit #4, Canyon County Commissioner's Minutes 
of December 10, 1982 
Joint Exhibit #5, Canyon County Commissioner's Minutes 
of December 2, 1982 
Joint Exhibit #6, Idaho Code§§ 25-2401, 25-2402 
Joint Exhibit #7, Canyon County Commissioner's Minutes 
regarding the approval of the minutes for fiscal 
term of December 1982 
Joint Exhibit #11, published notice of hearing on herd 
district 
Joint Exhibit #A-2, copies from the Parma Review 
Joint Exhibit #A-3, copies from the Idaho Press Tribune 
Defendant's Exhibit #A-1, compilation of herd districts 
Defendant's Exhibit #C-1, a map of the area 
Plaintiff's Exhibit #1, Canyon Herald Newspapers 
(Mr. Kosterman's notes 
The deposition of William H. Hurst and any and all 
exhibits attached thereto 
The deposition of Leon K. Jensen and any and all 
exhibits attached thereto 
The deposition of E. G. Johnson and any and all 
exhibits attached thereto 
The deposition of Glenn Koch and any and all 
exhibits attached thereto 
The deposition of Linda Landis and any and all 
exhibits attached thereto 
Plaintiff/Respondent's Request for Additional Record - Page 4 
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.. 
The deposition of Monica Reeves and any and all 
exhibits attached thereto 
The deposition of Bill Staker and any and all 
exhibits attached thereto 
The deposition of Dale Piercy and any and all 
exhibits attached thereto 
Defendant Jennifer Sutton's Notice of Appeal (3/4/2009) 
4. I certify that a copy of this request was served upon the following court reporter: 
Yvonne Hyde Gier 
3902 Rushmore Way 
Boise, ID 83709 
and upon the Clerk of the Third Judicial District Court and upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20 (and upon the attorney general ofldaho pursuant to Section 67-1401(1), 
Idaho Code.). £ f-
Dated this J../day of March, 2012. 
/ -
CHASAN & rTON, L.L.C. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on thi~ /S<tay of March, 2012, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing PLAINTIFF/CROSS-APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL 
RECORD/TRANSCRIPT was served upon each of the following: 
Rodney R. Saetrum 
Ryan Peck 
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES 
P. 0. Box 7425 
Boise, ID 83707 
Phone No: 336-0484 
By Fax: 336-0448 
Joshua S. Evett 
Elam & Burke, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701-1539 
Phone No: 343-5454 
By Fax: 384-5844 
Carlton R. Ericson 
Canyon County Deputy Prosecutor's Office 
1115 Albany St. 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
Phone No.: 454-7391 
By Fax: 455-5955 
Attorney for Canyon County 
VIA: /First Class Mail Facsimile Transmission 
Plaintiff/Respondent's Request for Additional Record - Page 6 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
LUIS JESUS GUZMAN, individually, 
Plaintiff-Defendant-Respondent-
Cross Appellant, 
-vs-
DALE PIERCY, individually, 
Defendant-Plaintiff-Appellant-
Cross Respondent, 
-vs-
CANYON COUNTY, 
Defendant-Respondent, 
And 
JENNIFER L. SUTTON, individually, 
Defendant-Respondent-
Cross Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-05-04848*C 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that the following 
are being sent as exhibits as requested from the Court Trial on 10-8-08: 
Joint Exhibits: 
1 Map Admitted Sent 
2 Colored Map Admitted Sent 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
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3-4 Commissioners Minutes Admitted Sent 
5 Resolution Admitted Sent 
6 Signatures of Parties Admitted Sent 
7 Order Admitted Sent 
8 Minutes Admitted Sent 
9 Vote Results Admitted Sent 
10 Notice in Paper Admitted Sent 
11 Notice in Paper Admitted Sent 
Plaintiffs Exhibit: 
1 Notes from Newspapers Admitted Sent 
Defendant's (Canyon County) Exhibit: 
C-1 Map Admitted Sent 
Defendant's (Piercy) Exhibits: 
A-1 Map Admitted Sent 
A-2 Copies-Parma Review Admitted Sent 
A-3 Copies-ID Press Tribune Admitted Sent 
Also being sent as exhibits were the Depositions requested of the following, 
however, they were not offered or admitted: 
William H. Hurst 
E.G. Johnson 
Linda Landis 
Bill Staker 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
Leon K. Jensen 
Glenn Koch 
Monica Reeves 
Dale Piercy 
Also being sent as an exhibit is the following: 
CD (Exhibit as attached to Affidavit of Dawn McClure, 
filed on 7-31-07) 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this ___ day 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
CHRISY AMAMOTO, Clerk of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, 
in and the County of Canyon. 
By: Deputy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
LUIS JESUS GUZMAN, individually, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Defendant-Respondent- ) 
Cross Appellant, ) 
) Case No. CV-05-04848*C 
-vs- ) 
) CERTIFICATE OF CLERK 
DALE PIERCY, individually, ) 
) 
Defendant-Plaintiff-Appellant- ) 
Cross Respondent, ) 
) 
-vs- ) 
) 
CANYON COUNTY, ) 
) 
Defendant-Respondent, ) 
And ) 
) 
JENNIFER L. SUTTON, individually, ) 
) 
Defendant-Respondent- ) 
Cross Appellant. ) 
I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that the above and 
foregoing Record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound under my 
direction as, and is a true, full correct Record of the pleadings and documents under 
Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, including documents requested. 
CERTIFICATE OF CLERK 
1462 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this -~-day 
CERTIFICATE OF CLERK 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, 
m the County of Canyon. 
By: Deputy 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
LUIS JESUS GUZMAN, individually, 
Plaintiff-Defendant-Respondent-
Cross Appellant, 
-vs-
DALE PIERCY, individually, 
Defendant-Plaintiff-Appellant-
Cross Respondent, 
-vs-
CANYON COUNTY, 
Defendant-Respondent, 
And 
JENNIFER L. SUTTON, individually, 
Defendant-Respondent-
Cross Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Supreme Court No. 39708-2012 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or had delivered by United State's mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the 
Clerk's Record and one copy of the Reporter's Transcript to the attorney of record to each 
Party as follows: 
Rodney R. Saetrum and Ryan B. Peck, SAETRUM LAW OFFICES 
Joshua S. Evett and Meghan Sullivan Conrad, ELAM & BURKE, PA 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, 
in and County of Canyon. 
By: Deputy 
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